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Resume
The evidence shows that the government knew that the Contras’ decided 
to traffic cocaine to finance themselves. The government participated in 
the drug trafficking by not interrupting it. CIA ordered the Contras to 
traffic drugs. Traffickers were protected from prosecution and received 
government contract.  The government  knew and sanctioned the drug 
trafficking into the US to support the Contras. The White House urged 
lenience for at least one convicted trafficker and terrorist.
The Issue and the Problem
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) protected major drug traffickers, who 
diverted drug proceeds to finance the Contras. When former Contra mer-
cenaries accused the CIA run Contras of being involved in drug traffick-
ing the  Senate started to investigate1.  Confidential memos and papers 
were leaked to the State Department, the Justice Department, the White 
House and CIA, who in a joined effort tried to sabotage the investigation. 
Documents were withheld, witnesses labelled as terrorist threats and put 
under surveillance, and the credibility of the Senatorial subcommittee’s 
members was questioned in the press. The conclusion of the investiga-
tion was that CIA had allowed the Contras to traffic cocaine and had pro-
tected them from prosecution. The conclusion went unnoticed in the me-
dia. When the drug connection came to the media’s attention a decade 
later, they focused on how the media covered the news2, not news that 
the government had sanctioned drug trafficking. It were three small art-
icles in San Jose Mercury News that sparked it all, and caused the Senate 
to  force  DOJ  and CIA to  investigate.  When the  official  investigations 
were finished two years later and the reports release, the media’s atten-
1 Kerry 1989a, 1989b
2 San Jose Mercury News, 18, 19 & 20 August 1996
tion had turned to Monica Lewinsky affair. All the reporters did was to 
quote from the conclusions of the reports3. The mainstream media repor-
ted that the US Government had not sanctioned drug trafficking, but the 
media  missed the  scoop.  The  reports  confirmed  that  the  government 
knew about the Contras involvement in drug trafficking, that the govern-
ment protected traffickers from prosecution, that the government gran-
ted contracts to trafficker whom they knew were drug trafficker, and that 
the Contras in part was funded by drug proceeds. The conclusions in the 
official reports denied what their reports confirmed.
What evidence does exists, which shows that the government knew 
about and was involvement in the Contras’ drugs trafficking?
This is the report about the evidence.
Literature and Methodology
The problem steamed from Congress’  ban in 1982 on for  funding the 
Contras. The President wanted the Contras kept alive until the Congress’ 
decision could be reversed. The ban on funding and aiding the Contras 
was known as the Boland Amendment after the Congressmen who pro-
posed it. As the ban barred CIA from running the Contras, the operation 
was  transferred  to  the  National  Security  Council  (NSC)  in  the  White 
House where Lt. Col. Oliver North was put in charge of the program. 
CIA and the Department of Defence (DOD) continued to provide intelli-
gence, which North passed on to the Contras. It would be almost im-
possible to prove that information was passed on. Funding the Contras 
was the hard part as funds had to come from somewhere. Therefore the 
3 CIA 1998a, 
CIA 1998b
DOJ 1998
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White House solicited funds from third part countries in return for polit-
ical favours or increased aid. This was illegal but hard to prove. The Iran-
Contra affair was two different affairs intermingled together. The scope 
of the Iran-Contra affair is too large for one person to describe, and for 
this reason my focus is on the cocaine issue. There are a few manuscripts, 
which deals with the issue:
• Report of Investigation by the CIA
• The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy by the DOJ
• The Kerry Report by the US Senate
• Dark Alliance by Gary Webb
• The Cocaine-Contra Connection by National Security Archives
• Cocaine Politics by Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall
• Powderburns by Celerino Castillo
Cocaine Politics is the only academic book that deals the Contras’ cocaine 
connection. The other five required academic works all have a broad fo-
cus on issues surrounding my focus. I lacked the space to include all the 
material  that  I  wanted to include,  and posed with the chose between 
presenting the required, but not directly relevant, academic works or ma-
terial that is directly relevant, I have moved the description of the five 
academic works to the description of studies.
An article series in San Jose Mercury News called Dark Alliance4 was the 
direct cause for two government investigations. Later articles were elab-
orated and published as a book with the same title5. When the Dark Alli-
ance series was published, ten years had passed since the US financed 
Contra operation ended. It was not the first time that rumours surfaced 
4 San Jose Mercury News, 18, 19 & 20 August 1996
5 Webb, 1998
about the Contras’ involvement in cocaine trafficking. Eleven years earli-
er Associated Press reported that the Contras where engaged in cocaine 
trafficking in part to finance their war6. The administration disapproved 
the story so much that they began a clandestine campaign to besmirch 
the professionalism of the two reporters and tried to discredit all future 
reporting on the Contras’ cocaine involvement7. The media coverage of 
the Dark Alliance series concern the author’s alleged lack of professional-
ism and conspiracy tendencies, and did not cover the affair itself. Criti-
cism of Webb was furious and it was hard to find a positive word about 
him on the Internet until after he committed suicide in December 2004 by 
shooting himself twice in the head. The coverage of Webb changed. Now 
not a single negative word about him can be found. No longer is he the 
unprofessional conspiracy freak, but a hard working and honest journal-
ist whose career was destroyed by the mainstream media8.
The Dark Alliance series  focused on the US Government’s  connection 
with the Contras’ cocaine trafficking9. The articles described the connec-
tion between three major and known cocaine dealers in California. Ricky 
Ross  was  known  as  Freeway Ricky  who  was  the  biggest  supplier  of 
crack-cocaine to Los Angeles’ gangs the early 1980s. Ross became import-
ant for the gangs in Los Angeles as they without him would have lacked 
the means to finance themselves and their weapons through the sale of 
cheap crack-cocaine. Ross’ cocaine career ended when his cocaine suppli-
er helped the narcotics police catch him with one kilo cocaine. Ross’ co-
caine supplier was the exile-Nicaraguan Danilo Blandón, who worked 
for the drug lord Norwin Meneses; another exile-Nicaraguan. Both had 
6 Peter Kornbluh, 1997
Cockburn 1999, 300ff
7 Peter Kornbluh, 1997.
8 Extra, Are You Sure You Want to Ruin Your Career? Marts/April 1998.
9 For a brief introduction to Dark Alliance see NBC’s Dateline story on the Cocaine-Contra Connection
http://www.americandrugwar.com/media/links/ricky_ross_bg.ram
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been well connected to the old regime in Nicaragua, and both had to flee 
the country after the 1979 revolution. US law enforcement knew them 
both. Meneses was described as the kingpin of drug- and gun trafficking 
in Nicaragua in DEA file, which was first opened in 1974. Blandón was 
implicated in 45 federal investigations10.
The Dark Alliance articles described how Blandón met Meneses, was in-
troduced to an old childhood friend of Meneses Enrique Bermúdez, who 
became  the  first  leader  of  the  Contras.  The  articles  described  how 
Blandón met Ross and became his cocaine supplier. The article showed 
how cocaine from the Contras went into the US and how money made it 
back to the Contras. Meneses and Blandón were described as members of 
the CIA run Contras, and its leaders as CIA operatives. The point that 
Blandón  and  Meneses  were  members  of  the  Contras  was  not  docu-
mented in the news articles, but circumstantial evidence does support 
the claim. The articles claimed, based on interviews with police officers, 
that the CIA had hindered law enforcement from investigating drug traf-
ficking offences by Meneses’ network11. The series had no literature refer-
ences  but  the  book  has.  It  shows  that  the  articles  were  based  on 
courtroom transcripts  and affidavits  by  law enforcement  officers.  The 
book uses the CIA and DOJ reports too, which were the direct result of 
the articles’ allegations. The book also makes use interviews with police 
officers in Central America and the US, members of the former Contra 
drug ring, and documents from the Iran-Contra investigation.
Both official reports explained that mistakes had occurred, but no crimes 
had been committed. It is custom not to give political asylum to people 
suspected of drug related crimes, but Meneses had been granted asylum 
10 CIA 1998, paragraph 98
11 Webb 1998
by mistake. It was a mistake that CIA intervene in a drug trafficking case, 
with links to the Contras and Meneses, and had the prosecution return 
drug money to a convicted trafficker12. It was a mistake that the arrest or-
der for Meneses was no issued until five year after he left  the US for 
Costa Rica. The arrest order charged Meneses with distributing one kilo 
cocaine; not even a pro cent of what he had imported and sold in the US. 
It was not a mistake according to the DOJ report that evidence against 
Blandón and Lister, an arms dealer that worked for Blandón and Me-
neses, was handed back while the investigation again them was ongoing. 
How the DOJ can claim it not to be an mistake is untenable. But it was 
not only CIA and DOJ who had committed mistake, so to had the State 
Department when it selected four known drug trafficking companies as 
contractors for the Contras. The State Department forgot to check if the 
companies that CIA had suggested were known for drug trafficking13. It 
was a mistake that DEA closed its office in Honduras after documenting 
that  the military leadership and the chief of  the narcotics police,  who 
both were instrumental in setting up the Contras, had either trafficked 
drugs or protection drug shipments14. It was a mistake that DEA facilit-
ated contact between CIA and a known drug traffickers, so CIA could 
buy two shrimp boats the trafficker had used to smuggle cocaine in to 
the US with.  It  was bad judgement that  the President and the White 
House tried to get the drug trafficking terrorist Bueso Rosa off, who had 
been vital in keeping the Contras running when he was a General in 
Honduras15. It was a lie the report stated when traffickers claimed that 
CIA knew about their trafficking and protected them. If the reports are 
true when must be the political affair were the most mistakes were made 
ever.
12 CIA 1998a, paragraph 341
DOJ 1998, Summery 8
13 Kerry 1989, 42-48
14 Kerry 1989, 75
15 National Security Archive, The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations
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Ten years earlier, during the Contra operation, the US Senate begun in-
vestigating the same claims that the Dark Alliance series later came for-
ward with. The Senate report was titled “Drugs, Law Enforcement and For-
eign Policy, A report prepared by the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics  
and International  Operations of  the  Committee on Foreign Relations  United  
States Senate”. Due to its long name it is often referred to as the Kerry re-
port after Senator John Kerry who chair the investigating subcommittee. 
The investigation took three years and totalled a more than thousand 
pages of Congressional Subcommittee Hearings. This report is the most 
interesting of the reports for an initial reading. The original scoop of the 
Senatorial investigation was the Contras’ alleged cocaine trafficking, but 
because of  the amount of  evidence that  the committee was presented 
with, the investigation was expanded to focus on the impact of drugs 
trafficking on US foreign policy in Latin America. The subcommittee’s 
finding was discredited but later the Bush administration used it to pro-
secute  several  criminal  trials,  including  the  successful  prosecution  of 
Gen. Manuel Noriega16.
In response to the allegation raised by the Dark Alliance series, the CIA 
conducted an investigation of itself and published on its findings titled 
“Report  of  Investigation,  Allegations  of  Connections  Between  CIA and The  
Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the US”. The CIA report consisted of two 
volumes,  the  first  volume17 was  issued  as  a  classified  report  on  17 
December 1997 with an unclassified version issued on 29 January 1998. 
The second volume18 was issued as a classified report on 27 April 1998 
and published in an unclassified version on 8 October 1998. The layout of 
16 Kerry 1989a, 5
17 CIA 1998a
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/cocaine/report/index.html
18 CIA 1998b
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/cocaine/index.html
the report was highly confusing and illogical and the conclusion differed 
from the content of their report. According to the report, 17 full-time staff 
worked a little over a year on the report, questioned 365 unnamed indi-
viduals and read roughly a quarter of a million pages. The methodology 
used is rather odd as the CIA in their conclusion copied part of Meneses’ 
testimony and quotes  it  as  evidence for  that  there was no connection 
between Meneses-Blandón-Ross and the Contras. This is done without 
informing the reader that the conclusion is based on the testimony of Me-
neses where he denies any connection between CIA and himself. Further 
CIA forgot to mention that Meneses was suspected of working for CIA. 
The  report  is  biased.  The  resume  in  the  report  cleared  CIA  for  any 
wrongdoing and denied that CIA had any knowledge of ongoing narcot-
ics violations. Nonetheless, the CIA report does contain several quite in-
teresting paragraphs that does not support their conclusion. It contains 
information about the memorandum of understanding (MOU) for when 
the CIA must report narcotics crimes to DEA. From 1981 to 1995 CIA was 
not obligated to report knowledge of narcotics violations to DEA, unless 
it concerned its own agents19. However there is several categories of em-
ployment in the CIA such as contractors, informers, assets, etc. that are 
not considered agents – and according to CIA’s report agents working in 
a operative environment would not be considered agents for the purpose 
of reporting knowledge of drug trafficking. Narcotics violations by these 
groups do not have to be reported to the DEA. Three quite interesting 
omissions that CIA made in its report were who they interviewed, who 
refused to  be  interviewed and that  CIA’s  Office  of  Inspector  General 
(OIG) lacked subpoena power. Duane Clarridge, Joseph Fernandez, and 
Clair George were all central persons in the Contra affair, and they re-
fused to be interviewed by CIA’s OIG.
19 Waters, 1999b
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The DOJ conducted an investigation and subsequently published a re-
port on their findings. But contrary to the CIA investigation they were 
not concerned with whenever CIA had knowledge of Contra drug traf-
ficking or whenever the Kerry subcommittee’s conclusion was correct, 
but if the allegations raised in the Dark Alliance series were correct. The 
DOJ conducted over 200 interviews, but some central characters refused 
to  talk  to  the DOJ.  This  included the  former  DEA country  attaché in 
Costa Rica, Robert Nieves, a country where the Contras were heavily in-
volved in drug trafficking according to former CIA Central American 
task force chief  Alan Fiers,  who took over  the Contra  operation after 
Duane Clarridge. Fernandez and North refused to be interviewed20. Since 
DOJ’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) did not have the power to com-
pel non-government witnesses to testify, it created “significant gap in the  
evidence-gathering  abilities”21.  The  DOJ  report  has  a  good  overview  of 
some of the central persons such as Meneses, Blandón, Ricky Ross and 
Ronald Lister. Besides these persons that were central to the Dark Alli-
ance story, the articles touched on an earlier story known as the Frogman 
case. Here the DOJ contained a nice overview of the two central persons 
Julio Zavala and Carlos Cabezas. Like the CIA report, the DOJ’s method-
ology seemed odd as its  conclusions differed from its contents.  DOJ’s 
conclusion was that there was nothing to Webb’s article, but the report 
also stated that the article was exaggerated. How can an article be exag-
gerated if there is nothing to its allegations? As with CIA’s report the 
scoop is not in the conclusion but in the chapters between the introduc-
tion and conclusion. DOJ admitted that a minor amount of drug money 
was given to the Contras, but they also admit they do not know how 
much drug money was given, which means the DOJ has no basis for as-
suming that it was a minor and not a major amount drug money that 
20 DOJ 1998, chapter 2.G
21 DOJ 1998, chapter 2.G
found its way into the Contras treasury. The three official reports, the 
Kerry, the CIA and the DOJ reports all had access to classified informa-
tion  that  was  filtered  out  in  the  final  public  release.  The  difference 
between them is that whereas the CIA and DOJ reports’ conclusions are 
that the allegations in the Dark Alliance series are wrong, the Kerry re-
port’s conclusion was that the US Government agencies knew and chose 
to overlook crimes of their allies in return for their cooperation for what 
was perceived as vital US interest: the destruction of the Sandinistas.
The focus of Cocaine Politics22  was CIA’s cooperation in the 1980s with 
traffickers and drug-corrupted regimes in the Americas. To support its 
argument Cocaine Politics drew a parallel from 1940s, when CIA cooper-
ated with the Mafia in Marseilles, the French connection, through to the 
1950s, 1960s and 1970s when CIA collaborated with opium smugglers 
and drug corrupted regimes in Asia. It continued with the cooperation 
with Afghan and Pakistani heroin smugglers when the Reagan Adminis-
tration supported the Mujahedin during the Afghan war. Cocaine Polit-
ics’ subject was not the Contras per se, but the cooperation and joint in-
terest  between  drug  traffickers  and  the  CIA  during  the  1980s  in  the 
Americas. By tracing the connection between individual drug traffickers 
and the corporation with the CIA, Peter Dale Scott painted a powerful 
and credible picture of joint interest and close corporation between drug 
traffickers and CIA from the 1940s to the Nicaraguan conflict. A lot of the 
stated facts in Cocaine Politics are based on the Kerry Report23. 
Powder Burns is written the former DEA agent Celerino Castillo, who 
worked in Guatemala and El Salvador between 1985-1990. He uncovered 
parts of the Contras’ cocaine trafficking operation, and forwarded his re-
22 Scott 1998
23 Kerry 1989
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ports to DEA. Nothing happening to the traffickers. Castillo came under 
a internal DEA investigation. He eventually retired on medical grounds, 
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. Powder Burns is very in-
teresting, and has lot of references to both the Contras and cocaine. The 
draw back is that Castillo seemed to a too quick to draw some of the con-
clusions.  He believed that Vice President Bush knew that the Contras 
were run with cocaine money; a conclusion he bases on his intuition after 
a short meeting with George Bush. Intuition is not acceptable as scientific 
and historical proof, but there are certain links that could potential im-
plement Bush in the affair. Bush’s friend, the former CIA agent and exile-
Cuban, Felix Rodriguez, was in charge of the Contra operations at Ilo-
pango airbase. The Vice President’s office is mention in the Kerry report 
for helping a drug trafficker, and the Vice President chaired the crisis 
group in the White House that was in charge of handling the Contras 
and terrorism24. There are links to the White House and the Vice Presid-
ent. Castillo’s intuition could be right, but more research is need to dis-
prove or prove George Bush’s involvement, not intuition.
Latin American names follows another tradition. The mother’s last name 
is added after the family name, so the family name became the second 
last name when the full name is written. Take for example the Somoza 
dictatorship in  Nicaragua.  Their  father  was named Anastasio  Somoza 
García, the son Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Somoza is the last name, Gar-
cía and Debayle is the last names of their mothers. I have used the Eng-
lish tradition and refer to people without the name of the mother added, 
and with just one first name. The full name of the notorious drug dealer 
Norwin Meneses was Juan Norwin Meneses Centarero. I refer to him as 
Norwin Meneses.
24 Castillo 1994, 126
CIA 1998b, paragraph 1064
What surprised me the most about Nicaragua during the 1980s was that 
there were not many books on Nicaragua and Contras available at Dan-
ish  Royal  Library.  The  entire  collection  on  Nicaragua  consists  of  124 
books, which had been published between 1971 and 2003, including all 
categories and subjects. Typically these books seemed politically motiv-
ated,  as  they  tended  to  focus  on  the  desire  and  positive  side  of  the 
Sandinistas policies in Nicaragua. International relations between the US 
and Nicaragua were even less documented in the library. In all there ex-
isted 35 books on US-Latin American relations and 7 on US-Nicaragua. 
Two books the collection concerned narcotics politics and foreign rela-
tions with Latin American. None concerned illegal drug trafficking. CIA 
and the Contras’ cocaine connect was mentioned in six sentences in the 
two book. The political research seldom mentioned the cocaine issue, it is 
for some reason not a research subject.
The cocaine oriented literature, unlike the political literature, involves a 
great deal of names, places and connections. This made it less readable as 
you had to have a certain amount of knowledge regarding a network of 
people. In between the drug network literature and the political ones, we 
have Scott25 and Cockburn26. These books put drug trafficking into a lar-
ger picture, like the Kerry report did. We have in these books and re-
ports,  what  looks like a  systematic  connection between the  drug and 
politics stretching from the mid-1940s till mid-1990s. Due to the criminal 
nature of drug trafficking where records are not public available,  you 
have to rely on the accessible literature. In the case of the Contras’ co-
caine affair the sources are Webb, Kerry, and Castillo. The two govern-
ment reports are blatant and failed exercises in white wash. The reports 
25 Scott 1998
26 Cockburn 1999
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confirms that the government cooperated with known large-scale traf-
fickers whom support to the Contras.
Amazon and Google were been extremely useful in locating literature on 
the subject. Google was great in locating official US documents, the CIA 
report, the DOJ report, the Kerry report, and various other documents re-
lating to the subject. I have found Amazon information on what other 
books their customers have bought quite useful. It is a different way of 
categorising books than traditional done by the libraries, but once you 
located one book within the subject,  finding other books on the same 
subject  became easy as  we consumers apparently  tends to buy books 
within the subjects that interest us. Once located I have been able to find 
all books in the collective library base at http://www.bibliotek.dk/. Rely-
ing on Internet sources can of course be problematic as tampering can be 
done quite easy. Therefore I have tried to locate documents on govern-
ment servers. The Kerry report is not available on governmental servers, 
but  parts of  it  can be found at  http://www.thememoryhole.org/kerry/. 
When again, the mainstream media coverage of the affair shows that you 
can not trust a source because its publisher is well known27.
The difference between the government reports and the independent re-
search is the ability to be critical. CIA and DOJ believes all statements to 
be true if  they fit  into a conclusion that  denied the allegations.  CIA's 
claims, that Meneses and Blandón were not associated with the Contras 
and did not funnel cocaine proceeds to the the Contras, is based on their 
statements. The conclusion is that the Contras wasn't financed with drug 
proceeds because the drug dealers told CIA that they did not do it.  En-
rique Miranda who worked for Norwin Meneses told CIA that Meneses 
and Blandón donated millions of their cocaine proceeds to the Contras. 
27 Parry 1998
This is not true according to CIA because Miranda’s statement could not 
be collaborated. We are not told what Miranda’s statement could not be 
collaborated with. All statements made that does not fit into the conclu-
sion CIA have not been able to collaborated. Statements that fits into the 
conclusion have not be collaborated either; they have been defined as the 
truth. When CIA learned that the Contras’ had decided to use cocaine as 
a means of finance, the information was disregarded because CIA now 
believed that their informant was a communist double agent.
I have not used sources, which denies that the government was involved 
in the drug trafficking with the Contras. There are two exceptions, which 
are the CIA and DOJ reports. The reports contains explicit denials that 
the US Government was involved in the affair, or that the Contras were 
involved in organised drug trafficking. The reports are failed whitewash 
attempts, and contains enough information to prove that their conclu-
sions are wrong. I chosen not to wasted time or words on the denials in 
the reports, as most are incredible bad. The report is full interviews with 
CIA agents, who explains the Contras could not have been involved in 
drug trafficking, as the agents would have found out. No agents recall 
hearing about any drug allegations at all, which is rather odd as the re-
port is full of reference to CIA cables, which states that the Contras is en-
gaged in organised drug trafficking28. Whenever CIA’s agents are suffer-
ing from memory lose, forgot to read their own intelligence reports, or 
are deliberately lying we can not know. That CIA only employed agents 
who all forgot to read their intelligence reports and who all sufferes from 
bad memory is of cause an explanation, but a very bad one. Only one 
agent remember hearing about an airport, which would have been used 
for drug trafficking because of the very low level of security, but of cause 
he was unable to remember the name of the airport although he could re-
28 CIA 1998a, 1998b
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member that he only heard that is would have been possible, not that it 
did in fact happen. Since the crime in mention is a capital crime, it should 
be noted that if it is not stated that people admitted to the crimes, it is as-
sumed that they have denied any involvement. Government employees 
who worked with the Contras, and are explicit or implicit suspected of 
involvement, also denies involvement unless the contrary is stated.
United States and the Contras
There exists some confusion as to then Reagan issued the order to create 
the Contras but most sources agree on that it was Reagan that created the 
Contras and that he did so in Marts, April, November or December. In 
Whiteout Cockburn writes that is was Carter who ordered the initial or-
ganisation of the Contras using officers from Argentina’s death-squats29. 
Carter authorized the expenditure of $1 million in covert funds to foster 
an internal opposition in Nicaragua30, and there exist evidence that CIA 
and DOD was involved with the initial build up of the Contras during 
1980 i.e. before Reagan was either elected or sworn in. Somoza’s cousin 
Luis Pallais Debayle started making trips around the US to various exile 
groups in 1980 to see if anyone was interested in helping fighting So-
moza  back  into  power.  During  his  travels  Pallais  meet  with  Enrique 
Bermúdez and asked if  he was willing to lead the future resistance31. 
Bermúdez had been a high-ranking officer in the National Guard and 
was properly the National Guardsman with the best ties to the US mili-
tary and intelligence community, since he had served as Nicaragua’s liai-
son the US military in the late 1970s. He had been recommended by the 
US to head the National Guard in the final days of Somoza’s regime. 
When the regime collapsed Bermúdez started a new career as truck driv-
29 Cockburn 1999, 4
30 Walker 1987, 23
31 Webb 1998, 46
er in Washington DC. Before Bermúdez moved from Washington to Mia-
mi he was invited to Pentagon by Col. Charles G. Boyda to  “kick some 
ideas around”. These ideas concerned an armed rebellion in Nicaragua. 
Boyd told Bermúdez that he had a friend in the CIA who as interested in 
meeting him. In the summer of 1980 Bermúdez quit his job, moved to Mi-
ami, and started around travel in the US and Central America to measure 
the sentiment of the former guardsmen. Seemingly Bermúdez was living 
off the profits from the house sale in Washington, which financed his fre-
quent travel. There is no state time for the meeting between  Bermúdez 
and Somoza’s cousin, but we can assume that the meeting took place be-
fore mid-1980, since  Bermúdez by mid-1980 had moved to Miami and 
begun  to  make  contract  to  various  pro-Somoza  groups.  Shortly  after 
Bermúdez moved to Guatemala and became the military leader of the 
Legion  of  September  15.  According to  another  account,  Webb writes, 
Bermúdez was on the CIA payroll by then, and as it was CIA that put 
Bermúdez in contract with and in charge of the Legion of September 15 
in Guatemala this seems plausible. The Legion consisted of former Na-
tional Guard officers,  who had established a safe house in Guatemala 
City where they trained on a farm close to the Honduras border. Either 
by historical coincidence or because of their CIA contacts, the farm they 
trained on was the same farm that CIA had used as headquarter in the 
Guatemalan coup in 1954. In the absence of an armed rebellion the Le-
gion turned to mercenary activities. In the trail of its crimes in Guatemala 
and Honduras the Legion left behind leftist political leaflets, thereby in-
sinuating  that  leftists  guerrillas  were  behind  the  crimes.  One  of  the 
crimes that the Legion was hired to do, was the killing of El Salvador’s 
a According to Webb Bermúdez was invited to Pentagon by “Mayor General Charles E. Boyd, a top U.S. Air Force 
official”. I believe that Gary Webb have made a typo and thereby confused a G with an E and thereby making 
Charles G. Boyd into Charles E. Boyd. In 1980 when Bermúdez was invited to Pentagon, Charles G. Boyd was still a 
Colonel; he was first promoted brigadier general in April 1985 and became mayor general in November 1987. This 
contradicts Webb’s indication that Bermúdez was invited by a Mayor General to Pentagon. However in 1980, the 
then Colonel Charles G. Boyd, served as chief, Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate of Plans, Headquarters 
U.S. Air Force, Washington DC, which is exactly the right employment position for the meeting to make sense.
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archbishop Oscar Romero. Because of his interest in the country’s disap-
pearing prisoners Romero meet with his God after being hit by a single 
bullet in his head as he was holding mess 24 March 198032. The skills they 
had learned during the repression in Nicaragua were used to generate 
their income as hired guns or in self employed hits. This was the Legion 
that  Bermúdez became leader for before it  moved to Honduras in the 
spring of 198133.
As the hawks took charge of the Nicaraguan politics in the Reagan ad-
ministration, Carter’s politics was viewed as insufficient, and in Marts 
CIA was ordered to begin a covert operation program in Nicaragua. The 
budget  was  increased  from  $1  million  to  $19.5  million.  Officially  the 
money was to be used to interdict the arms flow from Nicaragua into El 
Salvador34. CIA started to make contact with various anti-Sandinista ex-
iles in Miami and Central America, and US envoy Vernon Walters was 
dispatch  to  ensure  the  support  of  Argentine,  Honduras  and  Central 
American governments. In May CIA gave military intelligence officers in 
Argentina $50.000 to funnel on to the Contras as an incentive to unite35. A 
month earlier Bermúdez and Hamrick had visited Argentina, where Ber-
múdez received an initial payment from the Argentinian military. Ham-
rick introduced Bermúdez to an aid to Senator Jesse Helms and members 
of Argentine’s militarily intelligence36. According to Scott Bermúdez was 
given $50.000 in seed money before he left37, but Webb claims that  Ber-
múdez had attended the meet together with the representatives of UDN, 
an other emerging Contra group, and that  Bermúdez got $30.000 and 
32 Webb 1998, 47
33 Webb 1998, 49
34 Walker 1987, 23
North 1992, 262
35 Walker 1987, 24
36 Scott 1998, 48
37 Scott 1998, 48
UDN’s representative William Baltodano received $50.00038.
During Bermúdez’s first meeting with the Argentinians in Buenos Aires 
at the Latin American Anti-Communist Confederation (CAL) conference 
in 1980 they had displayed sympathy but did not donate a nickel. Instead 
they offered Bermúdez a deal. If Bermúdez and the Legion were serious 
about fighting communism, then they should prove themselves by tak-
ing out a left wing radio station in Costa Rica that the Argentinians had 
attempted to bomb with napalm but failed.  Bermúdez agreed. The Le-
gion met at John Hull’s farm in Costa Rica before raiding the radio sta-
tion39.  When the  Legion  raided the  radio  station  they  were  met  with 
heavy machine gun fire. The radio station had beefed up it is security 
after the attempted napalm bombing. The Legionaries managed to throw 
a Molotov cocktail at storage shed that did not cause any major dam-
aged, contrary to the fortified radio station’s machine gun fire, which in-
flicted heavy casualties on the legionaries before the survivors were ar-
rested by Costa Rican police40.
In  August  1981 CIA’s  Director  William Casey appointed Duane Clar-
ridge Chief of Latin American Operations i.e. chief of the Contra opera-
tion41. Clarridge went Honduras twice that month and visited president 
Paz, Col. Torres-Arias and Col. Guastavo Alvarez Martinez. Alvarez who 
was chief of police was trained in Argentina like most of Honduras’ po-
lice had been. The promotion of the Alvarez to general and chief of staff 
in 1982 did not change the regime’s involvement in drug trafficking. Cor-
ruption and drug trafficking kept flourishing while Alvarez was the de 
facto leader of the country42. In Honduras relation between the military 
38 Webb 1998, 68
39 Webb 1998, 212
40 Webb 1998, 68
41 Walker 1987, 24
42 Scott 1998, 51
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and drug trafficking was not unknown. In a coup in August 1978 Gen. 
Policarpo Paz Garcia was brought to power with drug money. Around 
the same time as the coup the DEA had learned that the coup was fin-
anced by Juan Matta Ballesteros, who was well known to the DEA. Matta 
had been arrested at Dulles International Airport with 20 kilos cocaine in 
1970. That arrest earned Matta a mark in DEA’s file as a major trafficker. 
In 1973 DEA had tried to entrap him but had failed. By 1975 DEA Matta 
was classified as the supplier to the Mexican kingpin Miguel Felix Gal-
lardo, whom Matta had been introduced to by his Colombian and Per-
uvian contacts. Matta was one of the bigger traffickers in Central Amer-
ica during the 1970s. Matta worked with the Cali cartel to smuggle co-
caine from Peru to the US west coast, whereas the Florida market was 
controlled by the Medellín cartel43.  Before the coup Honduras was the 
transit point for an estimated half billion dollars a year worth in drugs. 
Under Gen. Paz rule Matta expanded the cocaine trafficking industry in 
Honduras. Beside Paz Matta’s most important contact was the head of 
the  military  intelligence  Col.  Leonides  Torres-Arias.  In  the  mid-1970s 
Standard Fruit, a US company, were aided by the army in taking over 
peasants business, set up on the land that the company had abandoned 
in 1974. The army commander, who directed these attacks and was paid 
by Standard Fruit, was Torres-Arias. Several of the successors to Torres-
Arias as head of the military intelligence, were reported to have connec-
tion to drug trafficking; one of them was later appointed head of the new 
anti-drug enforcement unit in the armed forces44. After the coup in 1978 
Carter tripled economical aid to Honduras making it the largest receiver 
of aid in Central America by 1980. Due to the growing importance of 
Honduras as a trafficking centre, DEA opened an office in Honduras in 
1981.  In  less  than two years  DEA was  able  to  document  that  Torres-
43 Scott 1998, 55, 79, 99
CIA 1998b, Paragraph 613
44 Scott 1998, 54-56
Arias, Matta and other senior officers were involved in large scale drug 
trafficking operation. In 1983 DEA closed down its station in Honduras. 
The office in Honduras had only make a few arrests, but it had generated 
substantial amounts of intelligence. DEA had documented that the Hon-
duran political-military establishment had trafficked at least 50 tons of 
cocaine. Same year as DEA closed its office CIA’s doubled in size45. One 
of Alvarez’s most trusted men Gen. Jose Bueso Rosa was put in charge of 
Honduras day to day handling and management of the Contras. Later 
Bueso Rosa would become the main suspect in most significant case of 
narcoterrorism in  the  US at  that  time46.  Clarridge visited  Honduras  a 
second time in August with the Argentinian vice chief of Argentine milit-
ary intelligence Col. Mario Davico. At this meeting Clarridge pledge US 
support for the Contra operation, and urged the Hondurans to cooperate 
with Argentina’s training and supply mission47.  With those guarantees 
Honduras was established as a sanctuary for the Contras in Honduras 
and became committed to the US-Argentinian Contra operation48. Same 
month the Argentine president Gen. Leopoldo visited Washington DC to 
confirm his country’s support for the Nicaraguan Contras49.
Fuerza Democrática  Nicaragüense  (FDN) was also  formed in  August. 
The Legion had moved to Honduras and merged with the Unión Demo-
crática Nicaragüense (UDN)50.  UDN had a better relationship with the 
government and military in Honduras, and at the time their organisation 
was  more  developed  in  organising  an  regional  opposition  to  the 
45 Scott 1998, 55f, 57
Kerry 1989a, 75
Democracynow, A Response to the Recent CIA-Crack Report, 5 February 1998
46 National Security Archive, The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations
47 Scott 1998, 48
48 Scott 1998, 55
49 Scott 1998, 49 & 55f
50 Webb 1998, 45
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Sandinistas.  UDN’s leader Fernando ‘El  Negro’ Chamorro had fought 
with the Sandinistas against Somoza, and gained immortality by firing a 
couple of rockets at Somoza bunker from the rooftop of the nearby hotel 
in 1974. After the revolution he broke with the Sandinistas and joined his 
brother in Costa Rica before they joined UDN. The Legion and Bermúdez 
symbolized all the bad things that Chamorro had fought against with the 
Sandinistas. UDN wanted nothing to do with the Legion, and for the le-
gionaries Chamorro was a closet communist.  In fact the groups hated 
each other. After the two meetings between Clarridge and Paz,  Torres-
Arias and Alvarez the Honduras withdrew their support of UDN and be-
gun supporting the Legion. Even though UDN had the best contact to 
Honduras  government,  they  needed  to  join  FDN  under  the  Legion’s 
command if they wanted to fight the Sandinistas. Helping the US would 
mean access to US aid, and if CIA wanted Honduras to support FDN and 
the Legion instead of UDN then that was how it would be51. The meeting 
were the groups united was held on 10 August 1981 in an upstairs room 
at the Legion’s safe house in Guatemala. CIA paid for the meeting, draf-
ted the agreement, named the organization and the members of the polit-
ical junta and general staff, and rented the building, according to testi-
mony given during trial at the International Court of Justice in Hague by 
a distant relative of the UDN leader Chamorro52. This explains why the 
Legion’s safe house in Guatemala was the same as had been used by CIA 
when they executed in coup in 195453. One of the members picked to help 
Bermúdez run the FDN was Aristides Sanchéz, Somoza’s last ambassad-
or to Guatemala and an old friend of Bermúdez and Meneses54.
In October Casey visited Gen. Leopoldo the head of Argentina’s military 
51 Webb 1998, 70
52 Webb 1998, 71
53 Webb 1998, 47
54 Webb 1998, 71
junta. The result was that 50 Contras were sent to Argentine for training 
and subsequently  became instructors  at  the FDN camps in  Honduras 
that the Argentinians had set up along with camps in Costa Rica and 
Panama. The Argentinians made their chief of army intelligence ambas-
sador to Panama to oversee the coordinating the operation, and they sta-
tioned officers  in  Miami to  take  contact  to  anti-Sandinistas  groups  in 
Florida55.  Among  the  Argentinians  were  a  member  of  Battalion  601 
Leandro  Sanchez,  who  was  in  charge  of  financing  and  currency  ex-
change, which included buying special equipment. Sanchez oversaw the 
finances  of  the  Argentina’s  special  task  force  in  Honduras,  were  he 
worked with North’s representative Robert Owen. Sanchez and his su-
perior Raul Guglielminetti had attended an intelligence course in the US 
in 1976. Guglielminetti had set up a pawnshop in Miami that was sold to 
an exile Cuban with connections to CIA. Sanchez was in charge of ad-
ministrating the business and its covert arms buying operation56. The US 
knew Argentina were commitment to the international anticommunist 
struggle, and if they had forgotten, they were reminded then US ambas-
sador Blystone meet with officers from Argentina’s intelligence service in 
the summer of 1980. He was briefed on the cooperation between Argen-
tina’s Battalion 601 and Peru’s military intelligence in apprehended four 
Argentinians in Peru. The press had arrived so quickly that they could 
not be moved secretly from Peru to Argentina. Instead they would be ex-
pelled to Bolivia and from there to Argentina, where they will be “inter-
rogated and permanently disappeared”57.  Blystone was told that Argentina 
had dispatched intelligence sources to “Panama, Costa Rica, Guatemala and 
El Salvador to analyse the situation and report back to 601”58. Before the US 
allied with Argentina and Honduras to support the Contras they knew 
55 Scott 1998, 49
56 Scott 1998, 49f
57 Blystone 1980
58 Blystone 1980
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about Argentina’s methods and Honduras involvement in drug traffick-
ing. As an US official was quoted for saying in Los Angeles Times “If we  
move against these guys on drugs, they can screw us on the Contras”59.
A US Government  group with Clarridge,  Gen.  Gorman and from the 
spring of 1982 also North was set up to oversee the Contra operation60. 
The  group created  contingency  plans  and  a  series  of  options  papers, 
which was presented to NSC in November61. Three CIA proposals also 
were presented at the NSC meeting. The first option was to continue fin-
ancial aid to the internal opposition in Nicaragua that had begun under 
Carter and was expanded by Reagan. The second option was to create a 
500 man command force of exile Cubans to attack Nicaragua’s economic-
al infrastructure. This Cuban exile force would enable the US to take ac-
tion against Cubans in Nicaragua. The third option, which was a supple-
ment to the second, was provide financial and logistical support for Ar-
gentina’s training of a 1000 man army to overthrow the Sandinistas62. 
CIA requested $19.95 million for initial funding of the Contra project, but 
more would be needed. On 23 November Reagan signed National Secur-
ity Decision Directive 17 ordering CIA to build a 500 men strong para-
military force, collaborate with the governments in the region, foster a 
broad opposition to the Sandinistas, assisting the Argentine with the cre-
ation of a larger 1000 men strong Contra force, and attack special Cuban 
targets  within Nicaragua63.  The  covert  operation  would  be  conducted 
through non American agents – the Unilaterally Controlled Latino Assets 
(UCLA). If they got caught CIA could claim that CIA wasn't involved. 
Under the law a Presidential Finding required that Congress be notified 
59 Scott 1998, 57
60 Walker 1987, 24
North 1992, 264
61 Walker 1987, 24
62 Walker 1985, 431f
63 Walker 1987, 24
Walker 1985, 432f
if  major  covert  operations  was  being  planned64.  1  December  Casey 
briefed the House and Senate’s Intelligence Committee, who raised con-
cerns about targeting Cubans in Nicaragua and restricted the paramilit-
ary operation to arms interdiction. On 2 December Reagan signed a Pres-
idential Finding were paramilitary operations was limited to arms inter-
diction and the aspect of targeting special Cuban targets in Nicaragua 
dropped65.
To shield CIA’s involvement an arrangement was worked out with Ar-
gentina and Honduras. Honduras would provide bases along the Nicara-
guan border from where the Contras would operate, Argentina would 
provide the training and military advisors, and CIA would pay the bills. 
In return both countries received increased economic and military aid66. 
But the Contras economic situation did not improve as would be expec-
ted. The Contras saw little of the $19.95 millions that Reagan approved. 
The funnelling of money through the Argentinians helped the Argentini-
ans maintain control over the Contras67.
They [the Argentinians] handled all the money. The Nicaraguans –  
from Bermúdez, needing several hundred dollars for the rent on the  
Tegucigalpa [Honduras’ capital]  safe  house,  to  a  foot  soldier  on  
leave in the capital, asking for a couple of bucks to see a movie – had  
to get it from the Argentines68.
While the Contras had to beg for every dollar Hector Frances, a former 
Argentinian advisor, described how they spend millions on office equip-
64 Webb 1998, 72
65 Walker 1987, 24
Walker 1985, 432f
66 Webb 1998, 73
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ment, furniture, hotels etc. It took almost a year before the arms that the 
US had promised arrived69. That was the situation when Bermúdez met 
Meneses and Blandón in the summer of 1981 – a meeting we will return 
to.
CIA and the Congress
Argentina withdrew its support to the Contras in the wake of the Falk-
lands War. The bilateral relationship had been harmed when the US sup-
ported the British in the war. Divisions within the Contras had become a 
major problem, and in April 1982 CIA took full control of the operation70. 
A new front had been opened in the south when Alizana Revolucionaria 
Democrática (ARDE) was founded by the former Sandinista commander 
Eden  Pastora,.  He  had  become famous  in  1978  when  he  had  let  the 
Sandinistas who seized the National Palace. The majority of ARDE were 
former Sandinistas, and therefore ADRE not only enjoyed a much broad-
er public support than FDN; they were also a more potential and credible 
force against the Sandinistas. Clarridge met with Pastora and offered him 
to join forces with FDN and CIA in the fight against the Sandinistas. Pas-
tora accepted on the condition that he would maintain absolutely deniab-
ility. Any connection to CIA would severely weaken his credibility as a 
nationalist71.
Newsweek’s cover story in November 1982 showed a picture of para-
troopers dropping from the sky and was titled “America’s Secret War: Tar-
get Nicaragua”. Newsweek’s story portrayed the Contras as strong fight-
ing force of 4000 men, which could overthrow the Sandinistas. This im-
age and the fact that the Contras first act of war was blowing up a bridge 
69 Webb 1998, 74
70 Walker 1987, 25
Kenworthy 1995, 54
71 Walker 1987, 26
linking Honduras and Nicaragua, did not match the White House ver-
sion, which was that the Contras was a 500 man strong paramilitary bor-
der patrol to intercept weapon shipment from Nicaragua to the El Sal-
vadorian guerrilla. The President had signed a ‘finding’ authorizing CIA 
to create a 500 person paramilitary force, trained by the Argentinians72, to 
operate  in  Guatemala,  El  Salvador and Honduras to  cut  off  the arms 
shipment. Congress’ feared that once the aid to the Contras began to flow 
there would be no turning back. Considerable doubt existed on Capitol 
Hill on whenever the Contras would be able to fight a successful guerril-
la war even with US financial support, and Congress did not wanted to 
be dragged into another jungle war in a hostile country; like fifteen years 
earlier in Vietnam73.
It is often claimed that the Boland Amendments was passed either be-
cause the Congress wanted to prevent US from being dragged into a jun-
gle  or because that  the Congress  wanted a firmer grip on US  foreign 
policies. It is along these lines that Molineu74, Kenworthy75, Cockburn76 
and most  encyclopaedias  describe  the  amendments.  Common for  this 
perception is that they see the amendments as intended to limit or pre-
vent the US from funding the Contras in Nicaragua. The amendments is 
often referred to in singular, but the more detailed accounts distinguish 
between 1st and 2nd amendment. The difference between the amendments 
is explained as 1st amendment allowed funds to build a the Contras up 
for interdict arms purposes, but prohibited attempts to topple the Nicara-
guan regime, and with the 2nd amendment funding was cut off77.
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North and Webb have an alternative perception of the amendments and 
why they were passed. Their accounts of the amendments are similar al-
though they are positioned in the opposite ends of the political spectrum, 
and their accounts are the most detailed once78. According to North and 
Webb Congressman Tom Harkin proposed an amendment to the budget-
in responds to Newsweek’s story, which completely cut off of all funding 
to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. The White House informed 
Congress that they would veto the budget if the amendment was passed. 
Instead the Boland Amendment was passed, named after the Democratic 
member of the House Intelligence Committee Edward P. Boland. As a 
member of the Intelligence Committee Boland had been briefed on CIA’s 
funding and support for the Contras with which he had no problem. Bo-
land proposed his amendment to quiet the liberals. As an amendment to 
the  budget  it  was  to  be  in  force  for  one year  in  the  period  between 
December  1982 to  December 1983,  and  was passed on Christmas eve 
1982 by a vote 411-079. The reason the amendment received unanimous 
support was that it achieved what it was designed to: nothing, and at the 
same time it made it look like Congress was being thought on the White 
House, but did not prohibit the government from funding the Contras. 
The first amendment was criticized in the Senate, but not by supporters 
of the Contras but by Senator Christopher Dodd for giving a green light 
to continue funding the Contras80. According to Webb internal govern-
ment memos show that CIA, the White House, the DOD and the Contras’ 
Congressional supporters knew that the Contras had no hope of defeat-
ing the Sandinistas and therefore funding the Contras could not be con-
sidered as an attempt to overthrow the Sandinistas81.
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During 1982 and the first half of 1983 FDN mounted coordinated attacks 
on villages in northern Nicaragua in an attempt to set up a liberated zone 
and establish a provisional government. FDN’s raids on Nicaragua be-
came costly for Nicaragua, as it caused many deaths and severe econom-
ical damage, but they failed their primary objectives. FDN’s forces were 
unable to fend off the Sandinistas as they started to re-liberate the territ-
ories.  FDN’s failure proved that the US already expected; the Contras 
could not win militarily. Since US forces were needed to win CIA began 
their Unilaterally Controlled Latino Assets (UCLA) program; agents who 
CIA would deny any knowledge of or connection to. On 8 September 
CIA’s UCLA launched a series of attack against the Nicaraguan harbour 
at Puerto Sandino. Five weeks later frogmen sabotaged an underwater 
pipeline. On 10 October five oil storage tanks at Corinto were attacked by 
mortar fire and ignited 13 million litres of fuel. The raid left more than 
100 people death, caused the evacuation of 25.000 residents while the fire 
raged out of control for two days. Same month a manual the ‘Psychologic-
al Operations in Guerrilla Warfare’ manual was published, and prescribed 
different forms of terrorism such as assassinating civilians. The manual 
instructed the Contras in selective use of violence against carefully selec-
ted targets such as government official and village leaders. For the psy-
chological purpose of  armed propaganda, as the execution of civilians 
was termed, it was important that the local population was present, for-
mulated accusations against the selected target or took part in the execu-
tion. The US Government claimed that the US sponsored terror manual 
reduced the number of human-right abuse and civilian casualties, since it 
stressed that civilian targets should be carefully selected. Enough copies 
were circulated for all Contra units to have one82. In December 1983 Re-
agan approved NSC proposal to escalate the UCLA operations against 
82 Walker 1987, 27
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Nicaragua. In January 1984 helicopters raided Potosí’s port. In February 
pilots bombed a communication centre and military training camp. Two 
times in Marts were the petroleum facilities at San Juan Del Sur and Pu-
erto Sandino attacked by helicopters. In all CIA carried out at least 22 at-
tacks on vital targets between September 1983 and April 1984. In Janu-
ary, February and Marts the CIA/UCLA teams mined the shipping canals 
of major Nicaraguan ports on both the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts with 
300 pounds C4 mines. The mining operation proved too much. The So-
viet Union condemned the US for banditry and piracy. Congress con-
demned the actions just as US allies criticized the mining as deliberate vi-
olation of international law. The mining incident marked a turning point, 
CIA’s operation backfired and Congress was no longer willing to let the 
administration raged its low intensity warfare against Nicaragua. A new 
amendment was passed83:
To provide that none of the monies appropriated in this Act can be  
used to fund directly, or indirectly, activities against the govern-
ment of Nicaragua which have not been authorized by or pursuant  
to law, and for other purposes84.
The 3rd Boland amendment was the most restrictive and covered the peri-
od from October 1984 to December 1985. It prohibited using funds that 
directly or indirectly would support Nicaragua’s opposition. This time it 
meant  no more covert operations and no more funding of the Contras. 
By 1984 the direct funds from Congress had been used up, and the Con-
tras was left in the dark. Congress did relax its prohibitions and allowed 
humanitarian aid to be given. A 4th amendment was passed, which al-
lowed for  $27  millions  in  humanitarian  aid,  communications  support 
83 Walker 1987, 31
84 Senate amendment 396 House Resolution 2577
and intelligence sharing. A 5th amendment that ran from Marts 1985 to 
October 1986 did allow “a very specific and limited amount of CIA support” 
and authorized the State Department to solicit  humanitarian aid from 
third part countries to the Contras85.
Then the 2nd amendment was passed in July 1983 it was a compromise 
between the House that wanted to terminate all aid to the Contras, and 
the Senate that wanted to continue the program. An alternative network 
was created to sustain the Contras if  Congress decided to end US in-
volvement  in  Nicaragua.  North,  MacFarlane  and retired  Gen.  Second 
would take over the Contra operation. Alternative means of funding was 
developed, so that then the last funds ran out in 1984 the surrogate net-
work was in place86. Despite the Contras operation had been reassigned 
to NSC CIA was still involved87. The month before the 2nd amendment 
was passed, a failed assassination attempt was made on Pastora who had 
refused to unit ARDE with FDN under the leadership of FDN. Same day 
as assassination attempt CIA cut off aid to ARDE. In the aftermath of the 
assassination attempt Pastora’s right hand Robelo and half  of ADRE’s 
troops joined FDN. Two months later the rest was lured into FDN with 
the promises of military aid88.
To distribute and administrated the aid to Contras, which the 4th and 5th 
amendments did allow the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office 
(NHAO) was created in September 1985. Already by December Congress 
started to suspect that the NHAO funds were being misused. The Gener-
al Accounting Office (GAO) was asked to investigate NHAO manage-
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ment of the funds. At first NHAO refused to cooperate with GAO, and 
later then they did, it turned out that their records inaccurate at the best. 
Then GAO testified before Congress in Marts and May and said that mil-
lions could not be traced to the suppliers in Costa Rica, Honduras and 
Miami  which  NHAO  claimed  to  have  paid.  Congress  subpoenaed 
NHAO bank records and found that $1.5 had been paid to the Honduras’ 
military and more than $6 million had disappeared into obscure bank ac-
counts in Miami, Panama and the Cayman Islands89. This severely dam-
aged the administrations campaign to get Congress to re-approve fund-
ing for the Contras, and in May 1985 Jack Terrell, a mercenary and drug 
trafficker, who had worked at a Contra base in Honduras, publicly ac-
cused the FDN leaders for corruption, brutal atrocities, and the assassina-
tion attempt on Pastora. Other former FDN officers added their voices to 
Terrell accusation90. Despite this, despite Terrell’s accusations, despite the 
internal conflicts within the Contras and they horrendous human-rights 
record, and despite the missing NHAO money Congress still  approve 
$100 million for the Contras in June 1986 and removed all restrictions on 
the CIA from handling the Contras91.
In  October,  the  same  month  as  all  restrictions  on  CIA’s  involvement 
ended,  Sandinistas  shot  down  one  of  the  surrogate  networks  supply 
plane over Nicaragua, and in November the Lebanese Al-Shiraa newspa-
per published an article on US arms sale to Iran, which lead to the unre-
vealing of the Iran-Contra affair. As Congress had already lifted all re-
strictions  on  aiding  the  Contras,  the  Contras  received  CIA  funds 
throughout 1986 while the affair was revelled in the press. In the wake of 
the Iran-Contra scandal CIA withdrew funding for the Contras in 1987. 
Without CIA’s support the Contras were unable to continue as a military 
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force, and peace negotiations between the Contras and the Sandinistas 
began. With the peace agreement in 1988 the Contras officially dissolved 
as military force, although that in reality had already happened in 1987. 
The US had no intention to let  the Sandinistas stay in power.  During 
Nicaragua’s election in 1990 US poured in massive funds to have allies of 
the former Contras elected. Foreign funding of parties is a crime in most 
counties, but despite the US’s attempt to subvert democracy the election 
went forward. The Sandinistas lost and left the office, contrary to what 
was feared. The police and armed forces continued to be under the com-
mand of Sandinista officials.
Funding the Contras
The White House never accept the the Boland amendments’ restrictions. 
The law was circumvented and broken in order to keep the Contras alive 
until Congress could be turned around as happened were in 198692. The 
funds allowed by the 2nd amendment ran out in the spring of 1984. The 
empty bank accounts lead the White House to soliciting funds from third 
part countries. Robert McFarlane, the former National Security Advisor 
(1983-1985), had in the fall of 1983 asked North to draw up a list of coun-
tries, which could be expected to help finance the Contras93. The list in-
cluded Britain, West Germany, Taiwan, Singapore, Israel and Saudi Ara-
bia. The Israelis had declined to help according to North, but did ship 
hundreds of tons of weapons to the Contras as Israel had captured large 
quantities of soviet made weapons from the PLO during the invasion of 
Lebanon in 1982-1983. The weapons were shipped to a DOD warehouses 
from where they were transferred to the CIA who donated the weapons 
to the Contras. This operation was directed by Secord94. McFarlane met 
92 Kenworthy 1995, 55
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with the Saudi ambassador Prince Bandar Bin Sultan to ask for financial 
aid to the Contras. The first contribution of $1 million came in June 1984 
and for the next seven months the Saudis chip in $1 million a month. Mc-
Farlane’s meeting with Bandar Bin Sultan was authorized by the Reagan 
according to North. After a meeting in Washington DC between Reagan 
and the  Saudi  King Fahd in  February  1985,  the  Saudis  doubled their 
monthly contribution95. Soon after the Saudis’ generous doubling of their 
monthly donation they received a quick delivery of Stinger anti-aircraft 
missiles  that  had been held up by the Congress  for  some time96.  The 
donations continued until the spring of 198697 then the Boland amend-
ments were lifted.  By when the Saudis had chipped in $32 million in 
total.  Singlaub solicited $2 millions from the government of  Taiwan98. 
The  Sultan  of  Brunei  Haji  Hassanal  Bolkiah  Mu’izzaddin  Waddaulah 
donated $10 million after he was approached by the State Department99, 
but the money apparently never arrived as the Sultan made a typo when 
wire transfering the money. According to Wroe Israel also donated cash, 
which North denies. There was additional sources of funds; the arms sale 
to Iran and private money raised by the National Endowment for the 
Preservation of Liberty100.
Stanford Technology Trading Group International (STTGI) controlled the 
account that the Brunei donation apparently did not arrived at101.  The 
president of STTGI was Secord whose partner Hakim was the chairman. 
Hakim and Secord was in full control of the company that they had foun-
95 North 1992, 287f
Wroe 1991, 17
96 Wroe 1991, 17
North 1992, 288
97 Walsh 1993, Chapter 8,5n
98 North 1992, 315
99 Wroe 1991, 1
North 1992, 315n
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101 North 1992, 315n
ded in 1983 and was renamed Enterprise in 1986. In the fall of 1984 North 
had introduced Secord to Aldolfo Calero to assist Calero in purchasing 
arms with the Saudi proceeds, which Secord was experienced in. Hakim 
and Secord acted as brokers for Calero and brought weapons, munitions, 
and other lethal supplies for the Contras with money that Calero had re-
ceived  from  the  Saudis.  But  from  mid-1985  this  arrangement  was 
changed.  In  June  1985  Harim  and  Secord  meets  with  Bermúdez  and 
Calero to inform them that instead of deposit the money directly into 
Calero’s offshore account they would in the future be deposit  directly 
into an account controlled by STTGI. Calero was eliminated as a money 
handler. After eliminating Calero as money handler Hakim and Secord 
set up an account name closely assimilating the name of the arms com-
pany that the weapons was bought from. This was done to disguise the 
further mark up of the price that Hakim and Secord made. According to 
the Iran-Contra investigation most  of the funds went to Enterprise as 
profits, and the Contras received equipment worth a minor part of the 
money102. In the late 1984 Secord arrange for the first supply of weapons 
to the Contras  from China103.  This shipment did not arrive in Central 
America  until  April  1985,  and  was  when  impounded  by  Honduras’ 
armed forces104.  In all Hakim and Secord arranged for 11 deliveries of 
arms to the Contras105.
Then we add the numbers together $101 million in total were available to 
the Contras between December 1983 to March 1986. This figure excludes 
private donations, and materials and secret funds from DOD and CIA106. 
Officially it was these funds that kept the Contras going until official US 
102 Walsh 1993, Chapter 8.3, 8.5
103 Walsh 1993, Chapter 8.3
104 North 1992, 307
105 Walsh 1993, Chapter 12
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funding was resumed. Since the US was not paying officially the ques-
tion was raised about who then paid. This was according to North the 
reason why people started believing that the Contras was involved in 
drug trafficking. North claims that all claims was investigated and no 
evidence of any drug connection was discovered. This claim is a rather 
odd as CIA knew at that time that the Contras were involved in drug 
trafficking107. Beside the ‘secret funds’ there was the ‘overt funds’ author-
ised by either the president or the Congress until Congress re-approved 
aid to the Contras in 1986. Compare the $101 million in ‘secret funds’ to 
the total of $150 million in ‘overt funds’ and there appears to be no dis-
crepancy. The amounts were to last for 3 years each – the ‘overt funds’ 
from 1981-1983 and the ‘secret funds’ from 1983-1986. DOD transferred 
‘surplus’ military equipment to CIA free of charge, constructed bases and 
airbases during their military exercises in Central America and left be-
hind equipment for the Contras to pick up and use. By 1984 the US milit-
ary exercises had become almost continual108. Unfortunately there is no 
official  estimate on the  amount that  DOD spend on surplus  material, 
base construction and left behind equipment. Hence an accurate estima-
tion of the amount spent by the US on the Contras is impossible.
If we only consider the amounts we know of it appears that the Contras 
could be kept alive on the secret funds collected by North. If we instead 
compare the US spending on the Contras with the Soviet spending on the 
Sandinistas a different situation emerges. The US estimates that the Sovi-
ets around $3 billion on the Sandinistas in the same time span. Consider-
ing these numbers it is highly unlikely that a mere $101 millions between 
1983 and 1986 would be sufficient then the Soviet donation in 1985 alone 
107 North 1992, 315
108 Walker 1985, 437
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where $1 billion109.  Compare the amount the US spend on the Contras 
with the $5 billions a year they spend on the Afghan Mujahidins110. Al-
though the Mujahidin forces were larger than the Contras, the difference 
in size can't explain the difference in funding. As with the both the Con-
tras and Mujahidins only a minor amount of what the US spend reached 
the fighting forces. Alternative funding was needed. As the Mujahidins 
substituted the shortfall in cash with opium, the Contras did with co-
caine.
The Drug Connection
In September 1982 Enrique Bermudéz, FDN’s military leader, meet with 
Norwin  Meneses  and  Danilo  Blandón.  Meneses  and  Bermudéz  knew 
each other from childhood as Bermudéz had been a close friend of Nor-
win’s  older  brother  Edmondo Meneses.  Bermudéz  told them that  the 
Contras needed money111. The Contra leaders Alfonso Calero and Edgar 
Chamorro have confirmed that the meeting took place112. When Meneses 
and Blandón left the meeting Blandón was carrying $100.000 in drug pro-
ceeds from the Contras.  Blandón and Meneses travelled to Bolivia via 
Guatemala on business where the cash was going to be used in a “Bolivi-
an drug deal” according to  Blandón113.  Blandón was stopped in Teguci-
galpa Airport in Honduras, but he was released and the money returned 
when their Contra escort told the Hondurans that Blandón and Meneses 
were Contras114. That Blandón carried drug proceeds from the meeting to 
buy cocaine in Bolivia with means that the Contras already had done 
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110 Napoleoni 2004, 109
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their first drug trafficking, which is confirmed in CIA’s report.
Meneses had conducted large scale drug trafficking in Nicaragua and the 
US during Somoza’s regime. He came from a prominent family. One of 
his brothers was a general in the National Guard and another, Edmundo 
Meneses was chief of the police in Managua115. In the 1960s Norwin star-
ted moving between Nicaragua and the US. He lived on and off in San 
Francisco Bay Area, were owned several properties. Norwin was arres-
ted in 1977 for murder of the high-ranking Nicaraguan customs officer 
Oskar Reyes, who had investigated Norwin for smuggling cars, weapons 
and drugs. Norwin was released after his brother, the chief of police in 
Managua had conducted a  ‘extensive  and rigorous  investigation’,  but 
had been unable to find any evidence that indicated his brother in Reyes’ 
murder116. After the Reyes case Edmondo was promoted brigadier gener-
al,  retired  from  the  National  Guard  and  joined  the  diplomatic  corps 
where he became ambassador to Guatemala. His diplomatic carrier was 
short. In 1978 he was gunned down in Guatemala City by the People’s 
Guerilla Army in solidarity with the Sandinistas struggle117. Norwin left 
Nicaragua in June, one month before the regime collapsed in 1979. Before 
he arrived in San Francisco the beginning of 1980 he had been to El Sal-
vador, Ecuador and Costa Rica where Norwin owned the farm that John 
Hull lived on, and from which the Legion of September 15 had launched 
its failed attack on the left-wing radio station. Hull’s farm was the central 
transit point in Costa Rica for transfer of drug and guns to the Contras. 
When Norwin arrived in the US he applied for political asylum in his 
own name. Even though Norwin had more than one record with US law 
enforcement  agencies,  he  did  not  seem concern  about  using  his  own 
name. Norwin is first time mention in a DOJ file in 1968 then FBI for-
115 Webb 1998, 53ff
116 Webb 1998, 52, 55
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wards their arrest and conviction record on Meneses to the Nicaraguan 
police. This record “included convictions for shoplifting in 1963, misuse of  
slot machines in 1964, and statutory rape of a female under 18 years old in  
1964”118. In 1976 when Customs in Nicaragua requested information in 
connection with Oscar Reyes investigation the FBI informed the Nicara-
guan Customs that Meneses was suspected of running a car theft opera-
tion were cars from Californian and New York are shipped to Nicaragua 
where they were imported by the National Guard119. In 1978 FBI learned 
that Norwin and his brother Ernesto “were smuggling 20 kilos of cocaine at  
a time into the United States”120 and that his nephew Jamie, Edmundo’s 
son,  were  their  distributor  in  San  Francisco.  A  month  later  the  DEA 
learned  through  an  informant  that  Meneses  were  dealing  cocaine  in 
Miami too. Next year the DEA determined that Meneses supplied New 
Orleans too with cocaine121.  According to law enforcement reports Me-
neses ran a large scale drug trafficking operations as early as the early 
1970s122.  In  1979  FBI’s  legal  attaché  in  Mexico  wanted  Meneses  con-
sidered for FBI’s ‘top thief’ program because of his suspected car theft 
operation. The attaché wanted an arrest order issued for Meneses so that 
if he attempted to enter the US he would be stopped by the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS) and questioned. This did not happen 
because an Assistant US Attorney in San Francisco declined to prosecute 
Meneses for car theft.  According to US law enforcement Meneses had 
eluded prosecution in Nicaragua due to his political  connections.  The 
case was closed as US law enforcement concluded that further investiga-
tion in the car theft case would not be productive123. Without an arrest 
warrant INS could not stop Meneses from entering the country and ap-
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ply for political asylum as he did. At that time both FBI and DEA knew 
that Meneses was involved in drug trafficking. According to Webb both 
immigrant lawyers and the State Department have confirmed that there 
was a zero tolerance policy for immigrants and visitors suspected of nar-
cotics violations124. Still Meneses was able to enter the country and apply 
for political asylum.
Blandón had studied in Bogotá, Colombia were he had received a mas-
ter’s degree in marketing.  Blandón had, before he fled Nicaragua, been 
head of agricultural export program, which was Nicaragua’s main ex-
port. During this time Blandón developed ties with the US Department 
of Commerce, military, CIA and the State Department.  Blandón fled in 
the final days before the fall of Managua to Miami. His wife had travel 
straight to Los Angeles, but according to Blandón he could not effort the 
ticket and had to work as a car washer in Miami. When Blandón joined 
his wife in Los Angles he started to work as a used car salesman for the 
Torres brothers, who were major cocaine dealers. The brothers lived with 
two Colombian sisters, who were the cousins of one of the Medellín car-
tel’s founders, Pablo Escobar. During the late 1970s the Medellín cartel 
had fought and won control of the cocaine business in Miami from the 
exile Cubans. Instead of using the city for small time cocaine trafficking 
the Medellín cartel turned Miami into an hub for cocaine distribution. 
Miami  became  the  official  port  of  call  for  cocaine  dealers,  and  soon 
Miami’s  banks  began  to  swell  with  cocaine  profits  that  need  to  be 
laundered125.  After a short stay in Miami  Blandón joined his wife and 
kids in Los Angeles. According to Blandón his involvement with cocaine 
began with a call from his friend Barrios in Miami. Barrios told Blandón 
that Meneses was coming to Los Angeles soon and wanted to meet him. 
124 Webb 1998, 175
125 Webb 1998, 44
Cockburn 1999, 3
Blandón had not met Meneses but had heard that he was known as a 
gangster. He did not know why Barrios wanted him to meet with Me-
neses, but Blandón assumed that it concerned the Contras as Barrios was 
know to work for the Contras. When Blandón picked Meneses up at the 
airport Meneses began talking about the need to start a revolutionary 
movement to free Nicaragua. They needed to make money to send Hon-
duras. Meneses wanted Blandón to start a drug business in Los Angeles 
to raise the needed funds. At first Blandón had some reservations for get-
ting into the cocaine business working for a gangster, with the Spanish 
nickname for cocaine ‘El Perico’126. When Blandón started to sell cocaine 
is a matter of dispute, but according to  Blandón he accepted Meneses 
proposal after meeting with Bermudéz in Honduras127. Other claim that 
Blandón began dealing  cocaine  earlier.  No later  than  September  1982 
Blandón had begun working in the cocaine industry128.  Blandón visited 
Meneses in San Francisco for a two day seminar in the cocaine traffick-
ing. Here he was taught how to sell cocaine by the ounce and the kilo, 
how to transport the it undetected, how to drive, what to do and what 
not. After the seminar Blandón was supplied with a few names of of po-
tential customers and two kilos of cocaine129.
Ricky Ross aka Freeway Ricky had been a young talented tennis player. 
Ross had been invited to play at Long Beach State,  but  then the uni-
versity found out that Ross could not read or write the offer was retrac-
ted.  Disillusioned and unable to get  into college Ross dropped out of 
high school  just  before graduating130.  Instead Ross enrolled in a trade 
school were he became friends with Mr. Fisher, one of the teachers. Ross 
did not study at the trade school for long before as he was offered to 
126 Webb 1998, 50ff
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study and play tennis at a trade college. The friendship between Ross 
and Fisher continued after Ross left the trade school. Fisher would help 
Ross  out and buy him tennis  shoes,  racquets  etc.  Shortly  before Ross 
dropped out of trade college in 1981, he learned how Fisher could afford 
jewels, a new car, and a nice house in a nice neighbourhood. Ross’ teach-
er was a well connected small time coke user and dealer131. Ross bought a 
few grams of cocaine from Fisher for $250 and cut the cocaine, i.e. a pro-
cess  were  the  cocaine’s  purity  is  diluted by adding any cheaper  sub-
stance to the cocaine, which resembles cocaine, and sold it for $500-600132. 
Instead of spending the profit Ross reinvested it in more cocaine. Fisher’s 
cocaine was a little cheaper than average, so Ross easily got new custom-
ers as he would price the cocaine $25-$75 cheaper than average. Ross 
continued to reinvest the cocaine profits, buying more frequent in larger 
amounts133. Fisher had no ambition of becoming a big professional drug 
dealer, and told Ross’ that he would not sell them more cocaine. Instead 
he would introduce Ross to his cocaine source Ivan Arguellas. He prom-
ised Ross that his price would be lower than Fisher, and it was. The more 
Ross bought at once, the lower the price. Most of the dealers in South 
Central unlike Ross sold PCP known as angle dust. Around the time Ivan 
began supplying Ross, other dealers noticed that Ross made a lot more 
money than they did, so they started buying cocaine from Ross. It was 
not Ross’ discipline, which made him reinvest his drug proceeds. Ross 
was afraid that if he spent the profit his mother, whom he lived with, 
would notice. She did noticed when he bought a new pair of trainers and 
threw him out. Illiterate and with no idea how to rent an apartment, he 
moved into their garage and fixed it up with the drug profits134.
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8 months after Ross started buying from Ivan, Ivan disappeared. Ross’ 
sole cocaine source was gone. Blandón knew Ivan and what happened to 
him. Ivan’s wife had shot him in the back and injured his spine. Occa-
sionally  Blandón had sold Ivan a bit of cocaine, but Ivan had another 
source, which Blandón believed to be the Torres brothers.  Blandón had 
noticed that the Torres began to make a lot of money around the same 
time that Ross’ began to buy from Ivan. Ivan partner and brother-in-law 
Henry ran the business while Ivan was hospitalised. Henry had not de-
veloped any contacts while he worked with Ivan and he did not know 
Ivan’s source. Ivan’s customers expected Henry to deliver, but in a busi-
ness where a man is only as good as his connections Henry could not de-
liver what was expected. Blandón visited Henry and offered to help. Me-
neses wanted Blandón to sell more cocaine, but Blandón sales had been 
slow and small. Blandón learned about Ross from Ivan, and Henry con-
firmed that Ross was their best customer.  Blandón had his lucky break. 
Instead of  selling  1-2  kilos  ever  couple  of  months,  Blandón supplied 
Henry with 1-2 kilos a week. Then Ross began buying from Henry the 
prices  was lowered again,  but  since Henry was more concerned with 
snoring  cocaine than selling it  Blandón soon began to  sell  directly  to 
Ross. Again the prices dropped135.
Blandón’s testimony and statements are contradicting, and stated dates 
fluctuate. The amount of cocaine he sold differs too. Blandón claims that 
he sold his first ounce of cocaine in 1982, and he during 1982-1983 sold 1-
2 kilos, but he also told investigators that he picked up 1-2 kilos every 
couple of month from Meneses in the same periode136. Statements from 
Blandón father and mother in law suggest that  Blandón was involved 
with drugs before he left Nicaragua in 1979. In a sealed search warrant 
135 Webb 1998, 135ff
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affidavit filed in May 1992 DEA agent Chuck Jones wrote “Blandón had  
been a cocaine trafficker in Nicaragua prior to the fall  of  Somoza. (...)  Since  
about 1982 Blandón had been a cocaine trafficker in the Unites States”137. Four 
years  later  Jones  claim  that  he  had confused  Blandón with  Meneses, 
whom he was referring to. Regardless of when Blandón started his career 
as a cocaine trafficker for the Contras, they were no longer a disorganised 
group of mercenaries but run by the CIA138.  The time  Blandón started 
dealing with Ross is disputed. Ross have stated two different times that 
he began dealing with  Blandón, either between 1981-1982 or 1983-1984. 
Blandón claims that he started selling cocaine to Ross around sometime 
between 1983-1985, and that he sold approximately 200-300 kilos in all. 
However this is not consistent with his claim he broke with Meneses in 
1983. Jacinto Torres, who owned the used car lot that Blandón worked at, 
testified that  Blandón was involved with cocaine sales  in Glendale in 
1984. According to Torres Blandón’s cocaine business increased consider-
ably in 1984, and Meneses between 1983 and 1984 routinely flew 200-400 
kilos in from Miami to keep up with demands139.  The Torres brothers 
later told the FBI that Blandón picked up his first two kilos from Meneses 
in 1980 shortly after Blandón moved to Los Angeles and was introduced 
to Meneses. Their information proved reliable in other instances140.
DOJ estimates that Ross began in the cocaine business in the early of 
1982, and it was Blandón who supplied both Ivan and his partner Henry 
with cocaine. Ivan was shot in October 1983 and shortly after  Blandón 
started dealing directly with Ross. DOJ estimates that Blandón first star-
ted  dealing  directly  with  Ross  early  in  1984.  Since  Ivan  was  shot  8 
months after Ivan and Ross started dealing, Ross must have been intro-
137 Webb 1998, 65
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duced to him in the early 1983 141.  This means that  Blandón indirectly 
started supplying Ross early in 1983. It is not disputed in DOJ’s report 
that both Meneses and Blandón were “engaged in large-scale drug traffick-
ing in the 1980s”142, and that “Both gave some proceeds from their drug traf-
ficking to the Contras in the early 1980s”143. What is disputed is the amount.
How much they contributed to the Contras is unclear. (…), but the  
monetary amounts appear to be relatively insignificant compared to  
the money they made in drug trafficking144.
The estimate is based on Blandón’s statement that the “relatively insigni-
ficant” amounts were around $40.000 each145.  Compared to the charges 
that had been brought forward, that the Contras relied to some extent on 
cocaine as a means of finance, this could seriously damage CIA. It is in-
disputable that the Contras was a top run CIA organization,  which is 
confirmed in later emails from North. If CIA’s Contras relied on drug 
proceeds  it  would almost  certainly implicated CIA,  unless  the group, 
which had not  made a  single  independent  decisions,  had decided on 
their own to deal drugs. For this reason CIA and DOJ have a clear in-
terest in minimizing the amounts that  Blandón and Meneses donated. 
CIA has a clear interest in placing the estimation of when Meneses and 
Blandón began supplying Ross as late as possible. If the cocaine involve-
ment can be estimated to after 1984 when it can be blamed on North, 
who was handled the job of running the Contras, after the US Congress 
prohibited CIA from aiding the Contras. Remember that the unrevealing 
of the cocaine affair took placed in the mid-1990s, almost a decade after 
the Iran-Contra affair, where North was blamed for being a rouge agent 
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acting on his own. If the cocaine donation can be minimized and took 
place after 1984 then ‘the rogue agent’ North is to blame. According to 
his biography he informed his boss of everything he did146. The notes and 
emails  that  the National  Security  Archives have obtained through the 
Freedom of  Information Act  confirm North’s  claim147.  The most  blunt 
and interesting notes  was written by North,  which made me wonder 
why did he put such incriminating things down on paper in such a blunt 
language? North claims that he did so to be able to prove that his actions 
was authorized148.  The strongest evidence for that North did have au-
thorization is the fact that Judge Walsh who investigated the Iran-Contra 
affair believed that North’s boss National Security Advisors Poindexter 
covered  over  the  President’s  and  Vice  President’s  involvement149.  A 
second important reason for the government to place the  Blandón-Ross 
connection as late as 1984 is Blandón’s claim that he broke with Meneses 
in 1983. This claim is highly unbelievable, but if Blandón’s claim was to 
be believed, then Ross’ cocaine enterprise could not have been dealing 
cocaine supplied from the Contras through Meneses.  The official  asser-
tion is  that  both  Blandón and Ross started their  career in the cocaine 
trade in 1982 and first in 1984 started dealing with each other. This estim-
ation is placed fare to late. Blandón’s testimony, which is the sole source 
for the late dates, cannot be regarded as impartial as he was employed by 
the government at the time he was interviewed by the CIA. Evidence in 
the official reports and in Webb’s book points towards earlier dates. Ac-
cording to these dates Blandón’s started dealing cocaine in 1980150.  Ross’ 
entry into the cocaine business began in the early 1981151, and direct deal-
ing between Blandón and Ross began late in 1983. If DOJ’s assertion is 
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right that Blandón was the supplier to Ivan, then Blandón supplied Ross 
indirectly from the time Ross first started buying cocaine from Fisher. In 
line with evidence presented in CIA’s and DOJ’s reports, but contrary to 
the reports’ conclusions, the earlier dates seems to fit better into a overall 
time frame.
US law enforcement had known about Meneses for years, but had never 
been  able  to  pin  any  thing  on  him.  In  1981  Meneses’  organization 
smuggled close to a ton of cocaine into the US according to  Blandón152, 
who worked as Meneses’ accountant since the early 1980s. In June 1980 
DEA received an anonymous call, which informed them that Jairo Me-
neses had gone to Costa Rica to obtain 3½ kilo of cocaine. When Nor-
win’s nephew and lieutenant Jairo was arrested in June 1981 DEA was 
actively investigating Norwin for cocaine trafficking and possible gun-
running. Sandra Smith, who worked for DEA, investigated Meneses. By 
mid-1981 she had enough information to sketch out a detailed picture of 
operation. It appeared that Meneses had an endless supply of cocaine in-
coming in from everywhere. Rumours was that Nicaraguans was brining 
in cocaine and taking guns back. In June 1981 Detective Joseph Lee got a 
tip. Julio Bermudéz (not related to Enrique Bermudéz) made two trips a 
month to San Francisco “where he contacts a large cocaine smuggling organ-
ization headed by Norwin Meneses”153. Surveillance began.
On 12 November 1981 Julio left his house with a small beige suitcase and 
drove off to pick up Jose Herrera. They continued to Los Angles Airport 
where they bought two one way tickets and boarded Flight 425 to San 
Francisco154. They arrived 16:30 and where pick up by Carlos Cabezas155 
152 Webb 1998, 61
153 Webb 1998, 59
154 Webb 1998, 60
155 Webb 1998, 80
Page 25 of 71
who drove a  golden Toyota  registered  to  Jose  Herrera.  Cabezas  took 
them to his house at 8 Bellevue Ave in Dale City, where all three went in. 
Soon after Julio came out, open the trunk, took out the suitcase, placed it 
behind the driver seat and drove off. At this point police lost the tail on 
Julio, but 35 minutes later the car is spotted out side Jairo Meneses’ house 
in Dale City. Police arrested Julio and seized a notebook where Julio had 
written down that he had paid Jairo $90.000. A few days later Jairo was 
arrested  too.  The  police  seized  a  little  pot,  and  envelope  containing 
$9.000, O’Haus triple beam scale, a 12 gauge shotgun, a calibre .22 pistol 
and miscellaneous documents and passports in Jairo’s house. The case 
quickly fell apart. Julio was released on bail and was never seen again, 
and with Julio gone missing DEA decided against prosecuting Jairo156. 
The surveillance report shows that there was a connection between Me-
neses and Cabezas; a connection that the police never acknowledge.
The Frogman Case
In January 1983 FBI seized 195 kilos of cocaine while it was being un-
loaded from the Colombian freighter ‘Ciudad de Cucuta’ in San Fran-
cisco. The case is named after the frogman suits that some of the traffick-
ers were wearing at their arrest. The investigation that had begun a year 
earlier resulted in more than 50 arrests, including Julio Zavala and Carlos 
Cabezas, and the seizure of 250 kilos of cocaine, the biggest cocaine bust 
on the west coast at that time157.
Cabezas had fled from the revolution in 1979. He had study four years in 
US to become a commercial pilot, while working as a janitor to support 
himself. After gaining his licence he went back to Nicaragua and joined 
the National Guard as a pilot. Later Cabezas took an accounting degree 
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and was hired by Bank of America, where he became head of the Man-
agua branch’s foreign division. Next he took a degree in law and became 
a licensed attorney in 1978, but was shortly after recalled to active duty 
against the Sandinistas. Cabezas had to flee after the revolution as he had 
participated in the National Guards terror bombings of Masaya. Cabezas 
settled in San Francisco where he worked two jobs to support his family. 
His work paid off and in 1981 after selling both his car and wife’s jew-
ellery they were able to raise $10.000, enough for a down payment on a 
small house in Dale City. Cabezas had done legal research for a couple of 
lawyers, mainly to keep his skills in tune, but the worked made him real-
ise how much he missed practising law not to mention the income from 
it. In order to practise law he needed to take the California bar exam, but 
with a family to support, a mortgage and two jobs there was no way it 
could be done; that was until he met his ex brother-in-law Zavala158.
Cabezas had meet Nestor Arana at Zavala’s place who had come to pick 
up a suitcase. Once opened Cabezas had noticed that it was filled with 
neatly wrapped and stacked cash. Zavala explained that it was part of his 
job to bring cash to Miami, and that he paid Arana to do it for him. This 
was the job that would enable Cabezas to make ends meet and do the bar 
exam. He asked Zavala if he needed help,  but his inquiry was gently 
brushed aside. The more Cabezas though about it, the more it seemed 
that  Zavala  was  the  solution  to  his  problems.  Zavala  had  plenty  of 
money and if Cabezas could convince Zavala to give him a loan, he could 
quit his two jobs and begin studying law again. In October 1981 Cabezas 
called Zavala and asked him if he could come over and discuss his idea 
with him. Zavala agreed. Zavala was a cocaine dealer, which was the 
reason why he had plenty of cash. He was nothing compared with Me-
neses. Zavala as Ross was a mid-level dealer who sold kilos and ounces 
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to street dealers who supplied the addits. For several years Zavala had 
been  buying  cocaine  in  kilos  from  Colombians  in  San  Francisco  and 
Nicaraguans in Miami. So fare business had been good, but the day that 
Cabezas called every thing had begun crumbling around Zavala159. DEA 
had arrested several people in Southern San Francisco for possession of 
½ kilo of cocaine. One of the women arrested was a Contra fund raiser 
named Doris Salomon. She told DEA that the cocaine belonged to her 
boyfriend Noel. A month later DEA questioned Lilliana Blengino, who 
had been arrested together  with Salomon.  She  too told DEA that  Sa-
lomon had said that she had gotten the cocaine from her boyfriend Noel. 
Then Salomon 5 months later appeared in court for her bail hearing, she 
made a passing reference to her boyfriend Julio Zavala. DEA checked the 
visitors’ log and noticed that Zavala had visited Salomon 3 times in 11 
days – now DEA had the name of her boyfriend and cocaine source160.
Zavala was known by the police. The month before Salomon’s arrest he 
had been arrested while breaking into a woman’s apartment to collect 
drug debt from her husband. She called the cops who arrested Zavala, 
his henchman Edmundo Rocha, and seizes 28 grams of cocaine in the Ca-
dillac that Zavala had parked outside. The Cadillac had been stolen in 
Florida and was given to Zavala as a gift from his cocaine connection in 
Miami. Rocha was arrested again a month later, this time together with 
Zavala’s girlfriend Salomon. The second time Rocha was arrest he had a 
slip of paper in his wallet with Julio’s name and phone number on it. The 
charges against Zavala had been drop both times, but the odds of beating 
the charges one more time was bad; and now DEA was investigating 
him. Zavala had a wide range of customers in Miami, Oakland, Chicago, 
San Francisco and Los Angeles. His small and successful cocaine busi-
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ness made it hard for him to stay low. He needed someone to handle his 
business while he stayed out of sight. It was at this time Cabezas phoned. 
Zavala did not offer him a loan, but a job. Cabezas would make more 
money and work shorter hours. He would be able to support his family 
and have time to study. The perfect job, delivering cocaine and collecting 
drug debt. He would be paid $500 per kilo he delivered and a percentage 
of the collected debt. As a bonus he would help the Contras Zavala told 
him, as part of the cocaine profit went to financing the Contras. It was 
easy and well  paid work,  picking up a few kilos  here and delivering 
them there. During one of the first days working for Zavala, Cabezas was 
asked to pick up some of Zavala’s friends from Los Angeles at the airport 
and  let  them  stay  in  his  home  while  they  were  in  town161.  Cabezas 
agreed. He took a golden Toyota to the airport and picked up Zavala’s 
friends Julio and Herrera at the airport and brought them to his home on 
8 Bellevue Ave in Dale City. Agent Smith who had been tailing Julio and 
Herrera from the airport added Cabezas’ name and address to her in-
vestigation of Meneses. Soon Zavala and Cabezas would be busted. FBI 
and DEA investigated the two Nicaraguans, and at least four of their cus-
tomers were informers for FBI. They feed FBI with all the information 
needed,  when the  cocaine  arrived,  how much,  and  who  the  couriers 
were. Evidence that the two Nicaraguans were involved in a major co-
caine trafficking network piled up fast, but CIA already knew about Za-
vala’s cocaine business. Zavala was named in a CIA cable in 1980 as the 
supplier to a drug addicted Nicaraguan official, and it was not the last 
time his name appeared in CIA’s files, as CIA had at least one informant 
inside the organisation. In Marts 1982 FBI asked CIA to debrief the asset 
in the organisation periodically on behalf of FBI. As US law enforcement 
prepared to bust Zavala’s organisation CIA fired its informant; there was 
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to be no link between the drug dealers and CIA162.
Hiring Cabezas had been the best thing that Zavala had done. The cus-
tomers liked him, he was dependable, hard working, and would prop-
erly soon start bring in some customers of his own. Zavala wanted to go 
on vacation, visit his girlfriend Salomon, who had skipped bail and was 
waiting for him in Costa Rica, merry her and spend the honeymoon in 
Central America. So after working 1½ month for Zavala Cabezas ran Za-
vala’s drug business, met the suppliers and kept the books, which he did 
thoroughly as an educated accountant. According to Cabezas Zavala had 
two independent cocaine sources.  One was Alvaro Carvajal  Minota,  a 
Colombian in San Francisco who worked for the Cali cartel. Cabezas ne-
gotiated the prices and deliveries for Zavala with the cartel on his trips to 
Cali. The other source was in Costa Rica and it offered a much higher 
quality of cocaine than the Colombians. It was this cocaine that Cabezas 
had been told belonged to the Contras. Cabezas kept two accounts; one 
for each cocaine source as prices and delivery costs were different. In 
December 1981 Cabezas got a call from Zavala. He wanted him to come 
down to Costa Rica so Zavala could introduce him to some friends and 
business associates of his; the two exile-Nicaraguans Horacio Pereira and 
Troilo Sánchez who was the brother of two senior FDN members: Ar-
istides and Fernando Sánchez. Aristides, a close friends of Norwin Me-
neses, was chosen by the CIA to sit on FDN’s Directorate. Fernando re-
placed Edmundo Meneses as ambassador to Guatemala after Edmundo’s 
assassination. After the revolution Fernando stayed in Guatemala as the 
Contras’ representative in Guatemala. Troilo had been a one of Norwin’s 
drinking buddies and partners before the revolution. Troilo claimed he 
had flown for CIA during preparations for the Pigs of Bay invasion. In 
162 Webb 1998, 60, 79f
CIA 1998a, paragraph 229
the late 1970s Troilo had become addicted to drugs and was using most 
of the family fortune on drugs, women, and gambling. Pereira and Nor-
win knew each other too, they had grown up the same place, and they 
had been business partners before the revolution. The meeting was in-
dented as a purely social event, but according to Cabezas they ended up 
discussing Pereira and Troilo’s idea of trafficking cocaine to raise fund 
for the Contras; both Zavala and Troilo admit they trafficked cocaine, but 
denied that they did so for the Contras163.
In January 1982 Cabezas was send back to Costa Rica to pick up two 
kilos of cocaine from Pereira, but to Cabezas surprise Pereira was not 
comfortable with the arrangement any more.  Pereira had changed his 
mind because he had received information that Zavala was drinking too 
heavily, and now he was affright that Zavala might spend the Contras’ 
profits on his own needs. Cabezas conceded that Zavala was drinking 
heavily  and  was  neglecting  his  responsibilities,  forgetting  to  pay  the 
Colombians, and covering his debt to the Colombians by selling of some 
of Pereira’s cocaine. Pereira wanted the deal changed, so that Cabezas 
and not Zavala responsible for the cocaine and money. Cabezas called 
Zavala and explained the situation to him. As he was going to be held 
personally responsible for the cocaine and money he wanted half of the 
profits instead of only $500 per kilos he had been paid so fare. Zavala 
agreed as he had to. Cabezas travelled to Honduras with Pereria where 
they stayed at the home of Pereria’s brother-in-law Francisco Aviles, who 
was a senior member of UDN, for a couple of days while they waited for 
the cocaine to arrive164. Cabezas told investigators that he personally car-
ried 12 kilos cocaine in all back on several trip for Pereria in the first half 
of 1982, and he was not the only mule brining in the cocaine. Cabezas 
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made 20 trips to Miami and Costa Rica in 1982 carrying $64.000 on each 
trip making a total of at least $1.280.000. Cabezas claims that he once de-
livered $250.000 to Sánchez and Hereria, a claim which is backed by FBI’s 
records.  Cabezas  delivered  $50.000  a  month  to  Aristides  Sánchez  in 
Miami.  The cash that  Cabezas carried to Central  America,  he handed 
over to Pereria or an FDN logistics officer named Joaquin ‘Pelon’ Vega 
who lived in Honduras. If no one in San Francisco were able to make the 
deliveries either Fernando Sánchez or Pereira would bring the money 
back to Central America. FBI knew what was going on thanks to their 
wire taps and CIA’s debriefing of the asset working in Zavala’s organisa-
tion165.
Cabezas was introduced to Ivan Gomez by Troilo and Pereira as CIA’s 
man in Costa Rica during a meeting in the spring of 1982, and was told 
that “Gomez was there to ensure that the profits from the cocaine went to the  
Contras  and not into  someone’s  pocket”166.  Cabezas met Ivan Gomez one 
more time; at an airport in Costa Rica with Pereira. CIA confirmed one of 
their  agents  used the  cover  name Ivan  Gomez during  the  1980s,  but 
states that the Cabezas’  description of Gomez did not match their de-
scription of Gomez besides curly black hair and fluent Spanish. Cabezas 
was unable to pick out Gomez’s picture when asked to do so by CIA’s in-
vestigators 15 years after he last saw him. Gomez denied ever having 
met with Cabezas, Pereira or Troilo, and according to CIA Gomez was 
not in Costa Rica at the time of the first meeting in April or May. Troilo 
denied meeting with Gomez, but claimed that he was introduced by Me-
neses to another CIA agent named Roberto. Three high-ranking Costa 
Rican Contras, Pastora, Prado, and Aguado, claimed that they worked 
with a CIA agent, assigned to help build the southern front during the 
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early years, named Ivan Gomez167.
Who Ivan Gomez is, is unknown, and informations about him is minus-
cule, but according to the information that Webb had gathered, Gomez is 
properly  Venezuelan  and  related  to  Carlos  Andrés  Pérez,  the  former 
Venezuelan president. Clarridge who was in charge of the Contras from 
1981-1984 denied knowing that Gomez worked for CIA, but their own 
report confirms that Gomez did work for CIA from June 1982 to Marts 
1988. CIA’s report states that Gomez was not in Costa Rica in May, but in 
Washington  for  a  job  interview  with  CIA.  Further  CIA  claims  that 
Gomez had applied for Juan Gomez as his covert name, but because of 
his  bad handwriting CIA issued him Ivan Gomez as  his  covert  name 
when he was hired in June 1982. Based on these two claims Cabezas’ 
claim of Gomez involvement in the drug trafficking operation was re-
fused. Before Gomez was reassigned from Costa Rica to another Central 
American country in October 1984 CIA had become worried about that 
Gomez had become to close to ARDE. During 1986-1988 Gomez under-
went numerous polygraph examinations, and during a examination in 
Marts 1987 he admitted that he had help a family member traffic drug 
and launder money in the US in Marts or April 1982; around the same 
time as Cabezas claimed he first was introduced to Gomez in either April 
or May 1982. Gomez also admitted that he had helped his brother-in-law, 
a Miami based drug trafficker, carrying drug proceeds from New York to 
Miami. Gomez and his brother-in-law was handed $35.000 in a brown 
paper bag, which he believed was drug proceeds. Although Gomez ad-
mitted trafficking drugs and laundering money CIA did not refer the 
case to DOJ for criminal investigation as Gomez admitted crimes was not 
sufficient to indicated that there was criminal intentions in the eyes of 
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CIA. According to CIA’s report Gomez admitted being involved in drug 
trafficking and money laundering before he was hired by CIA. From the 
polygraph  examination  it  is  unclear  whenever  he  trafficked  while  he 
worked for CIA as he was asked whenever he had trafficked drugs either 
before or after was hired by CIA. As only yes or no answer are allowed 
in a polygraph examination. From CIA’s report it appears that Gomez 
was asked questions that only could be inconclusive as his ‘yes’ answer 
was. Since CIA chose only to ask inconclusive question it appears that 
CIA had no wish to know. CIA’s report states that CIA was still in doubt 
after the 1987 polygraph examination if Gomez had trafficked drugs after 
he was hired.  But after another polygraph examination in Marts 1988 
CIA was sure168.
Based  on the  interview,  the  interviewer  believes  Gomez directly  
participated in illegal drug transactions, concealed participation in  
illegal drug transactions, and concealed information about involve-
ment in illegal drug activity169.
There are clear indications in the report that Gomez did indeed smuggle 
drugs while he worked for CIA. The report confirms that CIA protected 
their agent from criminal investigation and continued to use him. In 1985 
an informant told FBI that one of Gomez’s brothers was arranging co-
caine shipments with Roberto Suarez, who was the worlds largest produ-
cer of cocaine at the time. CIA knew of Gomez family ties to drug traf-
fickers, but as Gomez received fine reviews for his work, his colleagues 
and bosses were determined to keep him as an agent170.
He was loyal to us. I was supportive of him throughout (...) What  
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comes across now is the lack of focus on the legal aspects. I was not  
alone, obviously. It is a striking commentary on me and everyone  
that this guy’s involvement in narcotics didn’t weigh more heavily  
on me or the system. We were looking more heavily on this officer’s  
contribution than this incident, accidental or not171.
Pereira was arrested in December 1982. An informant had told FBI that 
Pereira would be flying to Costa Rica via Miami with $80-100.000 in drug 
proceeds. Then arrested in Miami Pereira was carrying $70.000 that he 
had failed to declare.  FBI wire taps records shows that  Pereira called 
Cabezas from the jail  and told him he needed money. Cabezas replied 
that Jairo Meneses was giving him money to pass on to him. Pereira, who 
FBI knew was a major drug trafficker, was fine a minor fine for failing to 
declaring the $70.000 and when set free. As soon as Pereira was back in 
Costa Rica in January 1983 he called Cabezas and told him to get ready to 
received “some material” that he would send him. Pereira continued his 
drug trafficking until 1986 when he was arrested in Costa Rica on drug 
charges and sentenced to 12 years imprisonment172.  While Pereira had 
been detained for not declaring the $70.000 FBI had made the first arrests 
in what became known as the Frogman case. Through wire taps FBI dis-
covered that a cocaine shipment would arrive on a Colombian freighter. 
Two men was arrested on 22 December 1982 as they were carrying 17.5 
kilo cocaine off the Colombian freighter ‘Ciudad de Nieva’. In the first 
week of January 1983 another Colombian freighter ‘Ciudad de Cucuta’ 
arrived in San Francisco. FBI knew ‘Ciudad de Cucuta’ as they during a 
previous raid had found cocaine on board the ship. A stakeout was set 
up. On 17 January 1983 the traffickers arrived, some dressed in wetsuits, 
to unload their cocaine shipment. FBI moved in and arrested all the traf-
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fickers who was heavily armed; no surprise considering the value of the 
195 kilo cocaine shipment on the ship. Two week later police seized 67.5 
kilo cocaine on board another Colombian freighter. Cabezas and Zavala 
were arrested along with their Colombian supplier and some minor drug 
dealers during 14 simultaneous police raids in San Francisco on 15 Feb-
ruary 1983173.
Details of the Colombian involvement with the drug rings was passed on 
to the press, but not Meneses’ name.  Zavala and Cabezas lawyers were 
forced to get a court order to get the DOJ to release the documents and 
acknowledge the searches of Jairo Meneses and Julio Bermúdez’s houses. 
DOJ claimed that the searches were unimportant to the case, but the de-
fence lawyers came to a different conclusion. They accused FBI of conceal 
the identity of individuals who had either distributed or supplied co-
caine to the individuals in the case. The records showed, the defence law-
yers claimed, that there was a direct and ongoing connection between 
Norwin Meneses’  organistation and Cabezas.  The press  In Costa Rica 
and Nicaragua gave the Frogman case had a different spin, it was not the 
Colombians that were in focus, as the Sandinista paper ‘Barricada’ repor-
ted174:
Narcotics police of San Francisco, California, carried out a haul last  
Wednesday  of  20  cocaine  traffickers,  among  whom  are  several  
Nicaraguans who supported through this criminal activity the eco-
nomic needs of Contra groups175.
Before Zavala’s trial began the defence handed Judge Roberrt Peckham 
two  letters  that  were  addressed  to  the  court  and  concerned  Zavala’s 
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activities on behalf the Contras. One was written by Pereira’s brother-in-
law Aviles, who indentified himself as the international relations secret-
ary of UDN. The other letter was written by Aviles and Vicenta Rappac-
ciolo Marquis on behalf the Conservative Party of Nicaraguans in Exile 
(PCNE). The two letters stated that Zavala’s was a Contra official who 
was working for the Contras at the time of his arrest. Zavala was accord-
ing to the letters assistant treasurer of PCNE and a long time member of 
UDN. During the raid on Zavala’s apartment police discovered $36.020 
in his night drawer and seized it as drug proceeds along with cocaine 
and drug paraphernalia that was found in the apartment. According to 
the letters the seized money belonged to the Contras who had asked Za-
vala to make a some purchases for them in San Francisco. The Contras 
wanted their money back and Aviles was willing to testify if necessary. 
Zavala’s defence attorney wanted to go to Costa Rica and take the two 
Contras’ deposition. If their story was true then he would defend Zavala 
on the ground that176:
[A]gents of the U.S. Government were intricately involved in the  
alleged conspiracy and either sanctioned the use of cocaine traffick-
ing to raise funds for the Contra revolutionary activity and/or en-
trapped the Defendant into participating under the belief that such  
activity was sanctioned177.
Judge Peckham sealed the documents on the defence’s requested, as the 
defence feared that if  their identity became known to the US Govern-
ment, it could expose the two Contras to political pressure or harm. After 
a second meeting Judge Peckham orders the prosecution to go to Costa 
Rica and take the two depositions. A week later CIA learns from its Los 
Angeles office that Aviles and Rappacciolo were to be questioned in con-
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nection with Zavala’s trial178. The CIA cable stated that the Los Angeles 
office was:
concerned that this kind of uncoordinated activity [i.e., the AUSA  
and FBI visit and depositions] could have serious implications for  
anti-Sandinista activities in Costa Rica and elsewhere179.
Here the first mix up occurs then CIA misidentified Vicente Rappaccioli 
Marquis with on of their agents with same name, but whom was 10 years 
older; both Rappacciolis worked for the Contras. Aviles was elected as 
secretary of the CIA funded PCNE in 1982 but was kicked out of PCNE 
according to CIA in August 1983 because of his handling of the organisa-
tions money. A 1984 CIA cable stated that Aviles relationship with the 
Contras should be terminate as it would be most damaging if he contin-
ued to be part of the movement, which indicates he was not fired in 1983. 
Yet another cable claimed that Aviles was fired in 1986 as the UDN com-
mander Fernando Chamorro was outraged because of Aviles’ connection 
to drug trafficking. In the summer of 1984 Chamorro had begun smug-
gling drugs with Meneses according to a CIA cable.  CIA’s conclusion 
was that he wrote the court and claimed that the drug tainted money be-
fore he joined the Contras later in 1984 and was subsequently fired when 
Chamorro found out about Aviles’ drug connection. It is more likely that 
the reason for Aviles’ dismissal have to do with the fact that in 1986 the 
press was beginning to uncovering the link between the Frogman case 
and the Contras.  CIA’s report states that they feared the link would be 
perceived as if CIA was funnelling money into drug trafficking and us-
ing  the  proceeds  to  fund  an  illegal  insurgence.  Hence  the  confusing 
claims. The alternative time frame produced in CIA’s report eliminates 
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connections between the Frogman case and the Contras and between the 
Frogman case and CIA. Admitting that Aviles was an active and elected 
member of the CIA funded Contra organisation when he wrote the court, 
it would confirm that there was indeed a link between the drug traffick-
ers, the CIA financed Contras and CIA. If the alternative time frame was 
true it would creates problems too. UDN left ARDE and rejoined the CIA 
run FDN in 1984. When scrutinising the statements in CIA’s report it is 
appearent that Aviles was an elected and leading member of PNCE at 
the time of the Frogman case, and was fired sometime in 1986 when the 
press learned about the links to the Frogman case180.
When CIA in August 1984 learned about the two letters from its Contra 
officials and that their dispositions were to be taken CIA intervened. CIA 
asked their Costa Rican office not to contact Aviles or Rappaccioli as they 
had a plan, and if it worked then Aviles and Rappaccioli would not be 
questioned. A meeting with the prosecution, US Attorney Zanides, had 
been arranged. CIA was concerned about the disclosure of the two Con-
tras identity, Zanides recalled, and therefore preferred Aviles and Rap-
paccioli’s not to be questioned. CIA did not explain their interest in the 
case was, but simply stated that they would be very grateful, if the de-
positions were not taken. A problem that Zanides could understand, but 
there was another problem. Neither Zanides nor CIA knew the contents 
of the two letters. Zanides filled a motion asking that he be allowed to 
see the letters, since it would help the prosecution preparing to take the 
depositions. There was no need to unseal the letters, Zanides argued, as 
long as the prosecution was allowed to see them, and since the prosecu-
tion had to  take the  dispositions  of  the two Contras,  the  prosecution 
would have to learn their identities at one point or another. But the Judge 
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reasoned that since the letters had been sealed to prevent the government 
from learning the identity of the two Contras their would be no need to 
keep them under seal as the prosecution were about to take their disposi-
tions. Judge Peckham unsealed the letters. As soon as Zanides and CIA 
had finished reading the letters, Zanides went back to the court and re-
quested that the letters be placed under seal until the prosecution could 
prepare private presentation on why the letters should not be made pub-
lic at all. So judge Peckham sealed the two letters he just had unsealed 
earlier that day. A deal was worked out; the prosecution would return 
the $36.020 to Zavala if the defence would not press the issue of taking 
the depositions181.
The consul in Costa Rica had been informed that it was ‘funny farm’ who 
had the dispositions cancelled. The consul was not sure but thought that 
funny farm meant CIA. The consul had asked the local CIA office, and 
they cabled headquarters for advise so the consul could be reassured that 
CIA had no hand in the cancellation. It would appeared as if the Costa 
Rican  office  were  attempting  to  avoid  getting  their  hands  dirty;  they 
knew from earlier cables that headquarters had attempted to avoid the 
dispositions taken. Instead headquarters cabled back that the prosecution 
had been contacted to  avoid inquiries  in  into  CIA’s  activities  and in-
terests  and the prosecution had on CIA’s  request  returned the seized 
money to Zavala and would not introduced it at the trial. The cable con-
tinued by explaining that the prosecution would never have been able to 
disprove defendant’s  claim that  the money belonged to  CIA,  especial 
considering the link to the Contras, and that CIA was lucky that they had 
the dispositions cancelled. Only God knows, the cable said, what other 
testimony Aviles and Rappacciolis would give, considering that their let-
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ters linked CIA and the Contras directly to the biggest cocaine bust on 
the west coast. As long as any relationship continue to exist between Za-
vala, Rappaccioli and Aviles, the cable continued, then Aviles and Rap-
paccioli’s claim of the drug tainted money would make it look like CIA 
funds was diverted by into the drug trade. And as long as Aviles and 
Rappaccioli play any part in the Contras, the cable stated, then any pub-
lic disclosure would as a certain element have the fact that Aviles and 
Rappaccioli worked for CIA. There is no certain date for then Aviles was 
fired, and both 1983, 1984 and 1986 have been mentioned in the report as 
the year he was fired, but as the cable is from 1984 it is a strong indicate 
that he was still active in the Contras in 1984182. The US Attorney Office 
denies that they returned the money because of CIA’s request, and said 
that the money was returned as the costs of proving that the money were 
drug proceeds were higher than the amount seized183.
There is no mention in neither DOJ nor CIA’s reports of the amount of 
cocaine that Zavala’s organisation smuggled into the US for the Contras, 
but the amount appears to be minor according to the reports. According 
to FBI Cabezas’ ledger only documents the import of 7 to 8 kilos cocaine 
whereas  Cabezas  claimed  that  he  personally  imported  between  10-30 
kilos  of  cocaine184.  The official  claims that  the  amount of  cocaine  was 
minor, is not consistent with the fact that 250 kilos cocaine was seized 
and that it was the biggest drug bust on the west coast at that time185. Ac-
cording to Costa Rican authorities Pereria was the biggest trafficker in 
Costa Rica in the early 1980s186. Cabezas claims that Pereira had told him, 
that:
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he [Pereira] was representing the UDN-FARN and FDN in Costa  
Rica and that they had choosen Zavala’s organisation to sell the co-
caine they were getting in from Peru. He said the money was going  
to the Contras and that the CIA would control the delivery of the  
money187.
CIA’s files contains informations which supports Cabezas’ claim as we 
will see. It is uncertain whenever Zavala claimed to be trafficking for the 
Contras as CIA’s report both stated that he claimed and denied it. CIA 
knew about Zavala as early as 1980 when an CIA asset identified him as 
a Miami based supplier to a drug addicted Nicaraguan government offi-
cial. As the asset continued to have contact with Zavala US law enforce-
ment asked CIA in Marts 1982 to debrief the asset periodically so they 
could gather information on Zavala’s organisation. Same year CIA ter-
minated relations with the asset as it according to CIA was not worth the 
considerable  expenditure188.  The  true  reason  might  well  be  that  CIA 
knew from information they were passing on to FBI that the drug organ-
isation was going to get busted, and to prevent CIA from appearing in 
the middle of a 250 kilos cocaine case, CIA terminated its contract with 
their drug dealing informant in Zavala’s part of the organisation. CIA ac-
knowledged that:
a relative of one of those arrested or charged in the 1983 Frogman  
Case did have a relationship with CIA until mid-1982. That rela-
tionship began in the late 1970s based upon the individual’s access  
to information concerning Nicaraguan Sandinista activities189.
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From the information in CIA’s report, it is not possible to determine if it 
is the same asset that is discussed or if it is two different assets. However 
we know that an CIA asset had knowledge about Zavala’s drug traffick-
ing operations, that an CIA asset was related to Zavala or a member of 
the organization, that one of the Contra was misidentified with an CIA 
asset with the same name, that Cabezas claimed to have meet a CIA as-
set, who’s relatives there drug trafficker and who CIA believed to have 
been drug trafficking himself while working for CIA, that CIA got in-
volved in the prosecution of Zavala’s case to have the depositions of the 
two Contras cancelled, that the two Contras worked for CIA in two Con-
tras fractions that were funded by CIA, and that one of them was misid-
entified too as an CIA asset. Pereira and Sánchez denies trafficking for 
the Contras, although they did admit to traffic cocaine. The two Contra 
leaders  Fernando  and  Aristides  admits  that  they  knew  that  Zavala, 
Pereira  together  with  their  brother  Troilo  were  trafficking  drugs. 
Fernando and Aristides denied involvement or receiving money, but a 
FBI report  stated that  Fernando, Pereira and Troilo  were Zavala and 
Cabezas’ cocaine suppliers. There was a relationship between the Con-
tras and Cabezas, Zavala, Pereira and Troilo Sánchez190.
UDN served as the southern branch of FDN as CIA had forced UDN to 
join in September 1981, but a year later in September 1982 UDN left FDN 
and united with Pastora’s group to create ARDE based in Costa Rica. The 
merger of UDN with Pastora’s group into ARDE was politically sensible, 
as both groups had once been part of the Sandinistas struggle against So-
moza. Both groups hated the National Guardsmen that controlled FDN, 
and both Chamorro and Pastora had gained national fame during their 
fight  against  the  Somoza  regime.  Chamorro  no  longer  reported  Ber-
múdez but to Pastora. In reality little changed as Pastora and Bermúdez 
190 CIA 1998a, paragraph 314, 326
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reported to CIA who paid both of them. It was at this time when ARDE 
was created in September 1982 that Meneses’ cocaine profits started to 
bankroll ARDE according to Webb. That Meneses’ cocaine profits first 
began help funding ARDE in 1982 seems valid, but it could have begun 
even earlier. Pereira and Meneses were trafficking cocaine together be-
fore the overthrow of Somoza Troilo Sánchez told DOJ investigators. Me-
neses’ connections was not limited to FDN Contras but did also included 
UDN in which Pereira’s  brother-in-law was  a  member,  and to  which 
funds were diverted according to Webb191.
There is contradiction in the story as Webb tells it. As the story goes Za-
vala was already getting cocaine from Pereira and Sánchez in Costa Rica 
when Cabezas started working for Zavala in October or November 1981. 
If  Cabezas account  of  the December meeting in Costa Rica is  correct, 
when the it was at this point that it was decided that the Costa Rican co-
caine would be used to fund the Contras, and hence the cocaine then be-
came Contra cocaine in December 1981. This conflicts with the Cabezas’ 
earlier claim; that Zavala had told him, then he started working for him a 
couple of months earlier, that some of the proceeds would go to the Con-
tras. We must bear in mind that must of the testimony is collected during 
the  investigations  in  1996-1998.  Testifying  on  events  15  years  earlier 
means that the placement of certain events at the correct time and dates 
is bound to be flawed. Webb concluded that the the cocaine proceeds 
from Cabezas and Zavala cocaine sales supported UDN192. This conclu-
sion puzzles me a bit, because according to FBI then Zavala and Cabezas’ 
Costa Rican cocaine source were Troilo Sánchez, Fernando Sánchez and 
Horacio  Pereira193,  and according to  Cabezas  the  cocaine  profits  were 
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sometimes handed to Aristides Sánchez. Since Fernando and Aristides 
Sánchez were members of FDN, it do seems as if the cocaine Cabezas and 
Zavala were selling came from FDN. However Cabezas claimed that the 
cocaine helped fund UDN194,  of  which  Pereria’s  brother-in-law,  Aviles 
was a member and who provided Zavala with a letter, stating that the 
money seized during Zavala’s arrest belong PNCE and UDN195. Sebasti-
an Gonzalez was according to the Kerry report a central figure in the 
Pereira  network.  Gonzalez  were  an  high-ranking  member  of  ARDE 
which UDN joined in 1982. A possible indication that the cocaine pro-
ceeds helped UDN is  CIA’s worry that  the depositions of  Aviles  and 
Rappaccioli could “have serious implications for anti-Sandinista activities in  
Costa Rica  a  and elsewhere”196.  There is the geographical proximity, UDN 
was based in Costa Rica where Zavala and Cabezas’ cocaine came from, 
whereas FDN was based in Honduras197,  but Costa Rica might also just 
referrer to John Hull’s farm, which was used as a Contras airbase and a 
major transit point for drugs and guns. I would assume that the cocaine 
and profits helped both UDN and FDN, which UDN was part of until 
September 1982.
It is seems like another attempted denial in CIA’s report that it states that 
Zavala denies that Meneses worked for him or that they worked together 
trafficking drugs for the Contras. Norwin Meneses knew Pereira, Zavala, 
Cabezas, Troilo, and Fernando Sánchez, and he was involved in the their 
drug smuggling activities if not directing them. Police surveillance and 
wire taps shows that there was a link between the Frogman case and Me-
neses. Cabezas receive money from Jairo Meneses to give to Pereira then 
194 CIA 1998a, paragraph 265
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he was jailed. CIA knew about Zavala’s drug trafficking operation too. 
They were involved too such a degree that they had to intervene to pro-
tect their  interests once law enforcement started unrevealing the drug 
network. In short: Meneses and CIA were involved in the Frogman case, 
and funds from CIA was diverted from the Contra organisations into 
drug trafficking198. But did CIA know what was going on? As we will see 
the answer is yes, but could one expect CIA not to know? Through their 
informant they knew a lot more than FBI did.
Guns and Drugs
CIA knew about Zavala’s drug trafficking and that was not the only drug 
trafficking operation CIA was ware of.  The Guatemala based Legion of 
September 15, which Bermúdez became leader of in 1980, had been heav-
ily involved in crime to fund their activities. The Legion had kidnapped, 
extorted and robbed but it was not able to finance their missions, such 
the hijacking and bombing of a civilian Nicaraguan airlines. In order to 
feed  and  cloths  its  members  the  Legion  had  sought  to  finance  itself 
through crime,  which was known to the CIA199.  Still  CIA choose it  is 
leaders to form the core of the Contras. There were no room for other in-
dependent groups, like UDN, who was forced to join FDN under the Le-
gion’s leadership if they wanted to stay in the fight. Legion and UDN 
meet at the CIA rented farm, to sign the CIA drafted documents, and 
elect  its  CIA  chosen  leaders  in  September  1981200.  Same  month  CIA 
headquarters had received a cable, which stated that the Legion had de-
cided to engage in drug trafficking to raise funds for their activities. The 
cable stated that a successful trial run had occurred in July and that the 
drug proceeds had been handed over to one of the Legion’s members in 
198 Webb 1998, 80
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Miami201. CIA’s information came from a single source, which CIA dis-
credited  in  another  cable  from October  1981  where  the  source  is  de-
scribed  as  “untrustworthy  and  a  possible  agent  of  the  Government  of  
Nicaragua”202.  But  the discredited source was right.  A CIA cable from 
February 1982 described that the information did not concern the Legion 
itself,  but  a  renegade  splinter  group,  which  used  the  Legion’s  name. 
What in the CIA cable is describe as a renegade splinter group was in 
fact the Legion’s elite unit203.
CIA received a steady stream of informations during 1981-1982 that in-
dicted that UDN and FDN were involved in organised crime. In January 
1981 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) had requested that 
CIA provide them with a brief  background information on Francesco 
Jose Cardenal and any derogatory information as he was believed to vi-
olated US criminal laws under jurisdiction of ATF204. CIA forwarded bio-
graphical background information and noted that Cardenal “was in con-
tact with a group of Nicaraguans who are preparing an invasion of Nicaragua  
from Honduras and Costa Rica”205. When AFT a month later requested fur-
ther information, CIA replied that it had no additional information and 
“no interest  in  Cardenal  whatsoever”206.  In  fact  Cardenal  was one of  the 
earliest leaders of UDN and became a member of FDN when they were 
united in September 1981. In 1982 Cardenal travelled extensively trying 
to unite the different Contras groups. There is no information in the CIA 
report that Cardenal worked for CIA, but it appears that he did until he 
was kick out of FDN in 1983207. A 1983 CIA cable states that “has shown a  
disregard for security by indiscriminately divulging details of confidential in-
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formation”208. In Marts 1981 FBI contacted CIA because FBI were investig-
ating Neutrality Act violations by Cardenal and UDN. FBI believed that 
UDN had ties to the US and requested information on both Cardenal and 
UDN209. In April FBI informed CIA that they had monitored a conversa-
tion, and that they might have to make it public if the case went to trial. 
What  the  content  of  the  conversation was  or  who participated  is  not 
known, but the conversation and/or the persons involved must have had 
some interest to CIA, since FBI felt it necessary to inform CIA about the 
existence of the tape and its possible publication210. In October 1982 INS 
contacted CIA for informations on Cardenal and UDN. 
According to this [INS’] informant, there are indications of links  
between  [a  specific  U.S.-based  religious  organization]  and  two  
Nicaraguan  counter-revolutionary  groups  [UDN  and  FDNa].  
These links involve an exchange in [the United States] of narcotics  
for arms, which then are shipped to Nicaragua211.
INS’ informant had mentioned that Cardenal had been invited to speak 
at a exile Cuban freedom rally, organised by a group with ties to Omega 
7a, an exile Cuban terrorist group. The INS informant supplied informa-
tion about a upcoming meeting in Costa Rica, attended by FDN, UDN 
and the Unification Church, where the arms for drugs deal would be dis-
cussed. According to CIA’s report CIA was unable to find any informa-
tion that indicated that the drugs for arms meeting in Costa Rica took 
place, but CIA was able to confirm that Cardenal was in Costa Rica at the 
alleged time of the meeting and that he was in San Francisco at the time 
208 CIA 1998b, paragraph 638
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of another meeting mentioned by INS source212. According to CIA’s re-
port INS’ information was disregarded because it did not make sense to 
CIA. Therefore CIA concluded that INS had been misinformed213. Again 
information was discredited and the informant labelled unreliable and 
CIA refuted the allegations. Two years later then ADRE refused to united 
under  FDN  leadership  CIA  surfaced  information  that  indicated  that 
ARDE were heavily involved in drug trafficking to fund their operations.
One of the names named that would participant in the Costa Rican arms 
for drugs meeting was the FDN member Renato Pena, who was inter-
viewed by CIA during its investigation. Pena, was a drug trafficker as he 
himself  admits,  but he denied having trafficked for the Contras.  Pena 
said that he was appointed FDN representative in northern California in 
the late 1982 by Edgar Chamorro. Pena claims that he never travelled 
outside of the US due to his immigrations application, and hence never 
participated in the alleged arms for drugs meeting in Costa Rica. Pena 
and Meneses knew each other, and Pena knew that Meneses dealt with 
Bermúdez and the Contras. Pena made a interesting claim, that the Con-
tras must have had an alternative source of funding, as the funds they re-
ceived from the US was “peanuts”214. Pena had meet an Colombian asso-
ciate of Meneses who told him that portions of the proceeds from the co-
caine Pena brought from them went to the Contras. In 1984 Pena was re-
moved from his position as FDN representative, because because he was 
under investigation for drug trafficking. Instead he was appointed milit-
ary representative for FDN in San Francisco by Bermúdez, which accord-
ing to Pena happened “in part because of Norwin Meneses’ close relationship  
with [Enrique] Bermudez”215.
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According to all the CIA agent that was interviewed for the CIA report, 
drug trafficking did not happened and none of them have any recollec-
tion of any drug trafficking by anyone connected with the Contras. The 
overriding priority was to support the Contras. Narcotics was not on the 
radar screen at the time one agent said. The standard worldwide covert 
operation practice was to report any criminal activity to the station dir-
ector, who was responsible for forwarding the information to Headquar-
ters. As we will discus later, CIA was not obligated to report narcotics vi-
olation to US law enforcement, and agents involved in covert operations 
were exempted from any obligation at all to report crimes to law enforce-
ment. According to CIA’s Central American personal the one and over-
riding priority was ousting the Sandinistas. Politics complicated the task 
and it  was understood that  Congressional  restrictions had to  be hon-
oured as one CIA agent explained, and then continued216:
At the same time, they were determined that the various difficulties  
they encountered not be allowed to prevent effective implementa-
tion of the Contra program.217
[T]here was a range of derogatory information that may have in-
cluded narcotics activities. Early traces revealed these folks should  
be treated carefully. Some were scoundrels. (...) but we were going  
to play with these guys. That was made clear by Casey and (...)  
Clarridge218.
Norwin Meneses was, by most accounts, known as the man to see if your 
wanted to join the Contras219. DEA agent Sandra Smith, who had been in-
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vestigation the Meneses family,  believed that  Meneses was running a 
drug trafficking organization that possible was involved in arms smug-
gling too. Sandra Smith’s hunch was correct. Two days after the Boland 
amendment were lifted in 1986 Meneses’ lieutenant Blandón was arres-
ted. According to Sergeant Tom Gordon in LASD Blandón was in charge 
of a complex cocaine smuggling operation which laundered the proceeds 
through a bank in Florida, and then used to buy arms for the Contras220. 
Ronald  Lister  had  worked  for  Blandón  almost  since  the  time  that 
Blandón had begun working for Meneses. Lister, a former military police 
officer, police officer and a convicted felon, had left law enforcement in 
1980 and founded Pyramid International, a private security firm. In 1981 
Lister meet Blandón whom introduced him to Meneses. Lister was hired 
and paid in cash to “provided physical security for both men”221. Lister was 
involved  in  Blandón’s  cocaine  business  too.  Lister’s  employee,  Bill 
Downing, had told Lister that Meneses and Blandón were cocaine deal-
ers and had suggested that they started to sell cocaine for Blandón. Lister 
approached Blandón and  “began doing business  with  him right  away”222. 
Lister’s admitted cocaine trading is not the interesting aspect of his ca-
reer, that is his arms trading. According to Christopher Moore, one of 
Lister’s employees, Lister was doing business in Central America, spe-
cifically in El Salvador, where he was involved in arms trading and
helping the Contras, supposedly on behalf the [U.S.] government. I  
remember  the  longest  conversations  with  him  –  “I’m  protected.  
You’re working for the government. Don’t worry about anything.  
I’m protected, I’m protected”. I don’t know if that was true or not,  
but I do know that we stooped worrying about domestic security  
jobs and started concentrating on foreign ones223.
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Moore started working for Lister in 1982 and was shortly after asked to 
fly to El Salvador and babysit a government while Lister returned to US. 
Moore agreed, to what became the strangest trip of his life. As Moore did 
not speak much Spanish he was accompanied by a man who had intro-
duced himself as the El Salvadorian consul in Los Angeles, who would 
be his guide and interpretor during the trip. Moore was flown to an air-
base, which the French were building, and to a series of meetings with 
Major Roberto D’Aubuisson at Ramada Inn in San Salvador. The head of 
the El Salvadorian parliament Ray Prendes attended one of the meetings. 
D’Aubuisson and Prendes appeared to have a role in the award of the se-
curity contract that Lister was seeking. Whenever Lister got the contract 
or not, Moore did not know. Moore stopped working for Lister in 1983 
just after Lister began dealing in heavy weapons. Lister is often described 
as a man that boasted about having good connections and bugging cap-
abilities capable of getting any information any time224. If it is true or not; 
we do not know, but Frederico Cruz who owned Ramada Inn in San Sal-
vador where Moore and Lister stayed was not in doubt. Lister did what 
he said he did; sold arms to the Contras225. In October 1982 Lister’s Pyr-
amid International had a contract proposal to the El Salvadoran defence 
minister for a variety of services that included armed escort service and 
bodyguards for  El  Salvadoran public  officials,  including the president 
and top political and military leaders, protection of sensitive installations 
from sabotage and terrorism, installation of sophisticated electronic tech-
nology, including radio sensors and explosives detectors, at key military 
and industrial installations; but the contract proposal was just but a cover 
for another operation according to Timothy LaFrance, a San Diego based 
arms manufacture and business partner with Lister at the time. The real 
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operation was to set up arms manufacturing facilities in El Salvador for 
the Contras. LaFrance described Lister’s business, Pyramid International, 
as “a private vendor that the CIA used to do things [the agency] could not do”226
.  LaFrance  said that  he twice  accompanied Lister  to  El  Salvador  as  a 
weapons specialist  and helped set up facilities to make pistols for the 
Contras. By setting up arms production in El Salvador US law could be 
circumvented and the Contras supplied with arms. Attached to Lister’s 
Salvadoran contract proposal, was a list of nameless biographies where 
one employee is identified as a “specialist in the design and manufacture of  
unique  weapons”227.  LaFrance  have  made  custom  made  weapons  for 
Rambo and Miami Vice, and Moore confirmed that Lister had a friend 
who was a arms manufacture in San Diego, although Moore could not 
recall the name. To LaFrance it was obvious that Lister had friends in 
high places as once LaFrance applied in Pyramid’s name for a State De-
partment permit to take high powered rifles out of the US; it was ap-
proved in two days instead of the usual three months228.
The S  uper Crack Dealer  Freeway Ricky  
The Contras made a policy decision traffic drugs as a means to finance 
their operations; information that CIA disregarded. The Contras passed 
on CIA funds to a drug dealer in the Frogman case, which its many links 
to CIA and in which CIA intervened. The Frogman case did have links to 
Meneses, who was suspected of being involved in guns for drugs trades. 
Meneses’ employee Lister was involved in supplying the Contras with 
guns.  Meneses  supplied  Blandón with  cocaine,  who in  turn  supplied 
Ross. If a just small proceed from the Meneses-Blandón cocaine made it 
back to the Contras, then it would have been a huge income as Ross was 
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one of the biggest domestic dealers in the mid-1980s. Ross confirmed in 
court for the prosecution, where he testified in a criminal case against the 
cops who had tried and failed to arrest him, that he ran a multi-million 
dollars crack-cocaine empire in Los Angeles.
Jerry Guzzetta was a narcotics detective in the small town of Bell and 
had worked with two federal agents in a investigation of local a drug 
dealer. When IRS received a tip about the two customers who were mak-
ing large cash deposit on a regular basis in two local banks the federal 
agents  asked  Guzzetta  for  help.  Guzzatta  trailed  the  two  customers. 
Jacinto and Edgar Torres owned the used car lot were Blandón worked. 
The brothers travelled Los Angeles extensively, picking up and dropping 
off packages all over Los Angeles, and then there was their midnight trip 
to South Central where Ross lived. When police raided one of the Torres 
brothers’ houses in August 1986, Guzzatta discovered $400.000 in cash 
but no drugs. Like most smart drug dealers the Torres brothers had hid 
drugs and cash at different locations. The brothers’ weak spot turn out to 
be their girlfriends, who were Pablo Escobar’s cousins. Guzzatta told the 
brothers that he would let them walk, but that their girlfriends would be 
prosecuted  on  conspiracy  and  tax  evasions  charges,  afterwards  they 
would deported as undesirable aliens and forever denied entrance into 
the US. By prosecuting their girlfriends it  would appear as if that the 
brothers had sacrificed their girlfriends to save themselves from the law. 
Scarifying Pablo Escobar’s relatives was a certain way to have soon and 
painful death arranged. The brothers had no choice but to become in-
formants229.
“They were scared to death”, Guzzetta said. “They believed very  
strongly, and I agreed with them, that if anyone found out they  
229 Webb 1998, 263ff
were informants – including their girlfriends – they’d be killed in a  
minute”230.
The brothers agreed to plea guilty to drug charges, but under false name 
to minimize the risk exposure and Guzzetta was made their sole police 
contact for their probation. Even with the precautions it took less than 11 
days before the brothers was convinced that their girlfriends had hired a 
couple of assassin to kill them. The brothers was told to call Guzzetta 
every 24 hours to let him know that they still were a live. The two broth-
ers currently had around 1 ton of cocaine stored in Los Angeles, and ad-
mitted to have laundered roughly $100 million since January 1986. The 
brothers had between $250-500 million stored in various locations in Los 
Angeles that they had been unable to get out of the US. At first Guzzetta 
doubted the Torres brothers claims; he had never come across an inform-
ant who had a half billion stashed away in Los Angeles, but after trailing 
the brothers for a few days Guzzetta believed them. In those few days 
the brothers had picked up and delivered 40 kilos of cocaine, and collec-
ted and delivered $720.000231.
The Torres brothers were dealing with one major market in South Cent-
ral,  which was controlled by two black men, Rick and Ollie, Guzzetta 
wrote in his report. The informants, Guzzetta continued, estimates that 
the two black dealers are generating a conservative figure of $10 million 
a month. According to the brothers Rick where receiving cocaine from 
three Colombians whom they only knew by nickname, and “a fourth peri-
pheral” source whom they knew quite well: Blandón. The brothers told 
Guzzetta that Blandón was extremely dangerous, because of his access to 
information, and because he was able to “(...) override the informants’ mar-
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ket, thus cutting of the informants from the supply source of cocaine and cur-
rency, (...)”232. The brothers believed that Blandón had access to inside in-
formations from law enforcement. Ricky Ross confirm that Blandón had 
an incredible ability to accurately predict upcoming police raids. Accord-
ing to the brothers one of Blandón’s associates were the ex-police officer 
Ronald Lister, who had transported 100 kilos of cocaine for Blandón to 
Ross, and who had transported millions of dollars to Miami for Blandón. 
Once the cash arrived in Miami it was laundered by Roberto Orlando 
Murillo, an uncle to Blandón’s wife who had been appointed Nicaragua’s 
National Bank Director in 1978 by Somoza.
Guzzetta suspected that the case was out of his league as he was the 
single drug officer in Bell City’s police corps, but when the two brothers 
began talking about the Contras, and airfields in New Orleans and Texas 
were cocaine from the Contras was flown in under armed guard, then 
Guzzetta knew it was out of his league. Guzzetta’s boss asked him if he 
would mind working with LASD’s Major Violators Squad known by its 
nickname: the Majors, an elite narcotics unit that had all the resources, all 
the  funding,  all  the  surveillance  equipment,  night  vision  stuff,  heli-
copters, and overtime pay it needed. The Majors handled all the biggest 
cases, seized the largest amounts of cocaine and got the biggest overtime 
checks233. Guzzetta agreed and handed his notes them over the Sgr. Tom 
Gordon in the Majors. The case had an element that Gordon had never 
encountered before during his four years with the Majors; a drug ped-
dling CIA army. The first bust the Majors made using informations from 
the Torres brothers netted three Colombian dealers with military ids, 131 
kilos of cocaine, and $221.005234.  Guzzetta wanted to learn more about 
the mysterious black dealer called Rick and asked the two Torres broth-
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ers to show him around South Central. One of the places that the broth-
ers showed him was the Freeway Motor Inn, which they told Gazzetta 
that Rick had bought for a million dollars. That made Gazzetta realized 
one important thing. Since the late 1985 police had heard rumour about a 
super crack dealer in South Central called Freeway Ricky, and by April 
1986 police had received information which lead them to believed that 
super crack dealer Freeway Ricky in fact did exist. Driving by the Free-
way Motor Inn that Rick owned Gazzetta had realized that the brothers 
client named Rick was in fact Freeway Ricky. The brothers had lead him 
straight  to South Central’s  mysterious super crack dealer.  Two of  the 
three Majors units were assigned to the case. Majors I worked on Ross’ 
organisation from the bottom up, and Majors II  worked from the top 
down235.
The Major initially tried to target Ross’ cocaine source, but when the case 
against Blandón failed, a task force was formed in January 1987 to take 
Ross out of business. Since the Majors already knew Ross and his organ-
isation, they made up a large part of the Freeway Ricky Task Force. The 
Majors and the task force had harassed and threaten Ross, his family and 
friends. When Fenster, Ross’ attorney, complained to the LASD and DOJ 
about police harassment. Instead Fenster was accused of money launder-
ing and his office searched. It became public knowledge, according to a 
task force detective, that one of the task force’s members was driving 
around with a kilo of cocaine in the tire well of his car; ready to plan the 
cocaine on Ricky when he ran into him. Ricky Ross feared for his life, 
and it might have been with good reason. In February 1987 the task force 
ransacked his girlfriends apartment and left a note for him, which was 
attached to a knife, that had been pined to the wall through the head of 
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his daughter’s doll236.
One evening in April 1987 the task force managed to hunt down Ross. 
After a car chase Ricky ditched the car and attempted to make a run for 
it. Behind him Ross could hear gun shots, but all misted and Ross man-
aged to escape.  His friends,  who had been in the car  with Ross,  was 
caught and beaten up with flash lights and leathers saps. A task force 
member pulled out a kilo of cocaine from his car, and claimed that Ross 
had dropped the bag while running, but as the task force needed to ex-
plained why they had fired shots, they accused Ross of shooting at them. 
In all Ross was charged with four counts of conspiracy, three counts of 
transporting controlled substances,  one  count  of  assault.  Three  weeks 
later Ross turned himself in, and the police issued a press release that an-
nounced the demise of Ross’ multi-million dollar mid level crack cocaine 
organisation. Their success became short lived. It was revealed at his trial 
that there existed a taped recording where members of the task force dis-
cussed how they should frame Ross. The judge insisted that the tape be 
handed over to the court. Before it was handed over amateurish attempts 
were made to doctor the tape and the judge dismissed the case237.
Ross had had it. He decided to quit his career and moved to Cincinnati in 
Ohio. Ross and Blandón had become close friends, and kept in contact 
after Ross moved to Cincinnati. Ross had invested most of his remaining 
money in a car business, but his business soon headed towards bank-
ruptcy.  So when Blandón, who had often asked Ross to get back into 
business, again offered Ross cocaine at a cheap price, Ross was sold. Ross 
missed doing the one thing he knew he was good at; selling cocaine. In 
1987  Ross  began selling  cocaine  again,  this  time  in  Cincinnati  where 
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profits were higher than in Los Angeles that had been flooded with co-
caine. Crack-cocaine spread quickly in Cincinnati. The pattern from Los 
Angeles repeated itself. With cheap cocaine from Blandón Ross was able 
to dominate the marked as he had done in Los Angeles. With his busi-
ness success Ross needed trusted employees, and soon gang members 
from Los Angeles started arriving in Cincinnati to help Ross build his 
new  empire.  Now  Cincinnati  had  two  new  problems:  crack  and  the 
Crips. Ross’ cocaine did not stay within the city limit, and was traced to 
various cities in Ohio and as fare as Missouri, Minnesota, Indiana, Geor-
gia, and Texas238
Ross moved back to Los Angeles in fall of 1988 with problems piling up 
in Cincinnati. Alphonso Jeffries who worked for Ross was caught when 
he had picked up a nine kilo cocaine shipment for Ross at the the Grey-
hound terminal in Cincinnati. Ross feared that Jeffries would rat him out 
as he already had done. Around the same time Ross discovered that an-
other of his employees was, literally, fucking his girlfriend. On top of 
that Ross was indicted with cocaine conspiracy in Texas. Before Ross was 
arrested in November 1989 he had in June been indicted on cocaine con-
spiracy charges in Cincinnati too. What Ross did not no know, was that 
he would become a witness for the government against the Majors and 
Freeway Ricky Task Force239. In return for his cooperation the DOJ would 
cut hos sentence in half and allow him to keep his remaining properties 
and money, valued at $2 million240. The Major had been ripping off drug 
traffickers, and LASD had started investigating their officers as the stor-
ies the dealers told were more credible than the officers’. FBI become in-
volved in the investigation and set up an undercover operation called 
Operation Big Spender. The Majors were given a tip that a money laun-
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der courier had checked into the Valley Hilton Hotel. The Majors raided 
the hotel room, pulled out a suitcase from under the bed with $480.000. 
While being filmed by FBI’s hidden camera, the Majors stuffed $48.000 
into a gym bag, confiscated the remaining money and handed them in at 
the  station.  That  night  FBI  raided the  homes  of  the  deputies  and re-
covered some of the marked cash. Nine members of the Majors were im-
mediately suspended and two days later a member of the Majors went to 
FBI and agreed to testify against his squat. Much of what Ross had said 
turned out to be true, the Majors had beaten up suspects, planted drugs, 
lied in court, falsified search warrants affidavits, stolen drug and drug 
proceeds241. The first round trials from Operation Big Spender resulted in 
the conviction of six of seven Majors who had been charged242.
Ross became the governments star witness in the second rounds corrup-
tion trials following FBI’s Operation Big Spender. The federal prosecutor 
introduced Ross as “properly the most significant drug dealer” ever to testify 
for the government243. Ricky Ross and a host of minor crack dealers ap-
peared as government witnesses, and openly told the wide eyed jurors 
about the inner world of big time crack dealing. Alander Smith, a minor 
dealer who was introduced to strengthen the testimony of Ross, ended 
up being the direct cause for the aquittal of the defendants. After he had 
collaborated Ross’ testimony, Smith commenced a lecture on the drug 
war where he accused government officials for trafficking drugs into the 
US244.
“Yes,  I  mean  President  Bush”  Smith  told  the  Jurors  pointedly.  
“When he was with the CIA and now... The government is the only  
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people that have access to the equipment, but the minorities are the  
ones who do the time for it.”245
The trail became a failure but as Ross had kept his part of the agreement 
and testified the prosecution asked for his sentencing to be reduced. It 
was reduced from 10 years to 4 years and 3 months. Ross would be a free 
man in a little more than a year after the trial ended246.
The Majors, Blandón and Lister
What is  a  curious about the  Big Spender trials  is  that  Deputy Daniel 
Garner from the Majors sought to get Ronald Lister to testify. Garner had 
secretly copied 10 pages from the documents that the Majors had seized 
then they raided Lister’s  house in  1986.  Garner  hoped that  the pages 
would get him off the hook, as the documents showed that the govern-
ment was involved in drug trafficking and laundering drug profits. Har-
land Braun, Garner’s defence attorney, doubted that the copies would 
have the impact his client hope for, but it could prove at useful bargain-
ing chip. It was not Braun’s opening, but close to. While cross examining 
one of the FBI agents who had participated in the Big Spender operation, 
Braun asked the agent if he knew anything about seized drug money be-
ing laundered by the federal government and then diverted to the Con-
tras by CIA. After the day in court, Braun held his usual post trial spin 
session, where he was asked about his strange question to the FBI agent 
about  the  Contras  and  CIA.  Braun  explained  that  he  was  laying  the 
groundwork for  his  defence:  outrageous government  conduct.  Garner 
was a court  certified expert,  Braun pointed out and said,  that  Garner 
would explain in court how some of the cash he had been accused of 
stealing had been laundered by CIA and then used to buy arms for the 
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Contras  or  other  covert  operations.  Los  Angeles  Times  ran  an  article 
about Braun’s accusations247.
The prosecution asked the judge bar the defence from using this kind of 
argument as it was only meant as a smokescreen, and had no impact on 
the crimes committed. Braun replied in a motion that Garner had copied 
10 pages of the documents that had been seized in the raid at Lister’s 
house, and that these 10 pages had names of CIA agents in Iran, men-
tioned the Contras,  listed various weapons that  was being purchased. 
The pages contained a diagram that showed the route by which drug 
money was taken out of the US and back in again to buy arms for the 
Contras, and named the State Department as one of the involved agen-
cies. The pages, Braun explained, had been seized by the Majors in a raid 
in 1986 on a money launder, as Lister was identified, who the Majors 
knew was associated with a major drug trafficking and money launder-
ing operation that was connected to the Contras. Braun repeated Lister’s 
claim of CIA connections, and listed the items that the Majors had seized 
in Lister house, films of military operations in Central America, technical 
manuals,  information on assorted  military hardware  and communica-
tions,  and  numerous  documents,  which  indicated  that  drug proceeds 
were used to buy military hardware for the Contras in Central America. 
The police had seized blown up pictures of Lister in Central America 
with  Contras  who showed  military  bases  and hardware.  The Majors, 
Braun said, had pieced together that Lister had worked with Blandón 
who had imported cocaine from Central America into the US. Braun’s 
motion linked the crash of Hasenfus’ to, what he termed, the Blandón 
family248.
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The Judge ruled in favour of the prosecution, and barred Braun from 
continuing his line of defence as it had nothing to do with Garner’s case. 
In a later trial of the murder of DEA agent Camarena, the same judge re-
fused the defence from introducing material that alleged a link between 
CIA, the Contras and Mexican drug lords249. Camarena was kidnapped, 
tortured and killed by Mexican authorities, because Camarena had dis-
covered an CIA operation, former DEA agent Levine writes250. This was 
not the last time the US prosecution decided to protect murders. In 2004 
US prosecution again decided to protect an Homeland Security inform-
ant,  who had attempted to  kill  two DEA agents  and their  families251. 
Braun’s attempt to link Lister to the Big Spender case almost succeed, ac-
cording to Webb. Before investigating Ross the Majors had attempted to 
jail Blandón, and it was during this investigation that the Majors had ar-
rested Blandón and Lister, who Braun had described as a money launder 
with connections to both CIA and the Contras252.
When Guzzetta had teamed up with the Majors to investigate the inform-
ations provided by the Torres brothers, he had handed his notes over to 
Tom Gordon, the sergeant of the Majors second squad. Original the Ma-
jors had targeted the Colombians that the Torres brothers had indicated 
where Ross’ main suppliers, but the Majors had no luck linking to the 
Colombians to Ross. Instead the Majors targeted Blandón. If the two ma-
jor dealers who had half a billion dollars and a ton of cocaine stashed 
away  in  Los  Angeles  and  who  dated  Pablo  Escorbar’s  cousins  were 
afraid of Blandón then he most be important the Majors reckoned253.
Tom Gordon started the investigation the standard way; by making a 
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check on Blandón in the NIN and NADDIS databases. Blandón already 
had a file in NADDIS were he was listed as a Class One trafficker, which 
means he was amount the biggest traffickers. The file linked Blandón to 
the Torres brothers through an address in Glendale; the area were both 
Jario Meneses and Carlos Cabezas lived. A couple of files from 1983 and 
1984 described him as the head of the drug trafficking organisation in 
Los Angeles. The file named the only two known associates of Blandón: 
Norwin Meneses and Roger Sandino. The NADDIS check on Sandino 
showed that he had been convicted in 1981 for selling 50.000 Quaalude 
tables in Florida. It was a small file Sandino had in NADDIS, and nothing 
compared to the file that showed up then Gordon checked NADDIS for 
Meneses name. The NADDIS database showed that Meneses first was in-
vestigated in 1974, and that he had been in NADDIS since 1976, and was 
classified as a Class One trafficker. There were a couple of classified files 
attached to his file, which showed that he had been bringing in cocaine to 
New York Orleans, Miami, San Francisco and Los Angeles from Colom-
bia,  Costa Rica, and Ecuador.  The NADDIS file also showed that Me-
neses files had last been accessed 19 days earlier, and that a number of 
investigations were still open. Although Meneses had been under invest-
igation for more than a decade, he had never been charged with a single 
crime. Then Gordon brought up Lister’s file, it simply said that he was an 
ex-cop who was under an active DEA investigation. All details in the file 
were classified, but it had been opened less than a month earlier.  The 
NADDIS  database  lists  the  owners  of  the  files,  which  in  the  case  of 
Blandón and Lister was DEA agent Sandalio González at the US Em-
bassy  in  Costa  Rica.  When  Gordon  called  González  in  Costa  Rica 
González started screaming that all the lines go through Nicaragua and 
Gordon could not called him on a open line, but that he would fly to 
Panama and call him from there. Five days later when Gordon came back 
after being out of the office for a short while he found a note on his deck 
saying254:
Tom, got a call from Sandy González of Costa Rica DEA. He said  
[local DEA agent] will let you read the info. Sandy can not talk on  
the phone because all the lines are through Nicaragua. Sandy asks  
that you don’t mention anything in your s/w [search warrant affi-
davit]. It’s a burn.255
‘Burn’ is cop slang for that the investigation had been exposed and the 
bad guys know about it. For the same reason Gordon should not give 
any details in his search warrant affidavit because it would give away 
their source of informations256. Gordon called the local DEA office in Los 
Angeles,  and  was  told  that  González  did  not  investigate  Blandón  or 
Lister, but that a DEA agent in Riverside was. When Gordon contacted 
the Riverside agent Thomas A. Schrettner, Gordon should have been sus-
picions.  Schrettner was happy to help Gordon.  According to Gordon, 
DEA had a reputation for coming in and stealing the best cases, and DEA 
almost never handed of  national cases to local departments.  Yet DEA 
was  not  interested  in  a  multi-kilo  and  -million  drug  case.  Schrettner 
mailed a copy of his lasted report to Gordon and all Gordon’s worries 
disappeared. This was a worldwide trafficking case; no worries about 
how the investigation could be a burn. The only investigation that the 
Majors had done so fare was a couple of NADDIS checks, and only the 
Majors and a few DEA agents knew about that. How could it be a burn? 
Why would DEA in Costa  Rica  open a  file  on two traffickers  in  Los 
Angeles? And why was Schrettner happy to help?257
Schrettner told Gordon that DEA had had an informant inside the drug 
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network for three years, and that they had investigated Blandón the prior 
year. A DEA agent was shot during a raid so the local DEA agents where 
eager to bust Blandón, but they had been told not to do the case by their 
superiors. That was the reason why they handed over a worldwide drug 
trafficking case to the LASD. The copy of report that Gordon received 
stated that Schrettner had debriefed an informant that had been working 
for Blandón since 1983 after he first meet him in Miami. The informant 
admitted to hauling kilos of cocaine and millions of dollars across the 
border for Blandón in 1984 and 1985. Before doing a drug run the inform-
ant had tipped off FBI about the shipment and the route, but nothing 
happened. According to the informant the drug network hauled approx-
imately 400 kilos of cocaine a month, which was delivered to Blandón’s 
organisation in Los Angeles, who then bought the cocaine to Meneses’ 
organisation in San Francisco. According to Schrettner’s informant Nor-
win Meneses, Roger Sandino, Jacinto Torres, and Ronald Lister were in-
volved, and the groups primary money launder was Blandón’s wife’s 
uncle and the former National Bank Director in Nicaragua Roberto Or-
lando Murillo. Schrettner’s informant said that proceeds from the drug 
sale was going to the Contras in Nicaragua. But it was not only DEA that 
had information,  which linked Blandón to the Contras.  Douglas Auk-
land, a FBI agent in Riverside, had investigated Blandón too and his in-
formant had told him that parts of the profits from the drug sales when 
to  the  Contras  in  Nicaragua.  Now  Gordon  had  three  independent 
sources who told the same story; that proceeds from cocaine sales were 
funding the Contras in Nicaragua258.
Gordon informed his boss about his investigation. Gordon was ordered 
to cooperate with FBI on the case, who suggested that the Majors should 
halt the investigation as FBI believed it would result in a even bigger case 
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than it already was259. One wonders how FBI can suggest to halt an in-
vestigation into a world-wide cocaine business empire, because it would 
become an even bigger case, but they did. Thursday the 23 October 1986 
Gordon did what he had been told not to. He when to the court to obtain 
a search warrant and handed the court 21 page detailed affidavit. The af-
fidavit stated that Blandón ran a large scaled cocaine distribution net-
work, which included more than 100 persons who stored, transported 
and distributed the cocaine for Blandón. Blandón’s network has a centre 
in South Central from where 10 kilos cocaine is distributed each week, 
and it also delivers around 20 kilos cocaine each week to Ivan Arguellas, 
(Ross’ first supplier). Blandón was from the Central American country 
Nicaragua, which has been at civil war for several years. According to 
our informant, the affidavits continued, Blandón is a Contra sympathizer 
and a founder of the FDN that assists the Contras with arms and money. 
The FDN generates the funds to support the Contras through cocaine 
sales, which is laundered through a bank in Florida by Roberto Orlando 
Murillo, before it is used to buy arms for the Contras in Nicaragua260. 
There is the evidence, written by the police and handed in to the court. 
The elite anti-narcotics unit in the police believed that the Contras was 
funded through cocaine trafficking, and the court too believed that the 
evidence was strong enough the issue several search warrants.  At the 
time when the Majors began its investigation in 1986 the administration 
had just  finished a  publicity  and disinformation campaign.  It  was  no 
secret that the Contras were a US proxy army that had the President’s 
support. The White House had managed to convinced Congress to repeal 
the ban and instead approve a $100 million aid package for the Contras. 
While the White House had been lobbying in Congress for the Contras 
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an air plane from North’s network was shot down over Nicaragua. Be-
fore the Contras bought the plane, it had belonged to a drug traffickers 
named Barry Seal. The planes cargo kicker and sole survivor of the crash, 
Eugene  Hasenfus,  was  capture  by  the  Sandinistas.  The  White  House 
denied any connection to the downed plane or Hasenfus, who soon after 
appeared on television to tell his tale. He had flown for CIA’s Air Amer-
ica in Laos when CIA had conducted their secret war in Laos during the 
Vietnam War. Now Hasenfus was working for CIA again and revealed 
the secret Contra airbase at Ilopango in El Salvador. Hasenfus identified 
Ramon Medina and Max Gomez as his CIA handlers.  Ramon Medina 
was an alias for Luis Posada Carriles, a exile-Cuban terrorist and suspec-
ted drug trafficker. Max Gomez was the alias for Felix Rodriguez, anoth-
er exile-Cuban and former CIA agent. The plane crashed just as Congress 
were about lift the ban on funding the Contras. The disinformation cam-
paign and congressional reluctance delve on the matter meant that the 
appearances were keep up long enough for Congress repeal the ban. As 
the bill was waiting on the Presidents desk for his signature, Gordon’s af-
fidavit persuaded the judge to granted him his search warrant. Friday, 
the day after obtaining the search warrants from court, Gordon began his 
briefing for Monday’s raids when 45 officers from the Majors, DEA, IRS, 
ATF, San Bernardino Sheriff and Bell Police would raid 14 locations in 
Los Angeles, Orange and San Bernardino County261. Several of members 
of Majors recalled that they received information that the case was linked 
to CIA, and that the federal government was unhappy that the Majors 
were going a head with the raids. According to Deputy Virgil Bartlett the 
belief was that “the U.S. Government backed the operation. (...) The govern-
ment was bringing drugs into the country and shipping weapons back out”262. 
That Monday Blandón and Lister’s and houses’ were raided as the Pres-
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ident signed the bill. CIA and the Contras were back in business263.
In the raid on Blandón’s house the police seized a shotgun, an semi-auto-
matic  rifle,  records  of  drug transaction,  and 1.5  grams of  cocaine.  As 
Blandón was arrested he spontaneously erupted “the cocaine is mine, the  
cocaine is mine. It is mine”264. With the evidence and a confession the of-
ficers were sure that the drug kingpin would get convicted but they were 
wrong. Across town the raids turned up nothing. It appeared that the 
houses had been cleaned; one place a police officer found  an empty safe 
with a running garden hose stuck into, and at a other place a resident 
told the officers  that  he had been waiting for  them for  more than an 
hour265. When police raided Lister’s address, nobody was home. As the 
police was carrying out boxes of records, card files, video monitors, and 
photographs,  a  neighbour walked over  and told them that  Lister  had 
moved some time ago.  Now a Colombian couple,  Aparicio  and Aura 
Moreno was living there. Both Lister and a DEA informant confirmed 
that Moreno supplied Blandón and Meneses with cocaine, and that he 
had transported million of dollars to Roberto Orlando Murillo in Miami 
for Blandón. According to a document seized at Lister’s resident Moreno 
was associated with the FDN which Blandón have confirmed. Meneses 
introduced Blandón to Moreno in 1985, and received at least a one ton 
cocaine shipment from Moreno delivered by air via Oklahoma. Blandón 
thought that266:
the  plane  might  be  connected  to  the  CIA  because  someone  had  
placed a small FDN sticker somewhere on the airplane. This was  
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just a rumor though267
After the raid on Blandón’s FDN connected Colombian cocaine supplier, 
the Majors rushed to Lister’s new address. As the Majors had no search 
warrant for the new address on which Lister lived, they asked for per-
mission to search his house, unless he preferred them to wait outside un-
til they obtained a search warrant. Given the two choice, Lister invited 
them in. The Majors told Lister that they were searching for drugs and 
asked him to sign a consent form. To the Majors surprise Lister told them 
that he knew why they were there, but that they were not supposed to be 
there in the first  place. CIA and Washington is not going to like this, 
Lister told the Majors. When interviewed by the CIA and DOJ in 1996 
Lister denied that he claimed to connections to CIA or Washington. The 
Majors’  recollection is  different.  According  to  Detective  Boddy Juarez 
Lister told them he was dealing in South America and worked for CIA, 
and that the Majors would be in trouble then he reported them Scott 
Weekly of CIA. Deputy Art Fransen said that Lister told them something 
like “You guys do not know what you are doing. Oh, you do not know who  
you’re dealing with. I deal with the CIA. I got power”. Deputy Richard Love 
recalled that Lister stated “You do not know what you’re doing. There is a  
bigger picture here. I’m working for the CIA. I know the director of the CIA in  
Los  Angeles.  The  government  is  allowing  drug  sales  to  go  on  in  United  
States”268. No drugs were found in Lister’s home so Lister was not arres-
ted, but the Majors seized boxes of military material, films of military op-
erations, technical manuals for military hardware, training videos, pho-
tos of Lister with Contra leaders, along with documents which indicated 
that drug money was used to buy military equipment for the Contras, 
and names and address of CIA contractors and officers in Central Amer-
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ica269. The seized material was brought back to LASD and logged in the 
Master Narcotics Evidence Control as “miscellaneous CIA info” and “a lot  
of Contra rebel correspondence found”270
When the officers compared notes after the raids they felt that someone 
had burned their investigation, and their suspicions fell on the federal 
agents who participated in the raids. The Torres’ tips had always yielded 
large quantities  of  cash and cocaine,  and the  only difference  between 
earlier raids and these were that FBI and DEA were involved271. The Ma-
jors’ hunch were correct. DOJ’s report confirmed that the investigation 
was burned when a FBI agent conducted a clumsy pre-raid investigation. 
What is termed a clumsy investigation, is a clumsy attempt in concealing 
the truth.  Someone within the law enforcement warned the criminals. 
How else could a clumsy investigation lead to that the criminals knew 
the time and places for the raids272.
Soon after the Majors started going through Lister’s documents, they too 
knew that they were in over their heads. One of the seized documents 
was Pyramid International’s security offer to Roberto D’Aubuisson in El 
Salvador. Never before had the Majors come across a suspect whom did 
business with head of states in Central America. Along the seized docu-
ments were training videos for various US military hardware such as 
surface-to-air missile, tanks and other armoured vehicles, and the manu-
als appeared to be standard US Government military issue. Members of 
the Majors who had served in the armed forces recognized the codes on 
some of the documents as DOD codes. Some of the documents contained 
references to CIA, and that Aparicio Moreno, Blandón’s Colombian co-
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caine supplier, was a representative of FDN. Another page contained the 
names and phone numbers of Bill Nelson, CIA’s former deputy director, 
Roberto D’Aubuisson, the El Salvadorian leader of the death squads, Ron 
Brown, a retired Navy Captain,  and Scott Weekly, Lister’s alleged CIA 
contact. Weekly’s name appeared on a list of armaments, which included 
anti-aircraft weapons, fire bombs, AR 15 rifles, air-to-sea torpedos, and 
napalm bombs. On another page Lister had written:
I had regular meeting with DIA subcontractor Scott Weekly. Scott  
had worked in El Salvador for us. Meeting concerned my relation-
ship with Contra grp. In Cent. Am273
DIA stands for Defense Intelligence Agency; the military version of CIA 
responsible for collecting military intelligence. Like CIA DIA involved in 
the Contra operation. Lister told investigators that he believed Weekly 
worked for DIA because LaFrance had told him that Weekly was connec-
ted to DIA. FBI contacted CIA and DIA to clarify if Weekly worked for 
either agency. CIA denied that Weekly ever worked for them, and what 
DIA replied if  they replied has never been made public274.  Webb’s re-
search shows that Scott Weekly was linked with both the DIA and CIA275. 
Weekly was arrested with a group of US special  forces and bunch of 
high-tech US militarily hardware on the border between Thailand and 
Laos heading towards Vietnam on a mission to find POWs. Webb was 
able to link Weekly with a training mission of  Afghan rebels that  re-
ceived funds from STTGI;  the company used in the Iran-Contra affair 
that was controlled by North. Weekly acknowledged that he travelled 
with Lister to El Salvador to demonstrate special tactics and operations 
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for the Minister of Defense276.
What happened to the evidence that the Majors seized from Lister is dis-
puted, the only thing that is certain is that it disappeared. Three days 
later, 30 October 1986, three federal agents appeared, went through the 
seized material and spend two days making copies. When Gordon came 
back to the office after a couple of days off, Garner told him that CIA had 
walked in and seized the material from Lister. The Majors had seen the 
last of the evidence. According to Brunon, Blandón’s attorney, the official 
police records of the raids on Blandón and Lister disappeared too. For a 
long time the only document that Brunon could find was an informal 
note taken during the pre-raid briefing, which was discovered by acci-
dent a few years after the raids277. Brunon:
For a long time, they (the Sheriff’s Office) never acknowledged the  
existence of the warrant. I mean the whole thing was quite mysteri-
ous. Boom, they did 15 locations. Nothing turned up. Nobody got  
busted. There was a little tiny bit of cocaine found in one location,  
Nobody got filed on. They gave all the stuff back. The whole thing  
just was very strange, (...) I’d never had a case where all the reports  
disappeared278.
The Majors version of the seized material mysterious disappearances is 
disputed.  LASD claims  that  there  is  a  consistent  paper  trail  for  each 
seized item, which shows that the seized material was handed back to 
Lister a few days after the raid. No copies were kept and the few thing 
that was not claimed were destroyed within 6 months. The DOJ disputes 
the Majors stories of the disappeared evidence too. According to the DOJ 
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the evidence was either handed back or destroyed several months after 
the raids in-line with LASD guidelines. All documents had been copied 
by FBI, DEA and IRS according to notes found in LASD. What the DOJ 
does not mention is that the investigation was still active when the evid-
ence was handed back or destroyed. This should make one wonder, how 
often police destroy evidence or hand back during an investigation, and 
if it is within the guidelines to do so. The federal agencies have had prob-
lems locating their copies. Neither FBI and DEA could locate their sets of 
copies, nor could US Attorney Office, who had received copies from both 
FBI and DEA, find their copies. IRS could of cause not locate their copies, 
but IRS was able to provide the DOJ with a partial set of 1000 pages, as 
an IRS agent had taken the copies for her investigation of another crime. 
The set included copies of documents that were seized from all fourteen 
locations that was raided. The partial recovery seems to have been acci-
dental, and not due to a good archive practice279. LASD managed to loc-
ate a copy of Gordon’s search warrant affidavit when they copied from 
the Dark Alliance Series web site ten years after the raids280.
In conjunction with the Majors investigation of Blandón and Lister the 
FBI had opened a file on Weekly and Lister during their investigation of 
the Iran-Contra affair, but the file was closed almost as soon as it was 
opened281. The DOJ report concluded that:
In the end, when stripped of their quirky embellishments, the docu-
ments seized from Lister in 1986 largely corroborate his account of  
his relationship with Blandón and the Contras.
This conclusion is based on the assumption that Lister had no relation-
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ship with either CIA or the Contras, which the DOJ reached after “evalu-
ating these materials we have“ and “to some extent, considered Lister’s own ex-
planations of their significance and meaning“ although “Lister is hardly the  
most credible of witnesses”282. The DOJ reviewed the 10 page document that 
Garner had copied and tried to introduce into his defence at his trial. 
Contrary to what the Majors believed the document did not contain ref-
erences to drug money nor indications of links to the Contras the DOJ re-
port stated. There was no evidence that Lister had any connections to the 
Contras, because as Lister had explained to the DOJ, his references to 
Contras did not mean the Contras but Blandón, and DIA did not refer to 
the Defense Intelligence Agency but Deals In Arms283. Therefore the DOJ 
concluded that there was no evidence of a link between Lister and the 
Contras or CIA284. The DOJ report also confirms that IRS reviewed part of 
the 10 page document, which they believe indicated illegal arms transac-
tions. The report also confirms that document did contain the names and 
phone numbers of former CIA agents, US military officials, a Colombian 
drug dealer linked to FDN, politicians and the leader of the death squads 
in El Salvador, an business relation in Iran, reference to Korea and selling 
scramblers to Eastern Europe and several references to the Contras, FDN, 
CIA, DIA, and Weekly285. The report confirms too that Lister meet Pas-
tora and Chamarro of ADRE, but it states that Lister never provided the 
Contras with “any significanta information on weaponry”286; in other words, 
Lister did provide the Contras with information on weaponry. The DOJ 
reviewed air plane ticket and boarding passes, which documented that 
Lister had visited Miami in Florida, San Jose in California, and Bogota in 
Colombia during May 1986. The report confirms too that Lister told DOJ 
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283 DOJ 1998, chapter 5.C.2.B
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investigators that Blandón had been looking for a weapon supply source 
to sell weapons and equipment to the Salvadorian Government and the 
Contras287. Still neither FBI nor DOJ could not find evidence that linked 
Lister with CIA and the Contras. 
Nothing happened to Blandón or Lister and instead Ross was targeted. 
That investigation failed too, although it did lead to convictions, but of 
the Majors after Ross testified for US Attorney’s Office against the Ma-
jors. When Webb researched the  affair he called LASD for information 
about the investigation and raids on Lister and Blandón, LASD  denied 
they had investigated or raided Blandón or Lister288.
The DEA Connection
What is clear from the DOJ report is that both the FBI and DEA knew a 
lot more about Blandón’s drug trafficking than the Majors did. Although 
LASD had not targeted Norwin Meneses, his name appeared in a CIA 
cable from 30 October 1986. CIA’s office in Los Angeles informed CIA’s 
HQ that three men who claimed CIA affiliation had been arrested on nar-
cotics charges. CIA’s Los Angeles station requested that HQ forwarded 
information on Blandón, Lister, Murillo, Moreno, and Meneses and their 
connection to  CIA.  Next  day HQ replied that  had no  information on 
Blandón or Lister. Meneses was known by HQ as the Nicaraguan Mafia, 
and was involved in drug dealing, weapons, smuggling, money launder-
ing,  and counterfeiting of  US and Nicaraguan currency.  Meneses was 
residing in Miami as a result of unspecified drug charges in Costa Rica, 
and was the kingpin of narcotics traffickers in Nicaragua prior to the fall 
of Somoza the cable stated289.
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In June 1986 a few months before the Majors started their investigation 
Norwin Meneses agreed to become a DEA informant290. DEA had opened 
a new case against Meneses in October 1983 and had successfully intro-
duced undercover agents to members of Meneses’ organisation between 
November  1983  and  February  1984.  As  a  result  Roger  Meneses  was 
caught, charged and convicted to 6 years imprisonment. He had offered 
to cooperate, but his offer was rejected291. By January 1984 DEA had at 
least  one informant  inside  Meneses’  organisation,  who had meet  Me-
neses and had been asked by Meneses to run the operation in San Fran-
cisco as he was unhappy with Jairo’s work. Later that year DEA success-
fully introduced undercover agents to Jairo Meneses and Renato Pena in 
San Francisco, and in November 1984 DEA arrested Pena and Jairo after 
they sold had sold one kilo 97% pure cocaine to undercover DEA agents. 
Left with little choose Pena and Jairo Meneses agreed to cooperate with 
the DEA. Jairo admitted that he started to work for Norwin in 1981, and 
that the organisation distributed cocaine to between ten and twelve cos-
tumers, including Blandón, on a regular basis. The cocaine was provided 
on a consignment basis to the costumers,  and Jairo collected the pay-
ments. The US Attorney’s Office mailed a memorandum to the DOJ that 
in detail described the information that Jairo had provided on Norwin 
Meneses’  organisation292.  The  memorandum stated  Meneses  dealt  dir-
ectly with leaders of the Contras since the early 1980s, and that Jairo in 
1982 had negotiated an cocaine export agreement with Honduras’ milit-
ary on behalf of Norwin. Jairo admitted that it was Norwin who ordered 
the high-ranking Nicaraguan customs official Oscar Reyes assassinated. 
The memorandum stressed that Meneses only concern was the cocaine 
business  and  that  he  lacked  political  allegiance  as  he  dealt  with  the 
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Sandinistas too.  According to Webb’s research Norwin did not lacked 
political allegiance. He had worked for Somoza’s secret police, his broth-
ers were generals in the National Guard. Norwin was a strong supporter 
of the Contras.  Because of Jairo and Rena’s cooperation DEA opened a 
drug conspiracy case in January 1985 that targeted Norwin, but by that 
time Norwin had left  the US for  Costa Rica  and cut  off  contact  with 
Jairo293.
When Jairo was sentenced in 1985 he admitted that he was a delivery-
man and bookkeeper for Norwin, who he described as a large drug deal-
er whom sold 30-40 kilos a week. In exchange for his testimony Jairo was 
sentenced to 1 year in jaila. The amount of evidence that US law enforce-
ment had on Meneses could have convicted most dealers on either traf-
ficking or conspiracy charges, but nothing happened to Meneses. If the 
government wanted, they could have barred him from entering the coun-
try again, but Meneses continued to travel in and out of the US294. Pena 
was an active member of FDN, but he claims that  his drug trafficking 
activities were personal and unrelated to the Contras.  Pena started to 
work for Meneses shortly after he first met him at Contra meeting in San 
Francisco in 1981. Contrary to Jairo, whom collected payments from the 
buyers, Pena paid the suppliers295. Pena told DEA that the Contras must 
have an alternative sources of funding, since the funds that the Contras 
received from the US Government was peanuts. Pena said that Blandón 
and Meneses told him, that they were raising money for the Contras by 
selling drugs. Pena said that Blandón told him that the Contras could not 
have operated without the drug proceeds, and that Meneses told him 
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that Enrique Bermúdez knew about the drug trafficking296. Pena says that 
Carlos, a Colombian supplier to Meneses, told him in general terms that 
portions of the proceeds from the sale of the cocaine Pena brought were 
going to the Contras297. According to Pena Jairo told him that the govern-
ment knew about the drug trafficking, and it was therefore highly un-
likely that they would get in trouble. When Pena was removed from his 
position in FDN in mid-1984 Meneses used his close relationship with 
Bermúdez to have Pena appointed FDN’s military representative in San 
Francisco instead298.
What happened to DEA’s investigation into Meneses is not clear from the 
reports, but the case was closed the same month Meneses walked into 
the DEA office in Costa Rica and offered to become an informant. As 
closing remarks to the case DEA wrote that their two informants were no 
longer willing to cooperate, and it was therefore no longer possible to 
pursue the case against Meneses299. FBI had been investigating Meneses, 
and FBI had managed to get a taped recording in 1984 where Meneses 
said that he used his numerous properties to launder money, that he was 
associated with Pablo Escobar, and that he had smuggled and distrib-
uted of  kilos  of ‘apparatus’  to Nicaraguans in San Francisco.  FBI had 
founds three informants who between 1980 and 1985 had discussed traf-
ficking cocaine with Meneses, and were willing to testify. One inform-
ants told FBI that Meneses was known for smuggling arms to Nicaragua, 
and that Meneses properly worked for CIA300.
When Meneses walked into DEA’s Costa Rican office, he told DEA that 
he wanted to cooperate and help the administration’s fight against drugs 
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in view of the Presidents total commitment to free his native land. Me-
neses also mentioned a minor problem with IRS as another reason for his 
cooperation301. DEA noted in their report that these were the reasons that 
Meneses had stated, but the real reason or reasons for his cooperation 
was unknown. At the time when Meneses offered his cooperation the ad-
ministration was engaged in a public-relation campaign to get the Con-
gress to re-approve aid to the Contras. As part of the campaign the ad-
ministration had charged the Sandinistas with involvement in drug traf-
ficking into the US. The administration based the charges on a single pic-
ture taken by the drug dealer Barry Seal who owned the DC-3 that was 
shot down over Nicaragua with Hasenfus inside. The picture is widely 
disputed, but was presented as proof of that the Sandinistas and Pablo 
Escobar cooperated in smuggling cocaine into the US. This is possible the 
explanation why Meneses identified Blandón to DEA as a major traffick-
er and Sandinista sympathizer who distributed hundreds of kilos of co-
caine. During the debriefing Meneses claimed that he had helped DEA 
before. There is no mention in the DOJ report if Meneses claim is true, 
but the report confirms that Meneses met with DEA in 1981 or 1982302.
DEA had tried to convince Jairo to cooperate against uncle Norwin when 
Jairo was arrested in June 1981 but he refused. Instead he suggested that 
he could convince uncle Norwin to work with DEA. Norwin called DEA 
in 1981 or 1982, and said that he had spoken to Jairo and wanted to help 
DEA with information on drug traffickers.  Meneses told DEA that he 
was not a drug trafficker, he was a revolutionary who’s only interest was 
getting his country back. In 1982, after the initial phone conversation, an 
DEA agent met with Norwin and Jairo. Norwin repeated his claim, that 
he was not a drug trafficker, but involved in the revolution to overthrow 
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the Nicaraguan government. The DEA agent recalled that Norwin was 
pretty cryptical about what he did for the Contras, but the agent had the 
impression that Norwin was moving guns for the Contras and worked 
for CIA. DEA contacted CIA who denied connection with Meneses303. FBI 
too believed that Meneses was connected to CIA304. Officially there was 
no link between CIA and Meneses but there must have been indication to 
the contrary. In 1987 FBI had enough evidence against Meneses to indict 
him, but felt it necessary to inquire with DEA if an indictment of Me-
neses  would  “result  in  national  security  problems  with  other  agencies”305. 
DEA replied that they did not believe that it would not be a problem, but 
that an indictment would prevent DEA from investigating a group of 
traffickers with connections to the Contras306.
Webb believed that Norwin did work for DEA, but he bases his conclu-
sion on a different set of materials. According to Webb the US Govern-
ment had enough evidence in 1985 to indict Meneses and his nephew 
Jairo was willing to testify against uncle Meneses. Instead of indicting 
Meneses the US attorney contacted and pressured Meneses to become an 
informant  for  DEA.  Whatever  the  reason  is,  Webb  seemed  to  have 
missed the part of the DOJ report, which states that Meneses did become 
an  informant  in  1986.  An  official  Costa  Rican  document  from  1985 
stated307:
He [Norwin Meneses] was one of the first economic supporters of  
the FDN in Costa Rica. There are rumors that he works as an in-
formant for DEA308.
303 DOJ 1998, chapter 3.F.2
304 DOJ 1998, chapter 3.H
305 DOJ 1998, chapter 2.G.2.B.4
306 DOJ 1998, chapter 2.G.2.B.4
307 Webb 1998, 203
308 Webb 1998, 203
Page 53 of 71
DOJ’s  report  confirmed  that  Meneses  did  work  for  DEA.  The  report 
claims that Meneses offered to become an informant in 1986 and that the 
offer was accepted by DEA in 1987. However US Attorney Erik Swenson 
said that Meneses and the US Government began to cooperate in 1985309. 
The reason why DOJ claims that the cooperation began in 1987 rather 
than 1985 as the US Attorney claimed, is that it would be difficult for 
DEA to explain why one of their informants was involved in funnelling 
proceeds from large scale drug trafficking to the Contras. 1987 is a much 
better year for the cooperation to have begun as the Contra program was 
terminated that year. However the DOJ’s report confirms that there was 
contact between Meneses and DEA as early as 1981 or 1982. There has 
been  allegations  that  US  law enforcement  personal  were  on  Meneses 
payroll,  and that they had tip him off  about investigations and raids. 
Pena claimed that Meneses was tipped off by a corrupted DEA agent a 
few weeks before Zavala and Cabezas were arrested in the Frogman case 
in 1983. According to DOJ DEA investigated the matter and found the al-
legations were false, but then Meneses later told DEA about the corrup-
ted agent he had paid DEA was not interested310.
DEA facilitated contact between CIA and known drug traffickers before 
September 1983. CIA’s UCLA team used two converted shrimp boats as 
mother ships for their operations311. The two boats was bought from the 
seafood company Frigorificos de Puntarenas, which was owned by Luis 
Rodriguez. Frigorifcos was also one of the companies that were in 1986 
given a $261.937 dollars contract to deliver humanitarian aid to the Con-
tras.  The humanitarian funds was paid into an account controlled by 
Luis Rodriguez, who according to Massachusetts law enforcement offi-
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cials directed the largest marijuana traffickings ring in US history312. Luis 
Rodriguez was president of Ocean Hunter,  another seafood company, 
which was owned by Ramon Milian Rodriguez, a convicted money laun-
der. The Cuban born Ramon Milian Rodriguez was an accountant for the 
Medellín cartel until he was caught in the airport with $5.4 million in 
cash  on  board  his  private  jet  that  was  headed  for  Panama313.  Ocean 
Hunter  bough  seafood  from  the  Costa  Rican  based  Frigorificos  de 
Puntarenas and imported it into the US. Transactions between Frigorifi-
cos de Puntarenas and Ocean Hunter were used to launder money, and 
drugs were smuggled into the US in the seafood shipments. Ramon Mili-
an Rodriguez told federal  law enforcement about  Luis  Rodriguez’  in-
volvement with drug trafficking and money laundering in 1983. In Marts 
and April 1984 IRS questioned Luis Rodriguez regarding Ocean Hunter, 
money laundering and drug trafficking. In response to every question 
Luis Rodriguez took the Fifth Amendment,  i.e.  refused to answer the 
question as the answer would incriminate him. In September 1984 Miami 
police  officials  informed  FBI  that  Ocean  Hunter  was  funding  Contra 
activities through narcotics transactions. This confirmed earlier accounts 
that FBI had received on Ocean Hunters involvement with the Contras in 
drug  trafficking314.  The  State  Department  knew  that  Frigorificos  de 
Puntarenas was involvement in trafficking and money laundering when 
the they choose the company to deliver humanitarian aid to the Contras. 
The official explanation is that the State Department forgot to check if 
Frigorificos de Puntarenas was connected to drug trafficking. DEA could 
have told the State Department about the drug connection as they had fa-
cilitated  the  contact  between  the  traffickers  and  CIA  to  buy  the  two 
shrimp boats in 1983315.
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Government Sponsored Traffickers
Frigorificos de Puntarenas was not the only company with a drug con-
nection that the State Department chosed as contractor after ‘suggestion’ 
from CIA. Another example is SETCO that was founded and run Juan 
Matta Ballestros, who was classified as a Class One trafficker in DEA’s 
database, and both DEA and Customs knew that Matta ran SETCO316. 
Matta had a long history in DEA’s database. Matta had financed a milit-
ary coup in Honduras with drug money, was arrested in the US in 1970 
with 20 kilos of cocaine, supplied Mexican traffickers, had been involved 
in the killing of a DEA agent, and worked with both the Medellín and 
Cali cartel. In the 1970s long before the Colombian cartels existed Matta 
had been one of the biggest traffickers in the Americas. None were any 
secret to law enforcement, but again the State Department neglected to 
check SETCO for drug connections. Neither was it the first time that the 
Government relied on SETCO. Sources in Honduras’ military told report-
ers that it was CIA who sat up SETCO in 1983 to transport supplies to the 
Contras; by 1984 SETCO was the primary transporter for the FDN. After 
CIA pulled out North used SETCO in his supply network, before SETCO 
started flying for the State Department. The same year that CIA set up 
SETCO DEA closed its office after it had documented that the Honduras’ 
military dictatorship had trafficked at least 50 tons cocaine; CIA doubled 
the number of employees in its office that year. A former SETCO pilot, 
convicted of trafficking, started his own company named Hondu Carib 
in 1985, which subcontracted from SETCO. Two years later DEA seized 
and searched one of its planes after it had air dropped a drug shipment. 
In the plane files were found that contained names and phone numbers 
of Contra leaders and Robert Owen, who was Oliver North’s personal 
316 Kerry 1989a, 44
aid317.
When DIACSA was selected as an contractor in 1985, the State Depart-
ment again neglected to check for drug relations. DIACSA was known 
for its involvement in trafficking and money laundering, and was under 
active investigation when chosen as a contractor. DIACSA too was con-
nected to the Contras before chosen as a contractor. FDN had used DI-
ACSA  to  launder  money  and  concealed  that  it  received  funds  from 
North. Both DEA and CIA had information, which indicated that DIA-
SCA was used for  drug trafficking and money laundering.  When the 
State Department selected DIACSA its director and his business partner 
were under investigation for trafficking and money launder. Both were 
later convicted318
The State Department selected a fourth company in 1985, Vortex, which 
too  was  involved in  drug trafficking.  Vortex’s  vice  president  Michael 
Palmer had smuggled dope for a decade and a grand jury was preparing 
to indict him. Vortex’ two aircrafts were used for drug trafficking at the 
time when the contract was signed. Afterwards Vortex signed a contract 
with CIA, and at the same time Palmer worked for DEA  in a sensitive 
drug investigation. DEA was concerned that if CIA terminated their con-
tact with Palmer it would jeopardize the  investigation. CIA terminated 
all ties to Vortex. While Vortex was still contracting for CIA one of its 
planes was searched by Customs who detained the crew and seized their 
Government credentials. When Customs searched the plane, which had 
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been modified to make air  drops, they found weapons on board. The 
crew, who were indicted for trafficking, could not answer Customs when 
asked who owned the plane. Both aircraft and crew were released after a 
meeting between Customs and CIA. Customs were concerned that CIA 
flights were used to smuggle drugs, and wanted to know what CIA did 
to prevent traffickers from using CIA sponsored flights. None. It  was, 
CIA said, impossible to check all their employees, and therefore Customs 
asked CIA to handover the names of all crews and passengers. What the 
result was, or if the names were handed over, is not known319.
CIA claims that they did not, like Customs and DEA, known that Palmer 
or Vortex were involved in drug trafficking. When the allegations sur-
faced that CIA had known and assisted Palmer in drug trafficking Con-
gress forced CIA to investigate. There is no record that a final report was 
ever filed, and CIA’s investigator is not sure as she was taken off the case 
before she finished her investigation. She remembers that she did not re-
ceive much cooperation from CIA personal, and that she was unable to 
make a conclusion concerning CIA’s relationship with Vortex as most of 
the records she requested  “were unavailable, unobtainable and undiscover-
able”320. She discovered that CIA knew that about Palmer’s drug traffick-
ing activities before CIA suggested him as a contractor to the State De-
partment.  The chief of the Contra program Alan Fiers was told about 
Palmer’s drug connections, and had passed the informations to a higher 
level from where the decision to use Palmer was taken. CIA denied that 
it played a roll in the State Department’s selection of contractors except 
in the case of Vortex, which was chosen because Fiers had suggested it. 
In CIA’s report Fiers is quoted for saying “I believe we guided them toward  
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carriers they ultimately used”321; as carriers is in plural, not singular, Vortex 
was not the only case322.
The Contra Cocaine Hub
Celerino Castillo was the only DEA agent assigned to cover both El Sal-
vador and Guatemala between 1985 - 1987. When Castillo started work-
ing in Central America his boss Stia briefed him on the Contra operation. 
The operation was a covert White House operation directed by North, 
and run out of Ilopango airport in El Salvador. DEA was receiving re-
ports about possible drug trafficking out of Ilopango, but DEA had not 
pursued the matter, Stia said. Ilopango airport was a small airport, but 
still the main airport for both civil trafficking and the air force. The air-
port, which was just 40 kilometres out of El Salvador’s capital San Sal-
vador, was divided into a civil and a military part. Among the inform-
ants that DEA had lined up for Castillo to work with were three who 
supplied him with information on the Contras’ drug trafficking out of 
Ilopango airport; Socrates Amaury Sofi Perez, Luis Aparecio, and Hugo 
Martinez. Castillo claims he documented drug trafficking out of Ilopango 
by the Contras, but DEA denies that his reports documented anything323.
Sofi, as Socrates Amaury Sofi Perez was called, worked for both DEA 
and the Guatemalan government. He had fled the US due to an arrest 
warrant for drug trafficking, and had been classed as a Class One traf-
ficker in DEA’s computers. As the Guatemalan government had no in-
tention of deporting him to the US he was safe in Guatemala. Sofi was 
the first informant who told Castillo about the Contras’ cocaine traffick-
ing  out  of  Ilopango  airport.  The  small  Contra  air  force,  Sofi  said, 
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smuggled drugs to the US and weapons bought with drug money back. 
Sofi played his part in the Contras’ cocaine operation too with his small 
shrimp company in Guatemala. Sofi told Castillo that he picked up co-
caine in Colombia, hid it with his shrimp shipments for Miami, paid off a 
US Customs agents who hurry the shipment past inspection, and then 
used his company to launder the drug profits for the Contras324. The oth-
er informant Luis Aparecio confirmed Sofi’s account, but said that the 
Contras had received carte blanchet to use Ilopango as a cocaine transit 
point from the head of the El Salvadorian air force. An Salvadorian Air 
Force officer told Castillo that there was nothing covert about the opera-
tion. Everybody who spent any time around Ilopango airport or the Sal-
vadorian military knew about the drug smuggling. The people running 
the show did not bother to hide it, and his air force friends supported the 
smuggling operation enthusiastically as it meant more US aid. The Sal-
vadorian Air Force received a huge portion of the US military aid that 
was given to combat the FLMN insurgency in El Salvador. Even CIA ac-
knowledged that it would have been easy to move drugs in and out of 
Ilopango airport, if it had occurred, which they denied325.
Castillo’s third informant  Hugo Martinez worked at Ilopango airport’s 
civilian side where he was writing the flight plans. Martinez’ access to in-
formation meant that Castillo’s reports not just had the names of the sus-
pected traffickers, but also the their destination, flight path, tail numbers, 
and time and date for the flights. Martinez told Castillo that the Contras 
operated out of hanger 4 and 5, which were owned by CIA and NSC. The 
drugs was flown in from Colombia via airstrips in Costa Rica or Panama 
before it was transported to the US. The cash was flown from the US to 
Panama where it was laundered. From Panama the money was wired 
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into  accounts  in  Costa  Rica  controlled  by  the  Contras  who  used  the 
laundered drug money to buy arms and supplies. Martinez told Castillo 
that every pilot had his preferred way of getting the drugs into the US. 
Air drops were the least risky and most popular method and many of the 
pilots had experience in air dropping drug off the Bahamas or coast of 
Florida.  Others flew cocaine hidden in innocuous cargoes.  Some flash 
their CIA credentials and unloaded the planes in broad daylight. Others 
landed at US military bases knowing that no one would inspect a Contra 
plane326.
Enrique Miranda, who was arrested in Nicaragua together with Norwin 
Meneses, claimed that drug flights from Ilopango landed at a US Airbase 
near Fort Worth. The only airbase close to Fort Worth was Carswell Air 
Force Base, which is now closed down. All flight records from Carswell 
have been destroyed according to the US Air Force.  Miranda said that 
Meneses and Marcos Aguado supervised the loading of cocaine onto US 
bound aircraft in Ilopango and that on occasion Meneses flew with the 
drug plane to the US, but usually he travelled on commercial airlines us-
ing his own name. At the same time as he was listed as a Class One traf-
ficker in the computer systems. Crossing the US border set off  all  the 
alarm bells in Meneses’ own words. Meneses claimed that he pre-cleared 
all border crossing between 1985-1986 with DEA, i.e. before he became 
an informant according to DOJ. Either DEA clears traffickers to enter the 
country or Meneses was working for DEA while he trafficked drugs for 
the Contras327.
The traffickers at Ilopango were well connected. One received a US visa 
while he was listed as trafficker, another was honorary ambassador to 
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Panama, yet another was a presidential advisor in El Salvador, and an-
other one even had credentials from DEA, CIA and FBI. The traffickers 
were not just associated with the local governments but  also with the US 
Government. Brasher, the trafficker who had DEA, CIA and FBI creden-
tials, had his house in San Salvador raided by the El Salvadorian narcot-
ics police and Castillo. Loads of US and Soviet military equipment was 
discovered, along with license plates and radios that belonged to the US 
Embassy in El Salvador. CIA denied, as is the truth that, Brasher worked 
for them. He worked for North in the White House. Castillo had his in-
formants’ statements confirmed by embassy staff who knew that Brasher 
was  running drugs  and guns  for  the  Contras.  Ambassador  Corr  told 
Castillo that he had been ordered to cooperate with the Contra operation 
by  the  White  House.  When Castillo  questioned  the  Salvadorian  Gen. 
Bustillo, who was in charge of Ilopango airbase, about why they allowed 
Brasher to smuggle cocaine out of Ilopango, he replied328:
“I  don’t  understand  your  government”  he  said.  “North  comes  
down here and tells us he needs our help with his covert operation.  
Now you tell me what they’re doing is illegal.” As far as he knew,  
Oliver North represented the White House. That was all the reas-
surance he needed329.
US Protection of Narcoterrorists
In September 1986 North send an email to his boss the National Security 
Advisor Admiral Pointdexter. The subject of the email was the senten-
cing of the Honduran Gen. Jose Bueso Rosa, who had being arrest in con-
junction with 346 kilos of cocaine and a collection of Cuban and Hondur-
an arms dealers on a remote airstrip in the southern Florida two years 
328 Castillo 1994, 144, 148f, 160, 163, 165, 167f, 170f
329 Castillo 1994, 175
earlier. The wholesale price of the 346 kilos of cocaine were estimated to 
be worth $40 million. The cocaine was supposed to finance a military 
coup against Honduras’ the democratically elected president, and rein-
state the military dictator Gen. Alvarez who retired to Miami as demo-
cracy was introduced to Honduras in 1984. In the US the retired dictator 
found a job, working for Pentagon as a consultant. Before Alvarez be-
came army chief of staff, he had been chief of police, and it was as chief 
of police that Alvarez had participated in the meeting in August 1981 
with Clarridge,  where Honduras confirmed its  commitment to the US 
run Contra operation. Bueso Rosa, who worked for Alvarez, had been in-
strumental in setting up the logistics and training for the Contras in Hon-
duras, but with the democratical election and Alvarez’ retirement, Bueso 
Rosa was demoted to Honduras’ military attaché in Chile330.
One of the people FBI arrested on the remote airstrip in Florida with 346 
kilos cocaine was Gerard Latchinian,  an arms dealer who was one of 
Honduras’ richest men. He told FBI that the cocaine came from Hondur-
as’ presently chief of police, who had approached one of the coup plot-
ters on advice on how to dispose of more than a ton of cocaine in the US. 
When Alvarez retired to Miami he stayed in Latchinian’s house for a 
while.  One of  Latchinian’s  business  partners  was  Cuban born former 
CIA agent Felix Rodríguez,  who was a friend of Vice-President Bush. 
Rodríguez and worked at Ilopango airbase under his CIA cover name 
Max Gomez as a advisor to the head of the El Salvadorian Air Force Gen. 
Bustillo. Another of Latchinian’s business partner was Pesakh Ben Or, an 
Israeli  arms  dealer  in  Guatemala,  who shipped weapons  to  the  Con-
tras331. The coup plotters hired two former US special forces soldiers’ for 
330 National Security Archive, The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations, U.S. Officials and Major Traffickers
Webb 1998, 335
Scott 1998, 48f, 60f
 Los Angeles Times 1996a
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$300.000 and 18 kilo cocaine to create and lead the hit team that would 
start  the  military  coup  by  assassinating  the  president.  The  hit  team 
would of cause be supplied with a private jet and all high-tech weapons 
they needed for the mission. The two former special forces soldiers ac-
cepted the mission, called FBI and told them everything, which was the 
reason why FBI was waiting at the remote airstrip in Florida332.
Bueso Rosa has just been sentenced to five years in jail when North wrote 
the email to Pointdexter. The sentence must be considered mild when 
compared to the charges; conspiring to kill a head of state, stage a coup 
d’état,  finance  the  operation  with  a  ⅓ ton  cocaine,  and  he  had been 
named as the primary conspirator by the arrested arms merchants333. The 
DOJ public stated that the case against Bueso Rosa was “most significant  
case of narco-terrorism yet discovered”334. Bueso Rosa’s five years term was 
the lowest, his co-conspirators had received up to thirty years imprison-
ment, but the problem was, as North wrote to Pointdexter, that:
He [Bueso Rosa] apparently still believed up until yesterday that he  
w[ou]ld be going to the minimum security facility at Eglin for a  
short period (days or weeks) and then walk free. (...) The problem 
w/ the Bueso case is that Bueso was the man with whom Negro-
ponte, Gorman, Clarridge and I worked out arrangements [3 cen-
sored lines]. Only Gorman, Clarridge and I were fully aware of all  
that Bueso was doing on our behalf. Our major concern – Gorman,  
North, Clarridge – is that when Bueso finds out what is really hap-
pening to  him,  he  will  break  his  longstanding silence  about  the  
Nic[araguan]  Resistance  and other  sensitive  operations.  Gorman 
Clarridge, Ravell, Trott and Abrams will cabal quietly in the morn-
ing to look at options: pardon, clemency, deportation, reduced sen-
332 Scott 1998, 61
333 COPESA Chile
334 Scott 1998, 61
tence. Objective is to keep Bueso from feeling like he was lied to in  
legal process and start spilling the beans335.
Pointdexter replied that “You may advise all  concerned that the President  
want to be as helpful as possible to settle this matter”336. Two senior officials 
filed depositions that urge leniency on the ground that “Gen. Bueso Rosa  
has always been a valuable ally to the United States” and that “As chief of staff  
of the Honduran armed forces he immeasurably furthered the United States’ in-
terest in Central America”337. The judge made Bueso Rosa eligible for im-
mediate parole, but the move was blocked by DOJ and the State Depart-
ment despite pressure from CIA and Pentagon. Bueso Rosa served two 
years at  Eglin Air Force Base, which is named in Forbes as the nicest 
country club to serve your jail time in. Bueso Rosa never spilled a single 
bean338.
The Secret Memorandum
In 1982 a secret memorandum was written regarding which crimes CIA 
should report to the police. CIA should, the memorandum said, report 
any crime by any person as long as it is consistent with the protection of 
intelligence sources and methods. CIA’s report explains that rules were 
drafted on the language used in the former guidelines governing the re-
quirements for CIA to report possible crimes. What CIA reports tries to 
present in a misleading manner is the fact that they were excepted from 
reporting drug trafficking. CIA claimed that the new memorandum was 
strict compaired to earlier guidelines, but they state the same; that CIA 
did not have to report crimes if classified information would be revealed 
335 National Security Archive, The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations, U.S. Officials and Major Traffickers
336 Scott 1998, 62
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during the prosecution of the crime. The specific procedures for crime re-
porting was established in the memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
between CIA and DOJ. The MOU operates with two sets of rules; one for 
CIA employees and one for non-CIA employees. According to the MOU 
CIA was required to report a long list of crimes such as violations of the 
arms export act, neutrality offences, and unlawful enterings into the US. 
One crime that was not mention on the list was narcotics violations by 
non-CIA employee339. The Attorney General wrote Casey regarding the 
MOU, which only needed Casey’s signature, that.
[N]o formal requirement regarding the reporting of narcotics viola-
tions [by non-employees] has been included in these procedures340.
In the letter there are three references to reporting of narcotics violations, 
which I have not quoted. In each instance the conclusion was that the 
discussed sections did not create a requirement to report narcotics viola-
tions. According to CIA’s report the lack of requirement in the MOU to 
report drug crimes only concerned reporting to DOJ not DEA, but then 
scrutinizing the report it is clear that the requirements were the same; 
none. But the exceptions continued. It was not only narcotics violations 
committed by non-CIA employees that CIA did not have report. Before 
the MOU was made public with the publication of CIA’s report it was 
changed. Now the definition of ‘employee’ was changed to include341:
(...) staff employee, contract employee, asset, or other person or en-
tity providing service to or acting on behalf of any agency within  
339 CIA 1998b, paragraph 42, 56
CIA 1998b, Exhibits 1
CIA 1998b, paragraph 42-110
340 CIA 1998b, paragraph 59
341 CIA 1998b, paragraph 59-62
the intelligence community342.
With the memorandum CIA was allowed to work with drug traffickers, 
who could tell  CIA all  about their drug transactions.  Although it  is a 
severe crime to have this knowledge and not informing police, CIA was 
excepted from the law and did not have to report their knowledge. CIA 
did have to report CIA employees who participated in drug trafficking 
according to the memorandum. What CIA did was just to change the 
definition of  the term employee.  The definition of employee was not, 
contrary to what the report states, a person employed by, assigned to, or 
acting for CIA. According to Makowka, the former Chief of the Intelli-
gence Law Division, narcotics violations by agents or assets did not have 
to be reported; both CIA and DOJ were comfortable with the arrange-
ment. CIA was, Makowka said, restricted from reporting narcotics viola-
tions committed by US citizen. The Office of General Council (OGC) that 
handles  legal  matter  defined the term employee strange.  Neither CIA 
agents nor anyone who CIA dealt with operationally was considered em-
ployees when it concern the requirements to report narcotics crimes343. 
The just mentions definitions are from the former guidelines that Carter 
introduced, and which was replaced with Reagan’s definitions; here the 
term was narrowed down even further344. The truth is in stark Contrast to 
the illusion that CIA attempts to create in the beginning of the chapter 
were we are told that the term employee is defined as “a person employed  
by, assigned to, or acting for an agency within the Intelligence Community”345.
As had been true under E.O. 11905 [Ford’s guideline] and E.O.  
12036 [Carter’s guideline], the reporting obligations imposed upon  
342 CIA 1998b, paragraph 69
343 CIA 1998b, paragraph 47, 72, 73, 98, 99
344 CIA 1998b, paragraph 78
345 CIA 1998b, paragraph 47
Page 60 of 71
CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies by these provisions ex-
ceeded the obligations of other federal agencies. (…), E.O. 12333  
[Reagan’s guideline] requires CIA and other intelligence agencies  
to report all possible violations of any law by any person346a.
CIA’s Directorate of Operations (DO) was preparing a handbook in 1982, 
which included a section that centred on restrictions and prohibitions re-
garding contacts with individuals who were involved in narcotics viola-
tions. A summery of the handbook was forwarded to all DO field sta-
tions in July 1982. The draft focused on restrictions and prohibitions on 
CIA agent from associating with drug traffickers, but it did not apply to:
(…)  Contra-related  individuals  or  independent  contractors  dis-
cussed in Volume II, (...), since none of those individuals or inde-
pendent contractors were involved in the collection of narcotics in-
telligence347.
Since the agents who were involved in aiding and abetting drug traffick-
ing were not working on collecting narcotics intelligence they could deal 
with anyone and did not have to report narcotics violations because they 
worked in the operationally sphere of CIA. The handbook was first form-
ally issued 13 years later in 1995. With the exceptions to the term em-
ployee and with the omission in the obligations to report narcotics viola-
tions, no narcotics crimes would ever be reported; and while the MOU 
was in effect  till  1995 CIA could legally cooperate with traffickers  on 
drug shipments into the US as long as CIA did not ship the drugs them-
selves.
346 CIA 1998b, paragraph 56
a CIA's emphasis
347 CIA 1998b, paragraph 112
On Government Orders
So far I have tried to outline the link between the Contras and the traf-
fickers and showed that the link was known by CIA. The evidence indic-
ates that it was not a rouge operation or a few corrupted individuals. 
CIA intervened in the Frogman case, they had informants in working in 
some of the drug networks, they knew about the Contras’ decision to 
fund themselves through cocaine  trafficking,  and they did nothing to 
prevent cocaine from floating into the US. The State Department selected 
known drug trafficking companies,  who where already flying for  the 
Contras,  to deliver aid to the Contras.  CIA suggested that  the known 
drug trafficking companies were used. DEA cleared a known and major 
trafficker, who supported the Contras, to cross the US border, and they 
facilitated contract between known drug traffickers and CIA, for CIA to 
buy used drug trafficking equipment off  the traffickers.  The President 
and the White House intervened to have the sentence reduced for a ma-
jor trafficker, who had been instrumental in the Contra operation, and 
the President signed guidelines that allowed CIA to aid in drug traffick-
ers. It was the government policy from the highest place to aid and abet 
drug trafficking.
Blandón and Meneses were engaged in drug smuggling beginning  
in the early 1980s. Both were Contra sympathizers who may have  
played some role in local FDN chapters at some point. And both  
gave some of their drug profits to the Contras. The harder ques-
tions, the ones that the OIG cannot answer definitively, are (1) to  
what extent did Blandón and Meneses funnel drug profits to the  
Contras? and (2) to what extent were Contra leaders aware that  
they were receiving drug money?348
348 DOJ 1998, chapter 4.B.7
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Both CIA and DOJ denied that cocaine proceeds were used to finance the 
Contras as the amounts the traffickers gave were minor. As to the second 
question DOJ can not have studied CIA’s report, as it confirms that the 
CIA created Contras choose to engage in drug trafficking, hence the Con-
tras knew they were receiving drug money. As to the first question both 
CIA and DOJ admits that they have no clue about the amount of drug 
proceeds that was donated to the Contras. Still CIA and DOJ claims that 
the amount must have been minor as two traffickers who worked for 
them testified that they only donated around $40.000 each. The Kerry re-
port documents that other traffickers too donated equipment and cash. 
One trafficker sold a DC-3 for $1 and paid for the fuel to fly the plane to 
Central America. Another donated $100.000 a month. It is hard to believe 
that Blandón and Meneses donated less than $80.000 as Blandón also said 
that he scarcely made a dime as most of the profits when to Meneses and 
the Contras. The two official reports claimed that it was only a minor 
amount that  Blandón and Meneses contributed to  the  Contras,  which 
was far from enough to fund the Contras.  Therefore,  the reports con-
cludes, the Contras was not funded with drug proceeds. It is a logical 
contradiction stating that the Contras did receive drug money but was 
not funded by drug money. Let us let the contradiction pass and specu-
late a bit.
The Torres sold 1 ton of  cocaine every month which equals 1  million 
grams per month, if they just made $10 profit from every gram then their 
monthly profits would be $10 million. This number is likely too low, as it 
would have taken the Torres 25-50 month to accumulated the $250-500 
million that they had not managed to get out of the country. Since it is es-
timated that the worlds cocaine production and consumption were on its 
highest point in 1986 and therefore prices on their lowest, the same year 
that the Torres had $250-500 million floating around in Los Angeles, then 
the accumulation time must either have been even or the profits. If the 
accumulation time is already too high, then it must have been the profits 
that was higher. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the profit 
have been between $20-$40 per gram. If 1% of the Torres brothers’ profit 
went to the Contras then their monthly contributing would have been 
between  $200.000-$400.000.  Another  drug  trafficker  George  Morales 
donation around $100.000 per month to the Contras. With numbers like 
these then the Torres and Morales contribute 15-25% of Saudi Arabia’s 
monthly donations. We know that the Torres were smaller scale dealers 
than Blandón and Meneses, and that they too funnelled cocaine profits to 
the Contras. If profit margins and/or the donated share were higher than 
Meneses’ organisation could easily be one of the major contributor to the 
Contras. According to the official numbers from the Iran-Contra investig-
ation,  then Morales  contributed 4-5% of  the  Contras’  budget  between 
1984-1986. The official figure is presumable to low, and therefore Morales 
pro cent vice donation too high. The value of weapons, airbases etc. left 
behind after US military drills is not included in the official figures. But 
the official figures including the secret DOD aid is presumable too high 
too as  the Iran-Contra  investigation documented that  merely a  minor 
amount of the funds actually went to financing the Contras. 2/3 ended up 
in the pocket of subcontractors. The Contras were through their history 
always short on cash. All in all, a pro cent comparisons seems to be on 
the low side then calculated with one pro cent donation of the profit; 
keep in mind that funding the Contras, at least in Morales case, meant 
that CIA insured free and unhindered access to the US349.
When the senatorial subcommittee investigation of the cocaine affair, the 
government did what it could to sabotage the investigation. Subcommit-
349 Walsh 1993
Webb 1998
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tee staff suspected that members leaked information as were the case. 
Every step in the investigation was leaked to the State Department from 
where it was passed on to CIA and the White House. The committee un-
covered considerable evidence during its investigation,  and concluded 
that individuals who helped finance the Contras were involved in drug 
trafficking, that the resupply network was used for drug trafficking, that 
the Contras knew they received drug proceeds, and that in each case US 
Government agencies knew about the drug trafficking either while or im-
mediately after it occurred. CIA knew that the Contras had engaged in 
cocaine trafficking, but it was not only CIA who knew. The administra-
tion did what it could to prevent the Senate from investigating the co-
caine affair.  The subcommittee  requested that North’s notebook would 
be  made available to them. The committee received a partial copy that 
was censored. Of the 2848 pages half were partial censored and some 
completely blacked out. The subcommittee found 543 pages with refer-
ences to narcotics or terrorism. Because of these references the subcom-
mittee subpoenaed a full and uncensored copy of the notebook, but nev-
er received it350. In North’s notebook there are two entries I will quote:
wanted A/C to go to Bolivia p/u paste -  want A/C to p/u 1500  
kilos351
14M to finance came from drugs352.
A/C refers to aircraft and p/u to pick up, i.e. someone wanted an aircraft 
to fly to Bolivia and pick up 1500 kilos of paste. Paste can of course be 
any kind of paste material, i.e. toothpaste, tomato paste etc., but the most 
350 Kerry 1989a, 36, 147-150
351 Kerry 1989a, 146
352 National Security Archive. The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations, Documentation of Official U.S. Know-
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famous paste in Bolivia is its cocaine paste. The second quote could mean 
that the pharmaceutical industry were funding the Contras too. Neither 
explanation is credible. Known and convicted drug traffickers were not 
conducting  covert  flights  on behalf  of  CIA with tomato paste  for  the 
pharmaceutical industry.
CIA not just knew, they condoned the cocaine trafficking. The southern 
front commander Cesar testified in front of the subcommittee that he had 
told his CIA contact about the deal with Morales, who supplied the Con-
tras with both money and aircrafts. Cesar said that CIA told him that it 
was all  right.  Morales testified too for the subcommittee.  He believed 
that he became protected because of his connection to the Contras. Mor-
ales though so, because he knew FBI had been tipped off about one co-
caine shipment, but did nothing to prevent it from entering the country. 
Morales thought that DEA and FBI knew about his involvement with the 
Contras353. Ivan Torres made a similar statement to an informant, whom 
was regarded as reliable. The informant reported that Torres had said 
that  CIA knew about  his  drug activities,  but  that  they did not  mind. 
Torres told the informant that CIA in fact had gone so fare “as to encour-
age cocaine traffic by members of the Contras because they know that it is a good  
source of income”354. Torres claimed he was in contact with both FBI and 
CIA representatives because of his involvement with FDN, and that his 
CIA contact had told him to stay away from Blandón, because Blandón 
was about to get arrested, as it did happen soon after the informant re-
ported the conversation355. When the DOJ and CIA reports were about to 
be published ten years after the affair, the reports where withheld be-
cause the DOJ feared that the publication would jeopardize on going in-
vestigations. This means that the cocaine affair that occurred in the 1980s 
353 Castillo 1994, 143
354 DOJ 1998, chapter 2.G.2.B.4
355 DOJ 1998, chapter 2.G.2.B.4
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was still under investigation 15 years later; that is a pretty long time, es-
pecially  compared to  the  short  time it  took the  Majors  to  investigate 
Blandón.  Police  first  learn of  the  Contras’  cocaine  connection in  May 
1983, when an they caught an accountant for the Medellín cartel356.
What strikes me as being odd, is  that although the Contras never de-
veloped planing or intelligence capacities on their  own, although CIA 
drafted  the  unification  document,  rented  the  house,  footed  the  bills, 
trained them and planed their mission,  then the Contras were able to 
make one, and only this one, decision on their own to finance themselves 
through cocaine trafficking.
When Webb researched for his article, he tried without luck to get an in-
terview with Blandón. While Webb was attending Ross’ third trial; the 
one in which Ross was convicted and sentenced to life in prison for help-
ing a friend buy a kilo of cocaine off Blandón who worked for DEA at the 
time, Blandón walked into the court shielded by US Marshals. He was 
seated in  the  row just  in  front  of  Webb,  who leaned over  and asked 
Blandón one more time for an interview. Blandón said that he did not 
mind, but that DEA would not allow him to talk to Webb. During the tri-
al the defence had been kept in the dark about who Blandón was. The de-
fence knew that Webb was researching the Contras’ cocaine connection 
as Webb had interviewed Ross’ while he was waiting to go on trial. Since 
government had handed nothing over to the defence about the identity 
of Blandón, the defence asked Webb for help. Webb agreed and drew up 
a list of questions for the defence. He would get the interview; indirectly 
but under oath. Blandón had testified for the prosecution in the trial that 
he stopped selling cocaine for the Contras in 1982, 1983, 1984 and again 
356 Democracy Now, The CIA-Contra Cocaine Connection, 20 July 1998
Cockburn 1999, 54
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1986. There had been a few slips in the attempt to place the supposed 
break between Blandón and the Contras, that would show a direct link 
between the Contras and Ross’  crack enterprise in Los Angeles.  Later 
Blandón testified before the Senate and admitted that he did indeed con-
tinue to selling cocaine for the Contras throughout 1985. When it was the 
defence turn to question Blandón he was asked if he had kept the cocaine 
proceeds himself357:
“No Sir. Let me explain one thing. When we meet – when we raised  
money for the Contra revolution, we received orders from the –“ He  
paused and looked at [US Attorney] O’Neale.  O’Neale stared at  
him. “From other people.”358.
O'Neale was the US Attorney who had Blandón’s sentencing reduced to 
28½ months and a $50 fine. The investigation showed that Blandón had 
sold at least two tons of cocaine; a bit more the ten kilos limit which car-
ries a mandatory sentencing of ten years to life. When Blandón was sen-
tenced he had already been detained for 28½ months during which he 
had worked for DEA. Therefore he was able to leave the court as a free 
man359. Jack Blum, the attorney who was in charge of the subcommittee 
investigation between 1986-1988, testified before the Senate’s Intelligence 
Committee in 1994.
If you ask whether the United States government ignored the drug  
problem and subverted law enforcement to prevent embarrassment  
and to reward our allies in the contra war, the answer is yes360.
357 Webb 1998, 427-436
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Conclusion
It is clear beyond reasonable doubts that the Contras were involved in 
cocaine trafficking, and that it was a political decision within the Contras 
to traffic drugs as a means of finance. That is documented in CIA’s re-
port. It clear from the reports too that quite a few of government employ-
ee were involved with the Contras’ cocaine connection; a trait that be-
came more obvious after the Contra operation was transferred to Oliver 
North in the White House. There is no definite evidence that Meneses 
did work for CIA, but strong circumstantial evidence points towards that 
conclusion which is what several FBI and DEA agents believed too. It is 
certain that Meneses worked for DEA while he was smuggling cocaine 
into the US and sending part of the profits back to the Contras. The evid-
ence suggest that Meneses started working for DEA in 1981; the same 
time as we begun to peddle drugs for the Contras.
DEA’s involvement in the affair proves that it was not just a rouge opera-
tion where a few dirty agents worked with some majors drug traffickers 
to promote the Contras. DEA helped facilitated contact between CIA and 
drug traffickers of whom CIA bought equipment.  CIA decided which 
drug related companies the State Department should use in the Contra 
operation. The State Department showed an extreme interest in monitor-
ing the Senate’s investigation into the affair, and asked as the first ques-
tion  if  there  was  any  indication  of  administration  complicity  in  the 
crimes.  The investigation into  Meneses,  Blandón and Lister  points  to-
wards that there was a link to the DIA too, who was involved in setting 
up arms manufacturing plants in Central America. This assumption is 
supported by the fact that DEA, FBI, Customs and LASD believed Me-
neses to be involved in guns for drugs swaps. When evaluating the evid-
ence we end up with a long list of government agencies, which includes 
DEA, the State Department, DOJ, DOD, and the White House, who was 
active in the affair. FBI and DEA were resultant to investigate the infor-
mation they received on the cocaine link. DEA, FBI, LASD and Customs 
had information, which showed that the Contras were involved in large-
scale  drug trafficking,  and  possible  with  the  aided  of  CIA.  The  1982 
Memorandum of Understanding allowed CIA to work with traffickers 
without having to report their activities to law enforcement.
Information came forward, which showed that the government was com-
plicit in the drug trafficking, but the information was never used. Some-
how people refrain from attempting to jail several members of the cabin-
et, if not the President or the Vice President. Arresting the sectary of de-
fence or -justice is not likely to help your career, nor your boss’ if he ap-
proved it. It was no secret that the Contras were directed by CIA and had 
President Reagan’s full support. Any investigation into the Contras’ co-
caine  link  would  bring  the  investigators  into  conflict  with  the  White 
House as, even if untrue, it could be used to smear the Contras. If true, 
when an investigation would uncover government complicity as the Ma-
jors  quickly realised.  People who handled information concerning the 
Contras’ cocaine trafficking would most likely show a certain sensitivity 
towards the point, that neither you nor your boss would be likely to be-
nefit positively from trying arrest your head of state, his staff, or the cab-
inet for drug trafficking. Some did, which is why we today have docu-
mentation that the cocaine link did exist. None was promoted.
As to the question of what evidence there exists, which shows govern-
ment complicit in drug trafficking, the answer is short. CIA’s own report 
documents that the government knew about the Contras’ drug traffick-
ing, but did everything possible to discredit the information. DOJ’s re-
port confirms the same points. The Senate’s investigation in the 1980s 
Page 65 of 71
documents the same points, and documents from the State Department 
shows that the investigation where closely monitored by the administra-
tion. From neither CIA’s not DOJ’s reports is it clear that the government 
did participate in the drug trafficking, but plenty of suspicious instants 
points in that direction. There is the links to CIA in the Frogman case, 
where CIA is worried that it would appear as if they funnelled money 
into drug trafficking, then there is DEA facilitation of contact between 
CIA and drug traffickers, and the fact that Meneses worked for DEA and 
possible CIA too while he smuggled tons of cocaine into the US, there is 
the link between DIA/CIA and Lister, there is Blandón’s testimony that 
the Contras was ordered to smuggle drugs, there is the drug connected 
CIA agent Ivan Gomez, there is the Majors who believed that the govern-
ment was sanction the cocaine trafficking, there is the Senate report that 
documented numerous instants’ were North’s notebook referred to drug 
trafficking, the lead investigator who said that the government had sub-
verted  law enforcement  and rewarded the  traffickers  and their  allies, 
there is North’s two emails about flying cocaine paste and using drug 
money. Then there is Webb’s research that clearly shows that there was 
something rotten going on, but falls short of documenting actual govern-
ment participation. 
What  we  end  up  with  is  a  very  long list  of  circumstantial  evidence, 
which includes the reports from the Senate, CIA, DOJ and North’s emails 
that FBI seized during the Iran-Contra investigation. We have Webb’s re-
search. This collection of document proves that government knew that 
drug trafficking was going on without interrupting it. That is a severe 
crime in the US. What we do not know is if the government directly par-
ticipated or helped the traffickers smuggle cocaine into the US. So did the 
Contras’ get ordered to traffic drugs as Blandón testified? We can not 
know for sure, but it seems to be the case if we can trust reason and logic. 
CIA created, directed,  and funded the Contras.  It  seems odd that  the 
Contras would make a decision, which would risk end US support. CIA 
had a well established network of informants and assets within the Con-
tras, which the Contras must have known as they were the ones who 
worked for CIA. As we know, and as the Contras’ leadership must have 
known too, CIA knew what happened inside the Contras. Therefore it 
seems odd that the Contras’ made one independent decision, one that 
should risk antagonising CIA. Several of the involved traffickers have at 
one point or another claimed that CIA knew and encouraged the traffick-
ing because it was an effective means to raise funds. The three official re-
ports documented that the government chose to paid traffickers tax dol-
lars to fly the same route that they smuggled cocaine along. The circum-
stantial evidence points towards one conclusion, which is the only reas-
onable conclusion to draw: the government participated knowingly and 
actively in cocaine trafficking; it was a CIA ordered and directed opera-
tion that had the White House full support.
Perspective: a Policy Failure
As we have seen the US police allowed large-scale trafficking of cocaine 
into the US in order to build and maintain the Contras. There have only 
been minor hints in my report about the drug trafficking of the US allies 
in Central America. The rulers in at least Panama and Honduras were al-
lowed to traffic cocaine into the US in order to maintain their coopera-
tion, which was vital in order to keep the Contras running. With this dir-
ect  cocaine-pipeline  from  Colombia  the  government  inflicted  massive 
pain on their population. The domestic cocaine consumption rose in the 
1980s and created countless numbers of addicts, destroyed both families 
and lives. The problem was made worse as the cocaine was converted 
into crack. The government did not decide that the cocaine should be 
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turned into crack, or that it should be sold in the black neighbourhoods, 
but that was what did happen. The government bears a large part of the 
blame, not just, for letting the cocaine into the country, but for protecting 
the traffickers.
Did the US policy archive its aims in Nicaragua? The answer depends on 
how the aims are defined, was it  containment,  eradication or  punish-
ment. A ceasefire was signed between the Sandinistas and the Contras in 
1987, and in 1990 the Sandinista lost the election and left the government 
offices. Where the aim to remove the Sandinistas from power then the 
Contras failed, as it was achieved through a democratical election. By the 
early 1980s the US had realised that the Contras were unable to archive a 
military victory. The US friendly government that come to power in 1990 
had been heavily funded by the US throughout the election campaign. 
More money was spend per capita, compared to the seize of the econom-
ic, than during the US presidential campaign in 1988. This amount were 
minor absolutely minor compared to the money spend on the Contras. 
Monetarily the Contras were a failure too if the aim was to remove the 
regime. The US had officially spend at least $350 millions on the failed at-
tempt to create a successful insurgency; the cost was likely several billion 
dollars higher. More billions were spend on supporting regional allies 
like Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama. Mining the Nicaragua’s 
harbours, which resulted in the sinking of foreign vessels and killing of 
foreign sailors, did not help the US’ international image. That the Inter-
national Court of Justice in Hague convicted the US for sponsoring and 
aiding terrorists in Nicaragua did not help nor did the US’ subsequent 
refusal to uphold international law. Where the populations paid in blood 
for  cocaine,  the  US  paid  with  its  prestige  for  the  destruction  of 
Nicaragua. After seven years of war the country was mellow for peace, 
which could only be achieved if the government was changed; it was. 
The US wore Nicaragua down in economical and human terms. If that 
was the aim of the policy, then it was highly successful.
It was and is obvious that the US could not and would not tolerate ‘an-
other Cuba’ on the mainland. The revolutionary sentiment needed to be 
contained to protect US interests and allies in Central America from un-
rest and the change of revolution. Corruption, poverty and injustice are 
major catalyst for unrest. Both corrupt and poverty was and still is wide-
spread in Central America.  When life, liberty and the pursuit of happi-
ness can no longer be pursued, people have the right to alter or abolish 
the government and institute a new to secure their safety and happiness. 
But successful political reform, which reduces the amount of injustice, is 
bound to create a demand for change else where. Nicaragua’s successful 
economical  reform  therefore  threatened  US  interests  in  maintaining 
status quo. Too often the US have mistaken change for socialism.
The Carter administration had establish a diplomatic relationship with 
the Sandinistas, allowing them freedom to choose within rules as defined 
by the US. The Carter administrations initial success suggests that politic-
al change could have occurred within Nicaragua without breaking its al-
liance with the US. The high-level of trade and investment made it neces-
sary for any government in the region to maintain friendly relations with 
the US. Nicaragua could have been a social-reformed country had the US 
accepted political reform and pluralism in Central America without fear-
ing that it automatically lead to the deployment of soviet missiles. The 
reformation could have occurred without terrible costs in human lives, 
and without growing resented in Latin American, but it was not to be. It 
appears that the US wanted punishment and war.
The US blockade of the Nicaraguan attempt to buy arms from France 
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meant that Nicaragua was forced into the arms of the Soviet bloc. The 
Reagan Administration deliberately pushed Nicaragua into an alliance 
with the Soviet Union, and thus gained its casus belli for a war against 
Nicaragua. It appears that the major factor for US hostility towards polit-
ical change in Central America was the fear of communism, and change 
was perceived as communist subversion. The US history of interventions 
in the Americas means that independence movements in Latin America 
almost automatically assumes an ‘anti-gringo and -imperialist’ stance. By 
reacting to the ‘anti-gringo and -imperialist’ stance as thought it would 
automatically lead to a pro-soviet regime in the US, the US made it diffi-
cult to achieve peaceful and US friendly political change in the Americas.
With the political logic hard wired to this pattern – if you’re not with us, 
you’re a communist thread – a conflict was bound to emerge. Successful 
left-wing political reform in Nicaragua strengthen the left-wing in the 
neighbouring countries and thereby lead to a higher level on social un-
rest  as  political  reforms  were  repressed.  Nicaragua’s  political  system 
needed to be changed to preserve stability in the region, and until that 
happened Nicaragua’s neighbours needed to be strengthened. The Con-
tras was the US instrument of punishment, and the Nicaraguans needed 
to be punished for allowing left-wing radicals to seize power. Nicaragua 
served as a warning to other. The US administration choose war instead 
of diplomatic containment, and the war funds came, at least, partial from 
the cocaine sales.
During the 1980s,  then CIA and the  US Government  allowed cocaine 
enter the country, the Colombian cartels grew from being small criminal 
networks in Colombia to big international well established cartels. The 
administrations insistence on war and punishment, meant that massive 
drug trafficking was allowed to keep the war in Nicaraguan running.
The US cost of war was not only paid for in reputation, but also with the 
lives of addicts too; the decade of crack babies. There is the price of the 
addicts life and the crime that most addicts have to resort to to finance 
their addiction, and there is the emotional costs to the relatives. The side 
effects is not that the addicts crime that hurt society, it is that the money 
the addict gains through crime is funnelled back into organised crime in 
a money flow that is so fat that law enforcement can not compete on a 
financial basis. It is impossible to keep up with the traffickers whom can 
afford the latest equipment as Gen. Gorman testified before Congress. If 
power corrupt, then even more so does drug money, which can buy po-
lice officers , politicians, and presidents.
Remember the scenes from ‘Miami Vice’, based on the 1980s drug war 
between Colombians and Cubans in Miami.  Remember the true story 
about George Jung in ‘Blow’, or the painted description in ‘Traffic’. The 
battle is impossible to win and lost long before it is fought.
Beside it is illegal, and some would say immoral, the main problem with 
the US Government’s complicity in drug trafficking with the Contras, is 
not the human costs. It is that it strengthened the Colombian cartels and 
organised crime, and weakened the governments of the Americas.
Funding the Contras through cocaine sales was a total and complete fail-
ure, if  the US wanted to remove the Sandinistas, as they were still  in 
power when the Contras laid down their weapons. The only way it can 
be viewed as an success is if the aim was either punishment or strength-
ening the Colombian cartels. The strengthening of the cartels was a clear 
and visible side-effect, but it was hopefully not the intended aim. Only 
God and CIA knows how many tons of cocaine were flown in on CIA 
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sponsored flights.
The policy failed and the Colombian cartels won the war.
Intermediary
The subject had proven to be a most interesting subject, and – to my sur-
prise – an almost unreported subject too. The subject is to important to 
continue to go unreported as US Government involvement in drug traf-
ficking is not just a serious offence, and a way to divert funds to covert 
operations, it is a certain way to strengthen organised crime while pois-
ing the populations of both producer and consumer countries.
First, while studying the subject you come across several true ‘short stor-
ies’ that seems to incredible to believe. These stories – like North, White 
House  and  Gen.  Bueso  Rosa,  CIA’s  Venezuelan  Cocaine,  the  secret 
memorandum of understanding from 1982, or Lister that tells the Colom-
bian Mafia to fuck off after stealing $500.000 from them – all have the 
properties needed for being published as short articles, which I will at-
tempt to do as soon as this paper has been handed in. It is too important 
to let go – CIA and White House complicity in drug trafficking.
Secondly, my theses will be published on the Internet, and should be up 
and running at http://www.lallepot.dk around the time I hand it in. At 
first the format will just be simple homepage, but in time I will assemble 
the documentation and publish it too with link reference between this 
paper and the the documents too ease the task of verification. With an 
ongoing collection of documents and related information, I will try to set 
up a database of names and incident to help further public research.
Thirdly, the material I have used is excellent for teaching source critic, as 
for example the White House publication of the picture which Reagan al-
leged documented that the Sandinistas where involved in cocaine traf-
ficking with Pablo Escobar and the Medellín cartel. This story is not in-
cluded in this paper as it is not relevant to my focus, but it would be ex-
cellent for the study of source critic with plenty of official claims to the 
story’s truth, denials from DEA to the contrary, the Kerry report which 
contains reference, just like North’s notebook that indicates that Reagan’s 
claim is false, and independent researchers who is divided. As the task of 
building and develop a website with a database is huge, I will not be con-
structing any educational material,  but  I  truly believe that  the subject 
would be the perfect subject to use for teaching source critic – it is contra-
dictory,  and perhaps more  important,  it  might be able to  capture the 
minds of teenage boys as it involves the secret services, government con-
spiracies, organised crime and drug trafficking, the main ingredients for 
a Hollywood thriller.
Fourthly, this subject needs far more research done. We have two great 
books  on  the  subject,  Peter  Dale  Scott’s  Cocaine  Politics,  and  Gary 
Webb’s Dark Alliance. The first deals with the international settings in 
which the cocaine alliance unfolded, whereas the second investigates the 
domestic settings of one of the cocaine connections describe in the first. 
We have three important official report on the subject, CIA’s, DOJ’s and 
the US Senate’s. First two are attempts of white wash, and the third, al-
though the Contras are a minor issue for it, could definitely be used for 
more throughout research, especial the two last volumes. There is a lot of 
official material mostly collected in connection with the Iran-Contra af-
fair, some of is bound to be related to the Contra cocaine affair. There is a 
need for researching and describing all this material, i.e. the books, offi-
cial reports, and declassified documents, into one very thick and compre-
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hensive account of what did happened. On the other hand the is the do-
mestic policies in the US, the propaganda campaigns, the foreign policy, 
the cold war; and on the other side of the other hand, is the situation in 
Nicaragua, it is policies and alliances. And to make an comprehensive ac-
count of what happened, there is a need to put into it is proper context in 
order to understand why it happened. In short, there is material enough 
for a long range of publications and books.
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